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Zusammenfassung 
Diese Arbeit beschäftigt sich mit der Reaktion von Menschen auf Risiko. Risiko 
bezeichnet das Produkt des negativen Nutzens möglicher Konsequenzen eines Ereignisses 
oder einer Handlung und deren Auftretenswahrscheinlichkeit. Risikowahrnehmung hängt 
demnach von der Integration von Wahrscheinlichkeitsurteilen und Urteilen über die 
Schwere der möglichen Konsequenzen eines Ereignisses ab. Über diesen rein rationalen 
Ansatz hinaus wurde gezeigt, dass dieser Prozess auch von affektiven Prozessen 
beeinflusst wird. Das Zusammenspiel von rationalen und emotionalen Prozessen auf die 
Informationsverarbeitung wird in Zwei-Prozess-Modellen beschrieben. Es wird 
angenommen, dass die Reaktion auf ein riskantes Ereignis, d.h. die Bewertung für das 
eigene Wohlbefinden (Risikobewertung) oder auch Entscheidungen zwischen riskanten 
Optionen (Risikoentscheidung) von der Risikowahrnehmung abhängen. Experimentelle 
Studien nutzen Risikoentscheidungen oder die Risikobewertung eines riskanten 
Ereignisses, um auf die zu Grunde liegende Risikowahrnehmung zu schließen. Die 
vorliegendene Arbeit zeigt jedoch, dass sich Personen mit unterschiedlicher 
Risikowahrnehmung in ihrer Risikobewertung nicht unterscheiden müssen. Diese 
Inkongruenz von Risikowahrnehmung und Risikobewertung geht möglicherweise auf 
Anpassungsprozesse zurück. Außerdem wurde in dieser Arbeit beobachtet, dass die 
Risikoneigung nicht nur von den zu erwartenden Konsequenzen für die eigene Person, 
sondern auch von Konsequenzen für andere Personen, abhängt. Beide Befunde stellen die 
Annahme, dass Reaktionen gegenüber Risiken allein auf der Risikowahrnehmung basieren, 
in Frage. 
Der Einfluss von Anpassungsprozessen auf die Risikowahrnehmung wurde bisher 
nicht betrachtet. Um Anpassungsprozesse und ihren Einfluss auf die Risikowahrnehmung 
zu untersuchen, wurde eine Interviewstudie mit internationalen humanitären Helfern im 
Sudan durchgeführt. Die Interviews thematisierten die Wahrnehmung und Einschätzung 
von Risiken, die individuelle Risikobewertung und persönlichen Anpassungsmechanismen, 
welche genutzt werden um mit persönlichen Bedrohungslagen umzugehen. Während sich 
die Risikowahrnehmungen zwischen TeilnehmerInnen unterschieden, war die Sorge um 
die eigene persönliche Sicherheit bei allen TeilnehmerInnen niedrig. TeilnehmerInnen, die 
ein hohes Risiko wahrnahmen, schienen sich durch die Aktivierung von selbstregulativen 
Prozessen an die Situation anzupassen und deshalb nur geringe Sorge für das eigene 
Wohlbefinden zu empfinden. 
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Das Model der Assimilation, Akkommodation und Immunisierung wurde als 
theoretisches Rahmenmodel verwendet, um diese Anpassungsstrategien zu untersuchen. 
Das Muster der individuellen Bewältigungsstrategien, die Risikowahrnehmung, die Sorge 
um die persönliche Sicherheit und die Begründungen der Bewertung wurden als Indikator 
für die Aktivität der Anpassungsprozesse verwendet. Die Muster deuten bei 
TeilnehmerInnen, welche ein geringes Risiko wahrnahmen, auf die Aktivierung von 
Immunisierungsprozessen hin, d.h. sie nahmen, trotz objektiver Bedrohungslage, kein 
erhöhtes Risiko war und empfanden daher keine Sorge für die eigene Sicherheit. 
TeilnehmerInnen, die das Risiko hingegen als hoch einschätzten, zeigten eine Aktivierung 
von Selbst-Regulation. Die unterschiedliche Aktivierung der zu Grunde liegenden 
selbstregulativen Prozesse scheint die Beziehung zwischen Risikowahrnehmung und 
Risikobewertung zu beeinflussen. 
Ein weiterer Faktor, der möglicherweise die Beziehung zwischen der 
Risikowahrnehmung und der Risikobewertung der InterviewteilnehmerInnen beeinflusste, 
war das Ziel, welches mit der Entscheidung verfolgt wurde, in einem riskanten Kontext 
tätig zu sein. TeilnehmerInnen mit erhöhter Risikowahrnehmung gaben an, anderen 
Menschen helfen zu wollen, während jene mit niedriger Risikowahrnehmung dies nicht 
taten. Dies führte zu der Annahme, dass erstgenannte TeilnehmerInnen auch deshalb wenig 
Sorge für die eigene Sicherheit empfinden, weil sie, aufgrund der Möglichkeit, anderen zu 
helfen, bereit sind, die Wichtigkeit der eigenen Sicherheit abzuwerten. In zwei 
Experimenten wurde daher der Frage nachgegangen, ob Menschen eher geneigt ein Risiko 
einzugehen, wenn die riskante Handlung einer anderen Person nützt? 
TeilnehmerInnen mussten Entscheidungen zwischen riskanten und sicheren Optionen 
treffen. Dabei betrafen die Entscheidungen in einer ersten Bedingung nur sie allein 
(individueller Kontext), in einer zweiten Bedingung (within-subjects), sie und eine andere 
Person (interpersoneller Kontext). Die Auszahlungen im interpersonellen Kontext 
variierten hinsichtlich der Verteilung der Gewinne zwischen dem Entscheider und der 
anderen Person. Die abhängige Variable war die Risikobereitschaft, gemessen durch die 
Anzahl von sicheren Entscheidungen. Im ersten Experiment wurde die Darstellung der 
sicheren Option (sicherer Gewinn vs. Preis für Ticket zur Teilnahme) zwischen den 
TeilnehmerInnen variiert (between-subjects).  
Es wurde angenommen, dass die Berücksichtigung der Konsequenzen für andere im 
interpersonellen Kontext zu weniger risikoscheuen Entscheidungen führen würde. Die 
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Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Personen in interpersonellen Entscheidungen eine höhere 
Risikobereitschaft haben als in individuellen Entscheidungen. Die Manipulation der 
Darstellung der sicheren Option hatte hingegen keinen Effekt. Im zweiten Experiment 
wurde daher die Salienz möglicher persönlicher Verluste erhöht. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass 
kein Unterschied in der Risikobereitschaft zwischen den Entscheidungskontexten mehr 
gefunden wurde. Die Salienz möglicher Verluste scheint also pro-soziales Verhalten in 
interpersonellen Kontexten zu beeinflussen. 
Die Befunde im Rahmen dieser Arbeit führen zu der Annahme, dass die Reaktion 
gegenüber Risiken nicht nur auf der Risikowahrnehmung beruht. Reaktionen auf ein 
Risiko fußen nicht nur auf der Integration von gegebenen Wahrscheinlichkeiten und 
Konsequenzen, sondern hängen auch von moderierenden Situationsfaktoren und 
mediierenden Anpassungsprozessen ab, welche die individuelle Repräsentation der 
Situation beeinflussen. Um den Zusammenhang zwischen Risikowahrnehmungen und 
Reaktionen gegenüber Risiken besser zu verstehen, muss der Fokus der Forschung über die 
Wahrnehmung des Ereignisses oder der Handlung hinaus die Anpassungsprozesse des 
betroffenen Individuums und den Einfluss situationeller Faktoren untersuchen. 
 
4 
 
Abstract 
This thesis examines the response of people to risk. Risk is defined as the product of 
an event’s disutility and the probability of its occurrence. Risk perception then refers to the 
integration of perceived probability and subjective value of a consequence. Going beyond 
this rational approach, the risk-as-feelings-hypothesis posits that risk perception is also a 
function of the immediate affective reactions to a possible event. A number of dual process 
theories that aim to integrate these two processes have been brought forward. It is assumed 
that risk perception determines the response to risk such as the appraisal of risk and 
decisions about risky options. Studies generally infer risk perceptions from reactions to a 
risky option such as choice behavior. The present research, however, shows that the same 
response to risk can be observed in individuals with different risk perceptions, possibly due 
to adjustment processes. Furthermore, it was found that an individual’s propensity for risk-
taking depends not only on personal consequences but also on consequences a choice 
option is expected to have on another person. Both findings question the assumption that 
responses to risk are exclusively based on risk perception.  
In order to examine adjustment processes and their role in risk responses interviews 
were carried out among international humanitarian aid workers working in the Sudan. 
There they are faced with objective risks due to ongoing armed conflict. The interviews 
focused on individual risk appraisals and the adjustment strategies employed by the aid 
workers in order to function in their working environment. It was found that while risk 
perception differed between participants, the concern for personal safety did not differ. 
Those high in risk perception are assumed to rely on self-regulative processes for 
adjustment and therefore experienced low concern for personal safety.  
The model of accommodation, assimilation and immunization processes was used as 
a theoretical framework to examine adjustment. The coping strategies employed, the risk 
perception and the concern for personal safety, as well as the reasoning about the degree of 
personal concern, were used as indicators to infer the activated adjustment processes. The 
patterns of participants who perceived a low risk indicated a high activation of 
immunization processes and as a result those participants did not perceive the security 
situation as a problem and did not engage in self-regulation. The group of participants who 
perceived a high risk acknowledged the security situation as a problem and engaged in 
self-regulation.  
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Another factor identified in the interviews which might explain the relationship 
between risk perceptions and concern for personal safety was the personal goal for 
working in a high risk context. The group of participants who reported that the security 
environment was volatile and risky considered the benefits for others of their risky choices. 
In contrast, the participants who reported low concern, because they perceived the 
environment to be generally safe, did not mention the implications of their actions for 
others. This gave rise to the assumption that participants who view risk-taking as a means 
for helping devalue the importance of personal safety and as a result experience less 
concern. This assumption was explored further in two experiments. 
Two experiments were carried out in which participants were faced with choices 
between safe options and lotteries. The dependent variable was the risk attitude of 
participants displayed in their choices between a risky and a certain option. Participants 
made choices that only affected themselves (individual choice context) and choices that 
affected themselves and another person (interpersonal choice context). Experimental 
groups differed regarding the formulation of the certain option. In one group the certain 
option yielded a sure gain, in the other group the certain option presented the price to pay 
to participate in the lottery. It was assumed that if the outcomes of others matter, 
participants should be less risk averse in choices that affect others and themselves than in 
choices that only affect them individually. The first experiment found evidence that people 
consider the outcomes of others in risky choice, and are willing to take higher risks in 
interpersonal contexts independent of the formulation of the certain option. However, in 
the second experiment it was found that when payment for the lottery was made salient 
people ceased to behave prosocially. This leads to the conclusion that the salience of 
personal loss presents a moderator of the relationship between other regarding preferences 
in interpersonal risky choices and decision making. 
This thesis shows that responses to risk are based not only on the calculation of given 
probabilities and outcomes associated with an event or object, but also depend on 
moderating situation factors and mediating adjustment processes. In order to further 
understand the relationship between risk perception and responses to risk the focus of 
research needs to move beyond the object or event associated with the risk itself and needs 
to integrate the reactions and adjustment processes of the individuals affected by it as well 
as situational characteristics. 
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Introduction 
If the clouds are full, they will empty 
rain on the earth; and whether a tree falls 
south or north, the place where the tree 
falls, there it is.  
Those who watch the wind do not 
sow, and those who observe the clouds do 
not harvest. 
In the same way that you do not know 
what is the way of the wind or how the 
bones are formed in the mother’s womb, so 
you do not know the work of God, who does 
all things.  
In the morning plant your seed and 
do not let your hand rest at evening. For 
you do not know which will succeed, 
whether this or that, or whether both will 
do equally well. 
Ecclesiastes 11:3-6 
The writer of Ecclesiastes confronts us with a problem we face every day: a world 
that we cannot fully predict nor control. Our actions and choices are influenced by 
assumptions about the likelihood and impact of events that can have positive or negative 
consequences. The term “risk” is used as a measure to express the perceived danger of an 
object, event or action with multiple possible consequences, as the product of its 
probability and its perceived disutility (Aven, 2008; Breakwell, 2007). This thesis focuses 
on the question of how we perceive risk, judge its significance for our personal well-being 
and take action in the face of risk. 
As I am writing this introduction, CNN reports that two humanitarian aid workers 
from Belgium and Indonesia were killed in Mogadishu, Somalia, while providing medical 
assistance to the local population (CNN, 2011). While people generally exhibit dislike 
towards situations with unknown outcomes, it seems that some are willing to work and live 
in situations that involve the possibility of personal harm. One particular example is 
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humanitarian aid and relief workers deployed in countries with ongoing armed conflict. 
According to Stoddard and colleagues (Stoddard, Harmer, & DiDomenico, 2009), 2.4 per 
10,000 international humanitarian aid workers became victims of violence in 2006-2008 
world-wide. When looking at specific nations in the same period, two stand out: 90 
incidents of major violence on humanitarian personnel happened in the Sudan and more 
than 70 in Afghanistan, which in relative terms is presumed to be about 27 per 10,000 
international humanitarian aid workers. The likelihood to experience major acts of violence 
in those countries is roughly eleven times as high as compared to the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, in relative numbers the likelihood to be affected by acts of violence is low 
(0.27%), but considering that the humanitarian community in the respective countries is 
very connected, it can be assumed that people know others who were affected by violence 
personally. This is likely to affect how they perceive their safety. How are people able to 
work and live well in a context of ongoing threat?  
This question is particularly important since September 11
th
, 2001 and the fall of the 
Twin Towers in New York City. Security within the Western world can no longer be taken 
for granted. The bombings in Madrid (March 11, 2004) and bombings in London (July 7, 
2005) have further increased the feeling of threat. Civilians have increasingly become 
targets of terrorism. While the probability of becoming victimized is slim, the stakes are 
high. After experiencing these events that presented major crises, people adjusted their 
behavior (avoided public transport) and levels of fear and perceived risk increased sharply. 
These changes only prevailed for a limited amount of time before they returned to a normal 
level (Burns, Slovic, & Peters, 2011). While the study of Burns et al. (2011) reports the 
general aggregated behavior, individual psychological processes are not examined. A 
better understanding of the processes underlying adjustment to an environment that cannot 
be considered safe but in which possible sudden threats may occur is necessary. 
Government policy responds to security incidents by attempting to increase public security 
through new regulation and safety procedures, but is this the only way that people’s feeling 
of safety increases?  
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It is a widely held assumption that risk is negative and has to be avoided and the term 
risk-taking (the preference to take a risk rather than to choose a safe payoff of equal value
1
) 
has the connotation of reckless behavior. Perhaps the negative connotation of risk-taking is 
influenced by the definition of risk as “product of the probability of a negative event and 
its severity”, which only considers negative outcomes. The question has often been asked 
why people take risks and choose actions that might lead to negative personal 
consequences. In this context leisure activities (e.g., mountaineering) or behaviors such as 
unprotected sex, and smoking can be named as examples of such risk-taking behavior (see 
Parker & Stanworth, 2005). Another example that is often cited by the media coverage is 
about people who choose to live and work in countries that are regarded as unstable. The 
media often conveys the message that people who work in such contexts “receive good 
payment for their courage, or rather their carelessness” (Dahlkamp & Wassermann, 2007, 
p. 62, quote translated by the author). The general assumption of journalists as well as their 
readers seems to be that people who freely choose an occupation which involves risks are 
either pursuing a “death wish”, are not aware of the situation they are in, or are individuals 
that are seeking “thrilling” experiences.  
In psychological theories the term risk is often used in conjunction with decision 
making as well as perception. When decisions are made between options whose outcomes 
depend on probabilities, they are regarded as decisions under risk (Lopes, 1983). This leads 
to an important distinction of risk perceptions and decision making under risk. While risk 
perception focuses on how the risk (i.e., the potential harm) of an event or object is 
evaluated, decision making under risk (risky choice) tries to predict and explain choices 
between options where at least one option involves consequences that depend on 
probabilities. Thus, the assessment of personal security is a function of risk perception, 
while the choice to engage in a specific action is an example of a choice under risk. The 
choice under risk involves risk perception, but risk perception does not require a choice.  
The perception of risk is associated with an event or an object and depends on the 
associated dread, newness and control (e.g., Johnson & Tversky, 1984; Slovic, 1987; 
Slovic, Fischhoff, & Lichtenstein, 1984). Emotional reactions associated with an outcome 
                                                 
1 The value of a given option is assumed to be calculated based on the outcomes affecting only the decision 
maker. 
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and experience with a given situation influences the use of probability information when 
judging a risk. For example, when asking a person about the risk of skiing, it is assumed 
that the answer will present an estimate for the perceived danger of skiing. The estimate 
depends on the person’s valuation of breaking an arm or a leg in terms of severity as well 
as on the assumed probability of an accident. The emotional reaction to the outcome 
breaking a leg can either be neutral or negative, for example a person might dread breaking 
a leg, and as a result not the likelihood but the mere possibility determines the evaluation 
of the danger of skiing. The picture becomes more complex when considering that 
probabilities are not acquired from statistics, but usually shaped by experience. For 
example, people who ski regularly are more likely to experience skiing as safe, provided 
their experiences has been accident-free. This example demonstrates that in order to 
understand risk perception and choices involving risk, one needs to consider the influence 
of feelings as well as experiences in addition to information concerning outcomes and their 
probabilities.  
When people are confronted with a situation that presents a challenge to them, it is 
assumed that they adapt either by influencing the environment or by adjusting themselves 
(e.g., Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Karoly, 1993; Rothbaum, Weisz, & Snyder, 1982). 
However, theories focusing on decisions between risky options define the attractiveness of 
choice options as a function of its consequences and their probabilities alone (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). It is important to note 
that while risk perception is assumed to be influenced by considerations of control and 
newness, the study of decision making under risk does not consider these aspects 
explicitly. Furthermore, when assessing risk perceptions in surveys and experiments, 
people are asked about the subjective probability as well as the perceived severity of 
possible negative outcomes (e.g., Siegrist & Gutscher, 2006; Weinstein, 2000) but not 
about ways that they could act upon the possible risk. Thus, while control and newness of 
risks are identified as crucial components of risk perception, the ways people use strategies 
and knowledge to limit the impact of risks and how these in turn affect responses to risk 
have not been examined.  
The first aim of this work is to study the relationship between risk perception and 
responses to risk and how this relationship is influenced by adjustment strategies that 
people develop in order to feel safe in an environment of ongoing threat. In order to 
understand the influence of adjustment strategies on the relationship of risk perception and 
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resulting responses to risk, an interview study among humanitarian aid workers in the 
Sudan was carried out. 
Often decisions involving risk have implications for others, for example politicians 
make choices that are far reaching or experts recommend certain decisions based on their 
risk assessment. As a result, risky decisions which affect others (i.e., risky choice in an 
interpersonal context) should be an important research area. Surprisingly, the research on 
decision making under risk when it impacts others as well is scarce. The study of decision 
making under risk generally focuses either on choices people make for themselves or 
choices they make for others. People’s risk-taking in situations when another person is 
directly affected by the outcomes of one’s choices has not been examined.  
For this reason the second part of this thesis examines how risk-taking changes when 
the choice also affects others. The aim is to show that people are willing to take risks in 
order to benefit others when they perceive the risky option as entailing an opportunity for 
helping.  
Taken together, this work investigates the influence of adjustment and social benefits 
on risk perception and risk-taking. Current theories of risk perception view risk perception 
and risk-taking as a result of a one directional judgment process focusing on the event. 
Internal processes and actions of the individual influencing the event or the situation 
associated with the risk are not considered. Hence, in order to examine risk perception and 
risk-taking from a transactional perspective, multiple theoretical perspectives have to be 
considered and integrated.  
First, in chapter two it is argued that adjustment processes and risk perceptions are 
interdependent when viewing risk perception as a process embedded in the general 
psychological and physiological functioning associated with the response to challenges in 
the environment of the individual. However, theories of adjustment and risk perception 
present two independent lines of thought in the literature, decision making under risk and 
the adjustment to adversities.   
Second, an introduction into decision making under risk will be given in chapter 
three. Expected utility theory and prospect theory are introduced as models explaining 
choices as a function of probability and valuation of outcomes. This will be complemented 
by research showing that experience influences choice, and research showing that risk-
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taking is not only a function of probabilities and valuation of consequences in terms of a 
deliberate process but is also influenced by feelings.  
Third, research focusing on the adjustment to adversities is presented in chapter four. 
The concept of resilience is explained and it is argued that resilience refers to healthy 
adjustment. It is shown that resilience is influenced by adaptive processes guided by self-
regulation. Thus, theories of self-regulation are reviewed and related to resilience by 
drawing on research into stress and coping.  
Fourth, in chapter five an interview study among humanitarian aid workers is 
reported which examined the role of adjustment for risk perception and risk-taking. The 
findings from these interviews raised the question of whether the willingness to take risks 
(in choices) is influenced by possible consequences of those choices for others.  
Fifth, to answer this question, literature concerning prosocial behavior stemming 
from economics and psychology is reviewed in chapter six. This brought about the 
question of how people’s propensity for risk-taking changes when another person is 
affected by the outcomes of their risky choice option but does not benefit from choosing 
the certain option, which means to avoid all risk.  
Sixth, in order to answer this question two experiments were conducted. The 
experiments are described and their findings are discussed in chapter seven.  
Lastly, the findings of the two experiments and interviews are discussed together in 
the final chapter. 
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Towards a Transactional Perspective on Risk Perception and Responses to Risk 
The perception of an event which can have multiple consequences with different 
probabilities is captured by the term risk perception. Theories which explain responses to 
risk, generally assume that responses to risk are directly related to the perceived risk. 
Experiments use the measure of responses to risk such as judgments and choices as a 
measure of perceived risk. Responses to risk can either be manifest in actions or judgments 
about the significance of the risky event or action. Actions in the face of risk will be 
referred to with the term risk-taking and judgments will be referred to as risk appraisal. 
However, risk perceptions are distinct from responses to risk as the research on response to 
personal threat in ambiguous situations suggests. It is assumed that personal safety is a 
basic human need (Maslow, 1954). If this need is not satisfied the person experiences 
anxiety and fear, leading to physiological activation with the goal of being ready to either 
fight the threat or flee from it (e.g., Lovibond, Craske, Hermans, & Vansteenwegen, 2006). 
The unspecific activation of the physiological system aimed to adjust to situational 
demands is called stress. Stress is induced when the homeostasis of a biological system is 
challenged (Selye, 1991). The literature on stress yields three different perspectives, each 
of which results in diverse definitions of the term stress: the reaction oriented perspective, 
the stimulus oriented perspective and the cognitive-transactional perspective. The central 
characteristics and how the three approaches differ will be described briefly below. 
The reaction oriented perspective yields research which focuses on the physiological 
reaction in response to stimuli and views the increase of corticoids as the central 
phenomena of stress (Toates, 1995). An example for this perspective is the definition of 
stress presented above. 
The stimulus oriented approach focuses on events that are perceived as stressful. 
Specific events are examined and ranked according to their stressfulness. An example for 
this approach is the quantification of stress experienced in specific life events such as the 
birth of a child, unemployment or death of a spouse (Elliot & Eisdorfer, 1982; Kanner, 
Coyne, Schaefer, & Lazarus, 1981).  
The stimulus oriented as well as the reaction oriented approach cannot explain why 
people differ in their reaction to the same stressor and why the same person responds 
differently to the same event at different points in time. Therefore, it was proposed by 
Lazarus that stress does not depend on the stimulus or on the physiological reaction alone, 
but on the interpretation of the event through the individual. This is the central idea of the 
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cognitive-transactional model of stress (Lazarus, 1966). The model assumes that two 
interdependent processes govern the adjustment to stressors in the environment: appraisal 
and coping (Lazarus, 1966, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The central function of 
appraisal is “to mediate the relationship between the person and the environment” 
(Lazarus, 1982, p. 1019). Appraisal induces emotions in varying intensity as a response to 
the implications of an event for one’s personal well-being. The appraisal process entails 
two steps. The first step, referred to as primary appraisal, is the perception and assessment 
of the event itself. When the event is appraised as threat, stress is induced. The second step, 
referred to as secondary appraisal, entails the assessment of one’s available resources to 
overcome the threat. After the situation is appraised, the person responds with coping 
(Lazarus, 1982, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). Coping presents to the response of the 
individual to the appraised situation; it is “a stabilizing factor that can help individuals 
maintain psychosocial adaptation during stressful periods; it encompasses cognitive and 
behavioral efforts to reduce or eliminate stressful conditions and associated emotional 
distress” (Zeidner & Endler, 1996, p. 25). The model is transactional because it assumes 
that the person and situation influence one another in a circular process and the 
experienced degree of stress in a given situation is always a function of appraisal and 
coping responses together. For this reason, when a person does not experience a situation 
as stressful, reasons can be found in the person’s primary and secondary appraisal of the 
situation and/or their coping response.  
The cognitive-transactional model of stress presents a meta-theoretical model. The 
structural components and also underlying processes are supported in empirical studies 
(e.g., Folkman, Lazarus, Dunkel-Schetter, DeLongis, & Gruen, 1986). The cognitive-
transactional model of stress implies that responses to a stimulus are not an immediate 
consequence of the perception itself, but are influenced by internal processes as well as 
situational factors. It is assumed that risk perception and responses to risk can be captured 
from by the cognitive-transactional model as a meta-theory and thereby structurally 
integrate risk perception, adjustment and responses to risk for two reasons. First, primary 
appraisal involves the judgments of the likelihood and valuation of possible outcomes and 
therefore is based on processes described in theories of risky choice. The outcome of 
primary appraisal is therefore considered to capture what is referred to as risk perception. 
Second, coping is based on processes of self-regulation (Aspinwall & Taylor, 1997; 
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Benyamini, 2009; Tesch-Römer, 1997) and leads to adjustment which then again 
influences appraisal. The response to risk can be found in the coping and the appraisal. 
The cognitive-transactional model of stress suggests that the assessment of personal 
safety (i.e., risk perception) is dependent on judgment regarding the expected course of 
events, their valuation, and on the coping resources and means available to the individual 
to control the possible negative course of events. Furthermore, it is implicitly assumed that 
the adjustment process itself affects the future primary and secondary appraisal which will 
again influence coping. Hence, when using the cognitive-transactional model of stress as a 
meta-theory the structure of constructs is as follows. Risk perception is one step in the 
process which leads to risk responses. When judgments are part of the response to risk 
concerning the significance of an event or object for the person, they are referred to as risk 
appraisal. When choices are part of the response to risk and present decisions between 
objects or events with probabilistic consequences, they present risk-taking. Most 
importantly, it is not assumed that risk perception is the only predictor of risk responses 
and risk appraisals do not reflect only risk perception. 
In the next chapter theories and insight into how people perceive risk and how they 
choose under risk will be introduced. Then, in chapter four, theories explaining processes 
and outcomes of adjustment will be described. Both independent lines of research are 
integrated in chapter five and research questions will be formulated.  
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Theories of Risky Choice 
Organizations and individuals working in situations yield hazard use ways to manage 
the risks to their health and functioning in order to avoid or limit harm. Operational 
security management focuses on the subjective feeling of safety of staff and on the security 
of the general mission. It is guided by the principal that risk is a function of probability and 
severity and both are independent. It is assumed that the responses to risk are exclusively 
based on risk perception and predicted by probability and valuation of outcomes. A 
possible event yielding a very low probability or events yielding low severity are regarded 
as negligible and are not considered as relevant for the risk perception of staff (Van 
Brabant, 2000). This chapter will present the theory behind this assumption and will 
present literature that challenges it.  
Two types of theories about choices involving probabilistic outcomes can be 
distinguished: normative and descriptive. Normative theories provide a framework of what 
a rational decision should look like. When knowing probabilities of outcomes and the 
value of those outcomes, a “rational choice” based on expected utility theory can be 
proposed if its axioms, which are explained below, are abided by (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947). Normative theories, therefore, provide a benchmark to identify 
violations of normative assumptions since they provide a rationale to make the “right 
choice” (Eisenführ & Weber, 2003). However, people violate the axioms of expected 
utility theory, leading to so-called choice anomalies. The introduction of prospect theory 
by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) provided a theoretical 
framework accounting for and explaining the violations observed, and presents an example 
for a descriptive theory of choice. It was shown that the assumptions of expected utility 
theory were not obeyed by the human decision maker because information processing 
influenced choice.  
Next, expected utility theory and prospect theory will be described. Then, the 
research focusing on cognitive determinants of choice anomalies will be described. This 
will be complemented by work focusing on the influence of feelings on decisions 
involving risk.  
Expected Utility Theory 
When people choose between two options, it is assumed that they pick the option 
with the higher value. In order to express value, usually money is used. While generally 
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apples and oranges cannot be compared, they could be compared if we translate into 
monetary value what they are worth. For example the value of one kilogram of apples is 
about 2.00€ and of oranges 3.00€. If both entities are expressed in terms of money, a 
choice between them is easy and follows the rule “pick the option with the highest value”. 
This is referred to as value maximization. Depending on the decision maker’s preference 
the value or the amount of money she is willing to spend on a kilogram of apples or 
oranges will change. However, when the outcome of each option is associated with chance, 
for example a lottery in which one can win apples or oranges, not only the value of the 
outcome but also the likelihood of the favorable outcome matters. One way to choose in 
such a situation could be to weight the value of each outcome with the respective 
probability. This is referred to as the expected value model (Eisenführ & Weber, 2003; 
Lopes, 1994). The expected value model implies that the value of an option is calculated 
based on the sum of the outcome values multiplied with their respective probability. For 
example, a person can choose between two different lotteries determined through tossing a 
six sided die. In the one lottery, option A, the person wins one kilogram of apples when the 
numbers 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 are up. Thus, the likelihood of winning in case of option A is 
       . In the other lottery, option B, the person wins two kilograms of oranges if the 
numbers 1, 2, or 3 are up. Thus, the likelihood of winning in case of option B is        . 
In order to decide between option A and B, the expected value (EV) should be calculated 
and the option with the higher value should be chosen, thus   (        )  
 
 
   
 
 
 
       and   (        )  
 
 
   
 
 
      . Under the assumption that people 
maximize expected value, a person should choose option A. Furthermore, a person should 
be willing to pay any amount up to the expected value of a given lottery. In case of a 
lottery identical with option B, the person participates up to a price of 1.5€. 
This model was challenged by the so called St. Petersburg Paradox. In a 
hypothetical game people are faced with a fair coin toss. In case of tails the coin will be 
thrown again and when heads come up the game will end. In whatever round   the game 
ends the player will be paid    ducats. The game proposed in the St. Petersburg paradox 
yields an infinite expected value since    ∑       ⁄
 
     . Given that the expected 
value of the presented gamble is infinite, it was surprising that when Bernoulli asked 
people how much they would hypothetically pay to participate in such a game, most people 
were only willing to pay a low fee to participate. This observation is a paradox under the 
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assumption that people strive to maximize expected value. For this reason, Bernoulli 
proposed people do not maximize expected monetary value, but a function of expected 
utility over the monetary value. It is assumed that utility functions capture the relationship 
between a physical magnitude of a given entity and the associated subjective value. For 
example, utility over money captures how the subjective values of monetary gains 
correspond to increasing amounts of money. Three different shapes of utility functions can 
be distinguished: linear utility functions, negative logarithmic utility functions and power 
utility functions (see Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Examples of utility functions. 
The shape of the utility function reflects assumptions about the characteristics of 
utility. Given a logarithmic utility function, a person with an additional gain of 5€ with an 
initial wealth of 10€ leads to a higher increase of utility than an additional gain of 5€ for a 
person who already owns 1000€.Given a linear utility function there is no difference in the 
rate of increasing utility depending on the initial wealth for a person. For a logarithmic 
utility function this results in the so called “marginal decreasing utility of wealth”, which 
implies a lower rate of increasing utility for a given increase in wealth, while a linear 
utility function implies that utility increases at the same rate independent of wealth. By 
assuming a logarithmic utility function over expected outcomes, the expected utility 
becomes finite, limiting the price people would pay to play the game. On this basis Daniel 
Bernoulli was able to solve the paradox (Lopes, 1994).  
The concept of utility maximization was formalized by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern (1947), under the name of expected utility theory. Options involving 
probabilistic outcomes are referred to as lotteries or gambles. A lottery or gamble    is 
characterized by a combination of possible outcomes and their probabilities of 
occurrence (                     ). It is assumed that the number of possible outcomes 
is finite (           ) and as a result, the sum of all probabilities assigned to these 
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outcomes    is 1 (∑   
 
      ). Each outcome    has a specific utility  (  ) and a 
probability of   . The probabilities and outcomes are objectively known. The shape of the 
utility function reflects assumptions about the characteristics of utility which are not 
known but are inferred upon based on preferential choices. When outcomes of a lottery 
have lotteries as a consequence, then they present a compound lottery. An example for a 
compound lottery is the game proposed in the context of the St. Petersburg Paradox.  
According to expected utility theory it is now possible to rank all possible outcomes 
according to their utility, which results in a so-called utility function. In order to establish a 
rank order over the options and derive a utility function for a given individual, the 
following assumptions have to be fulfilled (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947):  
The set of choice options and the related outcomes have to be known to the decision 
maker and a person has to be able to create a rank order of the options. If a person strictly 
prefers lottery    over lottery    it is expressed as         But if both       and 
      are true, the person is indifferent between both lotteries, expressed as      .  
In order to ensure a consistent ranking of more than two options, the ranking has to 
be transitive. Transitivity refers to the assumption that for any set of options   consisting of 
              it has to hold that if       and      , then       .  
For all lotteries           , there exists a scalar or probability    [   ] such that 
       (   )  . This implies that for any Lottery    between    and    a 
combination of    and    can be found that is as good as   , and the lotteries are 
continuous. 
If       is true, then adding another outcome    to both lotteries should not change 
the preference order. By adding    a compound lottery is created. The added lottery    
must be irrelevant for the choice between    and   , because for all probabilities   , with 
     (    )        (    )   is true, and the choice is independent of   . This 
axiom of independence is also called the axiom of substitution, since a lottery can be 
substituted by another lottery if a decision maker is indifferent between the two lotteries 
yielding equal outcomes with equal probability. 
A lottery that yields a higher probability of a preferred outcome is preferred over a 
lottery that assigns a lower probability to the same outcome if the other outcomes of the 
lottery do not change. If this is true, the monotonicity axiom holds. 
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If all these assumptions are fulfilled, then a decision maker who chooses lottery    
over    only if  (  )   (  ) maximizes expected utility.  
Utility is calculated based on absolute and not relative changes of monetary wealth. 
Thus, depending on the initial point of wealth, the same increase of wealth can lead to 
different increases of utility. For example a logarithmic utility function implies that the 
utility of a certain payoff      results in a utility calculated with  ( )     ( ). If a 
person has an initial level of wealth       then gains         the utility is  ( )  
  (    )      . For the same person the gaining of another        would result in a 
final wealth of         and would lead to an increase of utility with  ( )  
  (    )      . Thus, the increase of utility is lower than the increase of additional 
wealth. This is referred to as the diminishing marginal utility of wealth. An important 
implication of expected utility theory is its implied assumption concerning the risk attitude 
of a given individual and that the risk attitude depends on the curvature of the underlying 
utility function.  
Which of the two options    and    with    leading to a certain payoff of       , 
and    leading to       with       or to        otherwise should a person choose? 
Assuming a logarithmic utility function under the assumption that the marginal utility of 
wealth decreases, the lotteries utility is calculated as  (  )    (  )     (  )(   ) 
and  (  )    (  ). While the expected value of both options is equal   (  )    (  ), 
the utilities are not, we find that  (  )   (  ). Thus, the certain payoff with the same 
expected value yields a higher expected utility. The person with such a utility function is 
therefore risk averse and will prefer    over   . This example shows that the individual’s 
risk attitude depends on the underlying utility function. The shape of the utility function 
can be concave (risk averse), convex (risk seeking), or linear (risk neutral). The risk 
attitude determines the preference for risky options in choices, which is referred to as risk 
preference. The risk preference in choices is used to measure the underlying risk attitude.  
Turning back to the question of operational security this means that when a situation 
is assessed as yielding a low risk of security incidents, then a person following the above 
described rational rules should feel safe. The choice to expose oneself to a possibly 
negative event can either be explained based on the person’s risk attitude, or the valuation 
of the associated positive outcomes. In any case, after making the choice the person 
choosing the risky option should not feel any regrets or be concerned about personal safety 
if the risk of a given situation is not exceeding the previously agreed on threshold. To 
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argue on an empirical level if this is true or not seems rather difficult since to my 
knowledge no studies exist. However, the hypothesis underlying operational security 
management was falsified. Empirical studies show that rational choice rules which are 
assumed by expected utility theory seem inadequate to capture the outcomes of choices 
(for a review see Edwards, 1954). One prominent example of the violation of the 
independence axiom was pointed out by Allais (Allais, 1953). He shows that people seem 
to prefer certain outcomes over risky outcomes with the same expected value (the certainty 
effect). Another example are preference reversals, depending on the evaluation scale used 
for a given set of options, for example whether an option is chosen or priced (Hsee, 
Loewenstein, Blount, & Bazerman, 1999). Prospect theory was formulated to capture some 
of these phenomena and to explain why choice behavior of humans does not correspond 
with the choices predicted by expected utility theory. 
Prospect Theory 
In order to create a theory that is more adequate to describe actual choice processes 
Kahneman and Tversky developed prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). Prospect 
theory explains violations of expected utility theory in choices between risky prospects 
with a limited number of outcomes. Prospect theory moved beyond the “black box” model 
of expected utility theory by making assumptions about underlying information processes 
leading to the final choice.  
According to prospect theory the choice process entails two phases: editing of 
prospects and evaluation of prospects. The simple prospects used here have the form 
(       ); thus, one receives x with the probability p and y with the probability q. In the 
editing phase the options are organized and reformulated, this involves different 
transformations such as coding outcomes as losses or gains depending on a reference point, 
combining the probabilities that are identical within a prospect and discarding outcomes 
that are shared by all considered prospects. After editing the prospects, their value is 
calculated in the evaluation phase.  
The major differences from expected utility theory are: first, while expected utility 
theory assumes that final wealth determines utility of a gamble, prospect theory states that 
the value of a gamble is dependent on the relative change of wealth in respect to a 
reference point. Second prospect theory features two main elements that determine the 
value of a gamble: (1) the value function which is concave for gains and convex for losses 
and steeper for losses than for gains, and (2) the assumption of decision weights, which 
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imply a non-linear transformation of probabilities that overweights small probabilities and 
underweights moderate and high probabilities. The decision weight is not an expression of 
subjective probability but it is inferred from final choices and reflects the impact an 
outcome has on the decision. 
Prospect theory assumes that the value, denoted as V of each prospect is the product 
of the value of an outcome [ ( )] multiplied with the weighted probability [ ( )]. The 
value of a prospect (   ) is calculated with  ( )   ( )   ( )  This means that the value 
of a prospect depends on the likelihood of its occurrence and the weighting factor 
associated with the given probability.  
Prospect theory was extended in order to capture decisions involving more than two 
outcomes and became cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). By 
replacing the individual weighting function of each outcome with a cumulative one, the 
scope of the theory broadened and captured uncertain prospects as well as multiple risky 
ones. Further, cumulative prospect theory relaxed the assumptions regarding the decision 
weights: while they have to be equal for gains and losses in prospect theory, they can differ 
in cumulative prospect theory. Because neither the general assumptions, nor the general 
predictions of the theory changed for prospects with two outcomes, the following 
description will refer to prospect theory as described in the 1979 paper (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979) rather than to cumulative prospect theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). 
Prospect theory is made up of two elements, the value function [ ( )] and the 
weighting function [  ( )], which leads to a fourfold pattern of risk attitudes being 
predicted. If probabilities are moderate or high, the shape of the value and weighting 
function implies risk aversion for gains, risk seeking for losses. In the case of small 
probabilities, the weighting function implies risk seeking for gains and risk aversion for 
losses. It is important to consider the significance prospect theory places on the reference 
point, since it determines whether the choice is in the domain of losses or gains. As a 
result, prospect theory assumes that the formulation of the choice problem as gain or loss 
can severely influence the preference order. This was shown in the Asian Disease 
paradigm, where participants were asked whether they wanted to use a vaccine in order to 
prevent an outbreak of a disease. People’s preference for the vaccine, which saved people 
with a given probability, was dependent on whether the number of people saved or killed 
was presented as a sure outcome (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).This finding presents a 
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violation of the invariance axiom, according to which choices with the same outcome 
should lead to the same preference order.  
The value function and the weighting function are the two cornerstones of prospect 
theory and enable it to capture the phenomenon that people prefer certain outcomes over 
uncertain outcomes with the same value (certainty effect) and the phenomenon that people 
seem to become risk seeking when they are faced with sure losses (reflection effect). For 
this reason both are described in more detail below. 
The value function. 
Expected utility theory assumes that the subjective value (utility) of a given option is 
based on final states of wealth. Prospect theory proposes that the subjective value depends 
on the change of wealth in relation to a reference point. To make the difference between 
the two clear consider the following hypothetical problems that Tversky and Kahneman 
presented to students and the resulting choices of the participants which are presented in 
the brackets below. The numbering of the problems follows Tversky and Kahneman 
(1979).  
Problem 13:      
A: 6000 with probability  .25 B: 4000 with probability  .25 
    2000 with probability  .25 
N = 68 [18%]   [82%]  
Problem 13´:      
A‘: - 6000 with probability  .25 B‘: - 4000 with probability  .25 
    - 2000 with probability  .25 
N = 64 [70%]   [30%]  
The choices of the student sample reported in Problem 13 and 13’ violate expected 
utility theory because a person choosing A should also choose A’ or if choosing B should 
also choose B’. However, the choices are in accordance with prospect theory, and reflects 
the hypothesized concave shape of the value function in case of gains and the convex 
shape in case of losses. A hypothetical value function is depicted in Figure 2. 
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Figure 2: A hypothetical value function (taken from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 279). 
Depending on how far we move away from the reference point, the value associated 
with the outcome changes. If the relative value is lower than the reference point, then it is 
treated as a loss, if higher as a gain. Therefore, the shape of the function is concave above 
the reference point, and convex below the reference point. Furthermore, it is assumed that 
people place a higher value on losing a specific amount than on gaining the same amount. 
Thus, the change in value is steeper for losses than for gains.  
The weighting function. 
The introduction of a weighting function represents another crucial issue when 
comparing expected utility theory and prospect theory. While expected utility theory 
assumes that the utility of an outcome is weighted with its probability, prospect theory 
assumes that not only the value of outcomes is weighted using the probabilities, but that 
the probabilities of the event itself are weighted with a decision weight  ( ). As a result, 
the weight of events is based on a subjective factor π. “Decision weights measure the 
impact of events on the desirability of prospects, and not merely the perceived likelihood 
of these events. The two scales coincide, i.e.,  ( )   , if the expectation principle holds, 
but not otherwise” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p.280). A hypothetical weighting 
function displaying the described characteristics is depicted in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: A hypothetical weighting function (taken from Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 283). 
It is assumed that   is an increasing function of  , with  ( )    and  ( )    and 
low probabilities are overweighted  ( )   , while high probabilities are underweight 
 ( )   . As a result “the slope of   in the interval (0,1) can be viewed as a measure of 
the sensitivity of preferences to the changes in probability” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, 
p. 282). Small changes on the low end have a larger impact on judgment than the same 
absolute change on the higher end. Prospect theory proposes that people are more sensitive 
towards changes in little gains, losses and low probabilities than towards changes in big 
losses, big wins or high probabilities (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  
The weighting function is unclear in the areas of extreme probabilities. The theory 
stated that due to “limited abilities to comprehend and evaluate extreme probabilities, 
highly unlikely events are either ignored or overweighted, and the difference between high 
probability and certainty is either neglected or exaggerated; consequently, π is not well-
behaved near the end-points” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 283). It is important to 
distinguish overweighting and underweighting from over- or underestimation of 
probabilities. In the experiments testing prospect theory the probabilities were always 
given; thus, the estimation could not have had any influence.  
Two assumptions are central to prospect theory: first, prospects with small 
probabilities are overweighted in decisions due to the shape of the weighting function π. 
Second, the framing of a choice as a loss or a gain shapes risk attitudes because they 
determine the shape of the value function υ, because losing a specific amount is associated 
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with the same value as gaining it. “According to the present theory, attitudes toward risk 
are determined jointly by υ and π, and not solely by the utility function” (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979, p. 285).  
Implications for decision making under risk. 
Prospect theory suggests that the risk perception of an individual, and as a result their 
perception of security in a given situation (risk appraisal), should take into consideration 
how the possible outcomes of prospects are formulated. If people differ in regard of 
whether they perceive a situation or choice as a choice between losses, then they are more 
likely to opt for an option that involves risks than for the sure loss. An example in the 
humanitarian sector would be the choice between to enter or not to enter a specific area 
which is considered dangerous. If the choice options are formulated as one option A being 
the sure loss of life if nothing is done and another option B yielding a high probability to 
loose no lives and only a low probability to personally be harmed then people would be 
more likely to choose option B. In this case the person would choose a risky option. 
Furthermore, prospect theory suggests that people do not neglect events with a very low 
probability as one could assume when viewing risk perception as a result of probability and 
valuation of outcomes but rather overweight them in their choice and risk perception. This 
would explain why events that involve very negative outcomes (e.g., major acts of 
violence) lead to a high degree of perceived risk even if they are rare. In both cases 
described the individual staff member would behave more risk seeking (in the first 
example) are more risk averse (in the second example) than institutional analysis would 
suggest leading to a higher likelihood of security incidents in the first example and 
increased stress in the second example because the institution assessed the risk based on a 
rational principle which diverges from the way how people actually perceive risks. 
One important limitation of empirical tests of prospect theory is that payoffs were 
hypothetical and probability as well as outcome information was provided to the 
participants. This limitation is result of the gambling paradigm employed. The gambling 
paradigm studies decision making in a risky context by observing lottery choices. 
Decisions are referred to as decisions from description. Another approach to study 
decisions involving risk is to allow participants to make repeated decisions without prior 
knowledge, and thereby learn the underlying distribution of the outcomes through 
feedback. Decisions based on learning through feedback are called decisions from 
experience.  
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When probability information was gained through experience, decisions did not 
follow the patterns predicted by prospect theory which adds an important boundary 
condition to prospect theory (e.g., Barron & Erev, 2003; Barron, Leider, & Stack, 2008; 
Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2004). The perception of risk in “real life” is generally 
based on descriptive information as well as experience. Therefore the next chapter will 
introduce research findings giving insight into how experience shapes choice and how 
decisions are affected when experience-based information and description-based 
information is available.  
Decisions from Experience vs. Decisions from Description  
To examine experience-based decision making in experiments, the decision maker 
has to carry out repeated decisions. Each decision is referred to as one trial. One way to 
study experienced based decisions is the click paradigm. Participants are required to 
choose between at least two unmarked buttons and after pushing one of the buttons they 
receive feedback about the result of the choice (Barron & Erev, 2003). Can prospect theory 
account for those possible boundary conditions?  
One feature of the value function implied by prospect theory is loss-aversion. Loss-
aversion refers to the effect that “the disutility of giving up an object is greater that [sic] 
the utility associated with acquiring it” (Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1991, p. 194). Loss 
aversion is supported by the status quo bias that people dislike giving up what they have, 
and the endowment effect that people attach higher value to a given entity when they own 
it than when buying it (Kahneman et al., 1991; Thaler, Tversky, Kahneman, & Schwartz, 
1997). The effect of loss-aversion is also found in studies when people make decisions 
based on experience. It is observed that people choose options less that sometimes lead to 
negative payoffs even if this event is very rare (Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev, Ert, & 
Yechiam, 2007). 
Due to the value function and the weighting function, prospect theory predicts risk 
seeking when faced with sure losses and risk aversion when faced with gains. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) found that more than 50% of their participants changed their risk 
attitude when switching from a loss to a gain framing. When choices were between 
hypothetical payoffs, as was the case in the studies presented by Kahneman and Tversky, 
the reflection effect was replicated (Hershey & Schoemaker, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1981); yet, when payoffs were real, the evidence was less convincing (Laury & Holt, 
2005). The reflection effect was not found in studies where participants learned 
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probabilities and choice outcomes through experience instead of receiving them in 
descriptive form, but participants were also risk seeking when in the gain domain (e.g., 
Erev et al., 2007; Hollenbeck, Ilgen, Phillips, & Hedlund, 1994).  
The assumptions of the weighting function of prospect theory implies that rare events 
are overweighted compared to their objective probability of occurrence, which has been 
supported by a number of studies using hypothetical as well as real payoffs in lottery 
choices (e.g., Camerer, 2001; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). But in studies examining risky choices from experience, rare 
events were not overweighted as assumed by prospect theory, but underweighted (Barkan, 
Zohar, & Erev, 1998; Barron & Erev, 2003; Erev & Barron, 2005; Hertwig et al., 2004; 
Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Ido, 2006).  
The empirical evidence suggests that loss-aversion seems to hold independent of 
whether decisions are made from experience or description. However, the impact of 
framing a choice option as loss or gain did not lead to the reflection effect in cases where 
decisions were based on experience. The same was found for the assumption of 
overweighting rare events, questioning the shape of the weighting function. But why does 
experience alter choice behavior? The difference is suggested to be found in the cognitive 
processes. It is assumed that the order of experiences and characteristics of the distribution 
from which information is sampled, leads to the observed discrepancy (Barron & Erev, 
2003).  
The distribution of outcomes influences choices because the likelihood to experience 
all outcomes of an option is dependent upon the number of trials. When the number of 
trials is low the subject will on average not experience prospects that have a low 
probability, which are by definition rare. The observed distribution will deviate from the 
true distribution and the rare event will be underweighted in the choice (Hertwig et al., 
2004; Hertwig, Barron, Weber, & Erev, 2006). In cases where experience is limited (i.e., a 
low number of trials was carried out) people seemed to underweight rare events in their 
choices. But when the value of the gamble is calculated on the basis of the observed 
outcomes, the choices reflect the maximization of the expected value principle (Hertwig et 
al., 2004). Thus, when increasing the number of trials, choice behavior converges towards 
the prediction of the maximization principle, which was violated in the findings of the 
gambling paradigm.  
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Furthermore, it is argued that recent outcomes determine subsequent choice because 
recent experiences are more readily available. Studies find support for recency, showing 
that choice between options depends on the most recent outcomes, and because rare events 
have a low probability they are less likely to be among the recent experiences, and as a 
result will be underweight in decisions from experience (Erev et al., 2007; Halpern-Felsher 
et al., 2001; Hertwig et al., 2004; Yechiam, Erev, & Barron., 2006).  
The finding that recent experience and the distribution of outcomes shape decisions 
can explain why people often are hesitant to use safety devices, such as seat belts, or 
remove their radios from parked cars. They generally do not experience the “bad” outcome 
associated with those actions and therefore do not acknowledge the risk associated with 
their choices. Can warnings help to increase the use of safety devices? To receive a 
warning means to receive information from description. Particularly in cases where people 
have information stemming from experience as well as description, the order when the 
information was received matters. In study examining the impact of warnings on 
experience-based choices it was found that warnings had a stronger effect on risk-taking 
behavior when it was given before the actual experience any choices were made. If the 
subject showed the risk-taking behavior before and received a positive payoff, the warning 
also lead to lower risk-taking in subsequent choices; however it was still significantly 
higher than in the other group (Barron et al., 2008). The finding that increased experience 
can lead to a decrease of security awareness and increase the likelihood of accidents is 
supported in field studies and surveys (Barkan et al., 1998; Musahl, 1997; Teigen, 1998). 
Although, if people had experienced the negative outcome, they became very aware of 
potential risks associated with a given option or event and use protective measures or do 
not choose the respective option (Benight, Cieslak, Molton, & Johnson, 2008; Bereby-
Meyer & Erev, 1998; Weinstein, 1989).  
The consideration of whether the information about choice options was based on 
experience or description and the associated principles of learning can explain well the 
underweighting of rare events in decisions from experience, but not why people tend to 
overweight them in decisions from description. Perhaps a reason can be found in the 
outcome itself rather than its probability.  
So far mostly research considering the likelihood of the events, learning and the 
outcome in terms of monetary value was presented. However, an important underlying 
assumption of the presented models is that outcome quality does not matter. What happens 
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if outcomes do not differ regarding their monetary value but regarding their affective 
valence? The next section will argue that feelings associated with outcomes of a given 
prospect can influence choices directly.  
Risk as Feelings  
Johnson, Hershey, Meszaro and Kunreuther (1993) examined the willingness to pay 
for insurances in the context of flying and discovered that insurances against terrorist acts 
were sold at a higher price than insurances against “all possible causes”. The finding is 
surprising since the insurance against all possible causes obviously covers more instances 
than just the insurance against negative events caused by terrorist acts. The authors argue 
that the reason people are willing to pay more for insurances covering only one event is 
due to the vividness of their image compared to the abstraction of all possible causes. As a 
result the negative event associated with a terroristic act is assumed to induce a stronger 
emotional reaction and therefore, this particular insurance has a higher likelihood of being 
purchased. “Emotion consists of neural circuits (that are at least partially dedicated), 
response systems, and a feeling state/process that motivates and organizes cognition and 
action. Emotion also provides information to the person experiencing it, and may include 
antecedent cognitive appraisals and ongoing cognition including an interpretation of its 
feeling state, expressions or social-communicative signals, and may motivate approach or 
avoidant behavior, exercise control/regulation of responses, and be social or relational in 
nature” (Izard, 2010, p.367). The research focusing on the influence of emotions on risk 
focuses on the phenomenological aspect, the subjective feelings evoked by a stimulus and 
how it influences decision making. Mood and affect present two forms of feelings. While 
affect is linked to the specific situation and relatively short lived and not necessarily 
mediated by cognition (Zajonc & Markus, 1985), mood is considered rather diffuse since it 
can last over longer periods of time and as a result does not depend on a specific present 
stimulus (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). Judgment and decision making is 
influenced by two distinct types of emotions: immediate emotions and anticipated 
emotions.  
Anticipated emotions present an outcome of a decision and are not present during the 
judgment and the decision process. They are considered part of the value of a specific 
outcome and not experienced during the decision making process (Loewenstein & Lerner, 
2003; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001).  
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Immediate emotions are experienced during the decision making process and can 
either be incidental or anticipatory towards possible outcomes. An example for the effect 
of incidental emotions is the influence of moods on decisions (Loewenstein et al., 2001). It 
was found that a good mood leads to optimistic judgments while bad mood leads to 
pessimistic judgments (Bower, 1991; Johnson & Tversky, 1983). Furthermore, mood 
impacts social judgment (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994; Bodenhausen, Sheppard 
et al., 1994; Bower, 1991), depth of information processing (Bless et al., 1996), and 
attention focus (Bower, 1991; Frijda, 1988; Zajonc, 1980). 
Anticipatory emotions are emotions present during the judgment and decision 
making process and are evoked by the potential consequences. The risk as feelings 
hypothesis postulates: “responses to risky situations (including decision making) result in 
part from direct (i.e., not cortically mediated) emotional influences, including feelings such 
as worry, fear, dread or anxiety” (Loewenstein et al., 2001, p.270). Characteristics of a 
choice situation that have little or no impact on cognitive evaluations can influence 
emotional reactions and thereby influence choice outcomes. Examples of such factors are 
immediacy of a risk (Wu, 1999), vividness of consequences (Elster & Loewenstein, 1992) 
and affective valence of outcomes (Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 
2001). The emotional account can explain why waiting longer for the occurrence of a 
hazard leads to a decrease of fear (Monat, 1976) or why fear increases immediately before 
the moment of truth (Welch, 1999). 
The model of risk as feelings exceeds previous models in two points. First, it 
proposes that feelings can arise directly from probability and outcomes without cognitive 
antecedents. Second, cognitive evaluations are partly mediated through affective responses.  
Rottenstreich and Hsee (2001) carried out three experiments to test whether affective 
valence of outcomes influences choices directly. In the first experiment they asked 
participants to choose between kisses and money. It was varied between-subjects, whether 
the choice was between sure outcomes or between outcomes with a low probability. It was 
found that students preferred money when there was guaranteed payoff, but preferred 
kisses when they were merely probable. The findings were replicated in a second study, 
showing that students were willing to pay more for a lottery possibly leading to a vacation 
than for a scholarship of equal value. In a third experiment the price of gambles involving 
strong negative affective valence were found to be relatively insensitive to changes in 
probability, while this was not the case with neutral gambles. The results indicate that 
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when choices involve small probabilities they are more likely to be affected by the 
affective valence of outcomes and, second, in outcomes yielding high affective valence, 
the mere possibility not the probability determines choice (see Hsee & Rottenstreich, 2004; 
Slovic, 2007; Slovic, Peters, Finucane, & MacGregor, 2005). 
The risk as feelings hypothesis tries to explain the role of feelings during the 
processing of probabilities and thereby affecting choices. A more direct relationship of 
feelings and choice is proposed by the affect heuristic. The affect heuristic assumes that the 
affect induced by a specific stimulus shapes both the perceived benefit and the perceived 
risk (Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Slovic et al., 2005). A study from 
Alhakami and Slovic (1994) found an inverse relation between the perceived risk and the 
perceived benefit of an activity. The results were linked to the affective judgments of the 
activity. If affect is positive, benefit is judged as high and risk as low, whereas if affect is 
negative, the effect is reversed. Finucane and colleagues (2000) tested the affect heuristic 
by comparing two experimental groups, time pressure vs. no time pressure. It was found 
that without time pressure the analytical process would govern the judgment rendering the 
correlation between risk and benefit low, while time pressure would lead to the use of the 
affect heuristic which would lead to a high correlation between risk and benefit. In a 
second experiment the same authors showed that affect was determined by either benefit or 
risk. The results of the study support the assumption that “positive and negative affect is 
attached to the images that people associate with hazards and is available when risk and 
benefit are judged” (Finucane et al., 2000, p.14). 
It is assumed that the more vivid, emotional laden pictures are associated with a 
specific outcome, the more easily they are recalled and lead to an overweighting of such 
outcomes in choices (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic et al., 2005). One 
way that emotions can be induced when judging risks can be the format of how 
probabilities are presented (Slovic, 2007). For example, warnings were more effective 
when associated with vivid affect-laden scenarios rather than just numbers (Hendrickx and 
Oppewal, 1989). Slovic, Monahan and Mac Gregor (2000) found that describing events in 
probabilities rather than frequency formats lead a lower risk perception of acts of violence 
and a lower affective activation. It is assumed that frequency formats activate mental 
images while probabilities do not. When the presentation of probabilities exceeds one (1 in 
100 instead of 0.1 in 10), the low probability events are overweighted (Koehler & Macchi, 
2004). In their exemplar cueing theory Koelher and Macchi (2004) assume that people 
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become more sensitive to low-probability events when descriptions of those events make 
exemplars more readily available. The exemplars are triggered by presentations in 
frequency format where the numerator is equal or greater than one. This suggests that 
frequency formats make vivid pictures of events more easily available, the pictures induce 
affect which then influences the cognitive process and behavior. The observation that 
emotions impact decisions involving risk directly leads to an important question: how do 
both cognitive and emotional processes interact? 
Feelings or Analysis: Two Processes Competing to Guide Risky Choice? 
It is assumed that two modes of information processing systems guide decision 
making under risk. One is a rational, analytical system which is based on deliberate 
cognitive analysis and is referred to as “risk as analysis”. The other is the intuitive system 
which is governed by emotions, referred to as “risk as feelings” (Epstein, 2003; 
Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic et al., 2004; Slovic et al., 2005; Zeelenberg, Nelissen, 
Bregelmans, & Pieters, 2008).  
Yechiam, Barron and Erev (2005) show that the responses of residents living in areas 
in which terrorist attacks occur differ from those of tourists travelling to these areas. 
Tourist behavior is more affected by the occurrence of terrorist attacks than the behavior of 
residents. Yechiam et al. (2005) argue that the residents are less sensitive to the terrorist 
attacks because they grew insensitive to them through not suffering bad consequences from 
unsafe choices (i.e., going to a restaurant or café). The residents’ knowledge is shaped 
through experience, but the tourists’ knowledge about terrorist acts is shaped by 
description through media and word of mouth and not experience. The findings of 
Yechiam et al. (2005) could also be explained from the perspective that assumes an 
interaction between risk as analysis and risk as feelings. The descriptive information, 
received by tourists through the media, most probably led to an activation of the affective 
system resulting from the fact that media coverage usually uses vivid pictures, which 
evoke emotional reactions (Bond, 2008). As described above, if the rare event is affect-
laden, not its probability but its mere possibility shapes behavior (e.g., Rottenstreich & 
Hsee, 2001). The residents who do not experience the rare event, might rely more on their 
experiences and judge the threat according to its objective risk and are therefore not afraid 
to go on with life as usual since the rare event is not affect-laden. The experience as second 
source of information might function as a buffer against the affect induced by the media 
coverage, which is also available to residents.  
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A recent study examined the role of emotional and cognitive processes on choice. 
Using fictitious scenarios that involved threats to the subject, participants reported how 
great they perceived a risk to be in analytical terms and they reported the affect that they 
would feel in this specific situation. This was followed by a measurement of risky 
behavior, in which participants had to indicate their behavior in terms of likelihood of a 
certain behavior and certainty about their choice (van Gelder, de Vries, & van der Pligt, 
2009). The study was based on three experiments and the results supported the assumption 
that: (1) risky choice is dependent on negative affect as well as perceived risk, (2) that 
negative affect and perceived risk are correlated and (3) that if the information about the 
situation is represented in a cognitive or affective manner, it influences the weight of 
negative affect and perceived risk on the risky choice.  
The relationship between the analysis based information processing and affective 
based information processing is particularly relevant in the face of dread risks, which have 
a low probability of occurrence but severe consequences (Slovic, 1987). Through the 
induction of emotions, the perception of probabilities and the weight of prospects is 
altered; thus the analytical processing is influenced by factors that are not within the 
theoretical scope of the theories focusing only on the cognitive processing of risk 
(Finucane, Alhakami, Slovic, & Johnson, 2000; Loewenstein & Lerner, 2003; Loewenstein 
et al., 2001; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Slovic et al., 2005).  
The relationship between cognitive and emotional processes seems to be influenced 
by a person’s characteristics. For example, medical professionals see risk as a function of 
the statistical probability, which is influenced by the analytical thought; lay-persons’ 
knowledge concerning specific risks is limited and thus risk perception is more strongly 
influenced by emotions (Reventlow, Havas, & Tulinius, 2001). It was found that experts 
judge risks of biotechnology lower than laypersons. The best predictors of the risk 
judgment of experts were their knowledge and experience level within a specific situation 
whereas for lay persons it was the affect associated with biotechnology (Savadori et al., 
2004). When people gain experience in a specific field in which the judgment of risks is 
important, the influence of the emotional system on risk estimates decreases 
(Fetherstonhaug, Slovic, Johnson, & Friedrich, 1997). One reason why emotions lose their 
grip on risk perception with increasing experience might be the development of strategies 
of emotion regulation. Before turning to the role of adjustment from a developmental 
perspective, the next section will argue that one possible factor influencing the changing 
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risk estimates of experts could be their knowledge about emergency procedures and other 
ways to mitigate the negative impact of when a risk turned into danger. 
Risk Defusing Operators 
In natural contexts probability information is not always available and the outcome 
of an option is uncertain. The decision maker can influence probabilities and the severity 
of outcomes through their own actions. To identify which information is guiding the 
decision between two alternatives in a quasi-naturalistic context the active information 
search paradigm is applied (Huber, Beutter, Montoya, & Huber, 2001). In this paradigm, 
the participant can ask the experimenter questions to receive information about the action 
alternatives. 
Huber, Wider and Huber (1997) report experiments questioning the assumption that 
people primarily search probability information when faced with a risky choice. They 
argue that individuals actively search for ways to reduce the possibility of a negative event 
or influence the negative outcome through risk defusing operators. “A risk-defusing 
operator is an action, performed additionally to a specific alternative, which: may prevent 
the negative event, interrupt the causal chain between event and negative outcome, or 
transform the negative outcome into an outcome state, which is more acceptable” (Huber et 
al., 2001, p. 410). Three global types of risk defusing operators are distinguished: (1) worst 
case plans, (2) control and (3) precaution. It is assumed that risk defusing operators try to 
manipulate the two central components of risk: probability of the event occurrence and the 
negative utility of the negative outcome. For example worst case plans aim to avoid the 
negative consequences if a negative event occurs, and as a result the negative utility is 
reduced or even removed. It was shown that risk defusing operators are risk type specific 
(Wilke, Haug, & Funke, 2008). The existence of time pressure leads to an increased search 
for risk defusing operator but to a lesser information search in general compared to a no 
time pressure condition (Huber & Kunz, 2007). However, justification pressure increases 
general information search and search for risk defusing operators (Huber, Bär, & Huber, 
2009). Generally the information search behavior and risk defusing operator choice are 
shaped by the expectations concerning the possible detection of the negative event in time 
to defuse it, and expectations about the possibility to find a functioning risk defusing 
operator (Huber & Huber, 2008). 
Risk defusing operators aim to impact the two central components of risk: the 
probability of the event occurrence and the negative utility of the negative outcome. For 
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example, worst case plans aim to avoid the negative consequences of a negative event 
should it occur. As a result, the negative utility associated with an option is reduced or 
even removed. Risk defusing operators are a mean to choose an option which has 
outcomes that one desires as well as outcomes that are detested, if the latter can be 
influenced. The consideration of risk defusing operators as factors influencing the response 
to risk moves beyond the assumption of a human decision maker as responder to an event, 
which is implied by the assumption that risk perception is directly reflected by the risk 
response. Rather the decision maker becomes an active agent shaping the environment. 
Conclusion 
In the previous chapter two traditions that inform decision making theory were 
introduced. First a normative theory of choice under risk, expected utility theory was 
introduced. Second, in order to account for the violations of expected utility theory in 
human choices, prospect theory was introduced as a descriptive psychological choice 
model. Prospect theory presented theoretical assumptions as to why people deviate from 
normative standards. Choices among prospects that involve rare events seem to be 
particularly prone to judgment anomalies. It was found that the probability and 
overweighting or underweighting of the rare event is dependent on the informational 
source (Barron, 2008; Barron & Erev, 2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979) and the level of affect or emotions evoked by the outcomes present during the 
judgment process (Finucane et al., 2000; Loewenstein, 2006, 2007; Loewenstein et al., 
2001; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Slovic & Peters, 2006).  
The research on risk perception gives insight into general human functioning and 
points out important factors influencing risk perceptions and final responses to risk such as 
risk appraisals and risky choices. Probability and severity estimates influence how people 
perceive risks. Prospect theory and empirical studies suggest that both measures are not 
independent, but particularly when outcomes are affect-laden and lead to severe negative 
outcomes and/or have a low probability, information processing will be influenced by the 
emotional reactions to risk as well as experience. As a result, the analysis of situational 
appraisal needs to focus not only on risk estimates expressed as product of severity and 
probability but also on the emotional valence associated with possible outcomes of the 
prospects involved and whether a person learned about the uncertain events through 
experience or through description.  
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The research focusing on risk perception introduced above gives insight into general 
mechanisms of information processing without examining differences between individuals. 
The influence of an agent’s action on the probability and the outcomes of the risk and how 
this changes possible risk appraisal are not part of the theories. As a result the experimental 
conditions under which the studies cited above were carried out did not involve risks that 
could be influenced by the participants. Differences in how individuals perceive the 
situation are not considered. The next chapter will point out that risk appraisal might not 
only be a function of the risky event alone but also of the person facing the situation and 
coping with it. Theories focusing on differences between individuals, so called inter-
individual differences, regarding adjustment are introduced. 
37 
 
Theories of Adjustment to Adversities 
Living in a context of ongoing threat is assumed to present a challenge to the 
organism because two conflicting goals have to be balanced. The first goal is feeling safe 
when living in a context that yields ambiguous security. The second goal is acting safe 
which entails the necessity to acknowledge risks for personal safety in the environment in 
order to adjust behavior to it. As a result people have to balance both goals through 
development of strategies to feel safe and reduce feelings of personal threat while at the 
same time remain aware of threats to their person. To experience personal threat due to a 
lack of personal safety leads to anxiety and fear (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989). 
Anxiety and fear are associated with stress and its persistence over longer periods will have 
negative effects on the human physical and psychological functioning (Toates, 1995). 
Stress is also linked to anxiety and depression (Arborelius, Owens, Plotsky, & Nemeroff, 
1999), which in turn leads to low sleep quality (Palma, Suchecki, & Tufik, 2000; 
Wheatley, 1993). For these reasons, it is assumed that feeling unsafe over longer periods of 
time has negative effects on well-being and performance. How do people adjust to ongoing 
threat? Different lines of research try to answer this question. The first concept is coping, 
meaning the response and adjustment to stress. Second, one could argue that people 
working and living under conditions that yield ambiguous security need to be resilient. 
Resiliency is the ability to remain healthy despite adversities (Bonanno, 2005).  
This following section will introduce the concept of resilience. The degree of 
resilience of an individual presents a way to infer on successful adjustment. Research 
focusing on strategies of adjustment and their implications will then be portrayed. Then 
theories about the underlying processes of adjustment are presented. Finally, in the 
conclusion of this section, processes and strategies of adjustment are integrated in order to 
pave the way towards an understanding of how individuals become resilient. 
Resilience 
Research among high risk children (i.e., children who are facing developmental 
challenges such as low social economic status or an abusive home) led to the surprising 
finding that most of the children do well despite adversities and are considered resilient 
(Luthar, Cicchetti, & Becker, 2000). Two criteria have to be fulfilled in order to call 
somebody resilient: they have to have experienced substantial threat and the adjustment to 
it must have been successful. Resilience is therefore an outcome of successful adjustment. 
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Possible criteria of successful adjustment are: the completion of developmental tasks, or 
adherence to cultural expectation (e.g., Masten, 2001).  
Yet not only children but people in general face adversities in the form of life 
changes or loss over their life span. For example accidents or the loss of a relative can be 
potentially traumatic. An event is considered traumatic when it fulfills two criteria 
according to the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders ("Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV,"): first, the event entails witnessing or 
experiencing the threat of death, serious injury or the damage of physical integrity to self 
or other. Second, the person reacts to this event with a feeling of fear, helplessness, and/or 
horror. After experiencing a traumatic event and not being able to cope with it, people can 
develop a post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Individuals are diagnosed with PTSD 
when they fulfill three criteria ("Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: 
DSM-IV,"): unwilling revisitation of traumatic events in flashbacks or nightmares, 
hypervigilance, and retreat from life and relationships. However, people who after a 
“potentially highly disruptive event, such as the death of a close relative or a violent or 
life-threatening situation, […] maintain relatively stable, healthy levels of psychological 
and physical functioning” are considered resilient (Bonanno, 2004, p. 20).  
Adults are faced with a number of possibly traumatic events in their lifetime and 
show very different adjustment trajectories (Ozer, Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). Four 
typical trajectories can be distinguished for the disruption of normal functioning (i.e., 
increased sleep disruption, health problems, and difficulty concentrating): delayed onset, 
chronic, recovery and resilience.  
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Figure 4: Prototypical patterns of disruption in normal functioning (taken from Bonanno, 2004, 
p. 21). 
People who follow the delayed or chronic trajectory of adjustment after traumatic 
events still experience severe functional disruption two years later. While people with 
adjustment trajectories characterized as recovering or resilient show a return to normal 
levels of functioning after about one year following the traumatic event. Two important 
differences can be observed between the recovery and resilience trajectory: 1) the 
disruption of functioning and the experience of emotional distress are lower on the resilient 
trajectory than on the recovery trajectory , and 2) the trajectory of resilience indicates a 
quicker return to normal levels of functioning than the recovery trajectory (Bonanno, 2004, 
2005).  
It has long been assumed that resilience is some kind of trait that only a limited 
number of “special people” possess for two reasons. First, trauma research focused mostly 
on participants who show delayed or chronic adjustment trajectories of functioning after 
the experience of traumatic experiences and second, the grief work hypothesis, according 
to which in order to avoid delayed negative health outcomes people have to actively work 
through negative emotions (Bonanno, 2004, 2005; Masten, 2001). 
Contrary to the grief work hypothesis, people who do well after a loss or traumatic 
experience do not necessarily suffer from elevated risk to experience negative health 
outcome later in time (Bonanno, 2004; Stroebe, 2008). For example after terrorist attacks 
in September 2001 in New York the level of symptoms indicating PTSD was relatively 
low (Fredrickson, Tugade, Waugh, & Larkin, 2003). Similarly, when investigating a large 
sample of peacekeepers, 70% showed no increased symptoms of PTSD (Orsillo, Roemer, 
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Litz, Ehlich, & Friedman, 1998). Among humanitarian aid workers with potentially 
traumatic experiences 81-85% showed only low symptoms of traumatization (Eriksson, 
Kemp, Gorsuch, Hoke, & Foy, 2001; Jones, Müller, & Maercker, 2006).  
The picture changes when resilience is studied in situations of ongoing threat. A 
longitudinal study among Gulf War veterans with two point of measurement (Benotsch et 
al., 2000) examined the change in distress and coping resources. It was found that people 
who employed less avoidant coping, scored high on the hardiness scale and received social 
support were more likely to display low levels of distress during the second measurement. 
However, participants showing high levels of distress during the second measurement 
seemed to be employing less advantageous coping and reported a decrease of social 
support. This indicates that resilience is dependent on adjustment strategies. Hobfoll et al. 
(2009) examined the four different trajectories of adjustment (resilience, recovery, delayed 
onset, chronic) among residents in Israel during the second Intifada 2004/2005. They 
discovered that about 54% of the sample suffered from chronic distress while another 10% 
showed a delayed stress onset. The low number of resilient participants is explained by the 
decrease of psychosocial resources, such as social support and economical resources as 
well as social status, and the lack of post-traumatic growth. Post-traumatic growth refers to 
the experience of mastering a difficult situation, and this experience is unlikely, because 
the threat is ongoing.  
The duration of the threat influences whether people are resilient, because when 
adversities grow and resources decrease people cease to be able to adjust well and their 
healthy functioning is jeopardized. Thus, strategies that allow adjustment and conservation 
of resources are essential for resilience. This leads to an important question: what enables 
people to do well in contexts of ongoing threat? 
In the literature at least two explanations can be found. First, it is assumed 
personality traits, such as hardiness, are associated with resilience (Kobasa, Maddi, & 
Kahn, 1982). A hardy personality (Maddi, 1999) is committed to finding meaning and 
purpose in life and a high feeling of control over environment and outcomes, and is open to 
learning from positive as well as negative experiences. Furthermore, hardy people use 
active coping and social support (Maddi & Hightower, 1999). They employ strategies of 
self-enhancement, exhibit an optimistic bias and an exaggerated sense of control and are 
more likely to employ repressive coping and show positive emotion and humor during or 
shortly after traumatic events. The first three are cognitive strategies and the others focus 
41 
 
on emotions. It is found that hardiness functions as a buffer for stress and permits healthy 
functioning despite adversities (e.g., Bartone, 1999; Maguen, Suvak, & Litz, 2006; 
Westman, 1990).  
The second explanation does not rule out the first, but provides a process perspective. 
It has been proposed that people generally adjust well due to an “adaptational system” 
inherent in human functioning (Masten, 2001). For example people who are resilient seem 
to apply paradigmatic coping (i.e., doing what is necessary), and have the ability to 
effectively enhance or suppress emotional expression when necessary (Bonanno, 2005). It 
has been observed that people employ a number of mechanisms (consciously and 
subconsciously) to overcome negative affective states and to experience positive emotions 
that supposedly foster positive development (Fredrickson et al., 2003; Hobfoll et al., 2009).  
Before turning to the “adaptational system,” different responses people use to cope 
are going to be presented in the next section.  
Coping 
When examining coping responses it was discovered that some strategies are 
adaptive while others were not. As a result coping was used as a term for adaptive 
behavior, while non-adaptive behavior was labeled as defense (e.g., Haan, 1977). Folkman 
and her colleagues point out that these distinctions “that define coping in terms of a value 
or outcome tend to create a tautology, whereby the coping process is confounded with the 
outcomes it is used to explain” (1986, p. 993). According to this clarification coping does 
not automatically refer to functional adjustment, but refers to any way of adjustment. The 
adjustment process is the focus of research on coping. Two questions guide the research: 
first, what determines the individuals chosen strategy and second, how do specific 
strategies correspond with functional adjustment.  
The question of what determines the coping behavior in response to a given stressor 
is approached from two angles: exploring coping styles and investigating the process of 
coping which means examining the situation and the modes of coping and appraisal 
simultaneously. It is assumed that coping styles present tendencies of how people respond 
to stressors and that people have a specific coping repertoire which they learn and use. The 
conception of coping styles is similar to the trait concept. One early example of how 
coping behavior was explained based on traits was developed by Byrne (1961). Byrne 
assumed that people differ in regard to their sensitivity to threatening information and they 
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can be placed on a continuum between people who are sensitive to threatening information 
(sensitizers) and people who avoid threatening information (repressors). Self-report 
measures were used to distinguish between the two types. Neither the trait nor the coping 
reactions are tied to a specific stressor and as a result the relationship between the person 
and situation is not considered. This approach is grounded in the assumption that coping 
behavior is stable within individuals across situations.  
A current approach to coping that criticizes but also builds upon the repression-
sensitization model is the model of coping modes proposed by Krohne (1993). The model 
of coping modes distinguishes two independent processes: avoidance and vigilance. 
Avoidance refers to strategies that turn attention away from threatening cues; vigilance 
refers to strategies that orient attention towards the threat.  
Research interested in coping styles explores how inter-individual differences can 
explain variation of coping strategies, the outcome of coping and adjustment success are 
not of importance (e.g., Hock & Krohne, 2004; Hock, Krohne, & Kaiser, 1996; Krohne, 
1993). Because the present work focuses on the influence of a given coping strategy on the 
individual’s success at adaptation a process perspective is taken. 
The model of the coping process is rooted in the cognitive-transactional model of 
stress. It assumes that the degree of perceived stress induced by an event depends on the 
appraisal of the potential stressor (primary appraisal) as well as on the appraisal of 
available resources to cope with the stressor (secondary appraisal) and the coping strategy 
(Lazarus, 1999). The theory proposes three components of primary appraisal: goal 
relevance of the event, its goal congruence and the ego involvement. The goal relevance 
refers to the degree to which the event is actually related to any personal goals. Goal 
congruency captures if the way it is affecting the goal is in accordance with the goal. Ego 
involvement refers to the importance of the goal to the person. Secondary appraisal is 
influenced by the attribution of the cause of the event, the assessed coping potential to 
direct the course of the event in a desirable direction, and the future expectations about the 
course of events. Depending on those characteristics of primary and secondary appraisal, 
different emotional patterns arise, which in turn influence how the event is appraised 
(Lazarus, 1999; Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). An event can be appraised as “threat 
(containing the possibility of harm or loss), or challenge (holding the possibility of mastery 
or benefit)” (Folkman et al., 1986, p. 993). Coping behavior is a response of the individual 
to a threatening event and aims to stabilize the individual and limit the emotional reaction 
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by either removing the threat (problem-focused coping) or by influencing the emotional 
reaction (emotion-focused coping) (Lazarus & Folkman, 1984). The two ways of coping 
are complemented by avoidant coping, which refers to strategies trying to avoid the threat 
such as suppression of thoughts about the threat or distraction (Zeidner & Endler, 1996).  
What is the value of different ways of coping after experiencing violent or life-
threatening situations? A study among university students incidentally measured coping 
and appraisal once before and twice after a bomb attack on a bus. It was observed that 
participants who directly experienced the incident, and indicated high levels of perceived 
threat and applied avoidant coping were more likely to suffer symptoms of PTSD six 
months after the event (Gil & Caspi, 2006). The negative effect of avoidant coping is also 
found among policemen where emotional inhibition after traumatic experiences was 
associated with a higher likelihood of suffering from symptoms of PTSD (Davidson & 
Moss, 2008). In a study among peace keepers it was found that social support decreased 
the probability of symptoms of PTSD, while negative social interactions increased it. 
Individuals engaging in wishful thinking and taking personal responsibility (emotion-
focused coping) were more likely to suffer from symptoms of PTSD, than the ones who 
engaged in problem solving and seeking support (problem-focused coping) (Dirkzwager, 
Bramsen, & van der Ploeg, 2003). Another study found that repression, the non-experience 
of emotional distress while experiencing physiological arousal, had to be distinguished 
from deliberate avoidant behaviors associated with emotion regulation through 
suppression, which involve the “pushing away” of negative emotions (Coifman, Bonanno, 
Ray, & Gross, 2007). People who applied repressive coping experienced less distress after 
loss. Repressive coping was associated with fewer psychological symptoms and showed 
better long-term adjustment. It seems that automatic emotion regulation might lead to 
adaptational advantages since no links to negative health costs were found. Possibly 
repressors can more easily re-focus and re-direct their attention away from the threat 
towards positive aspects and thereby increase their capacity to experience positive affect. 
This means that the repression of negative emotions, which alone could be unhealthy, 
might lead to the ability to refocus and engage in planning in order to remove the stressor. 
Generally studies among war-veterans found that the absence of avoidant coping strategies 
was associated with fewer symptoms of PTSD (Solomon, Mikulincer, & Avitzur, 1988), 
while self-isolation and wishful thinking (examples of avoidant focused coping) were 
associated with more symptoms of PTSD (Ozer et al., 2003).  
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Data indicates that emotion-focused coping does not generally lead to negative 
adjustment, while avoidant coping does. Furthermore, problem-focused coping generally is 
associated with a lower level of functional impairment. However, particularly in the realm 
of emotion-focused coping the results of the cited studies are contradictory. The reason 
could be that concepts are often not clearly distinguished. Strategies that are considered 
emotional coping in one study are classified as avoidant coping in another, and strategies 
are sometimes differentiated according to processes of coping, and at other times according 
to the focus of the coping activity. Therefore, one of the central goals of research on coping 
is the creation of a taxonomy of coping (Skinner, Edge, Altman, & Sherwood, 2003). Is 
there a way to structure the numerous different coping behaviors within a broader but more 
precise framework?  
When individuals are faced with a changing environment and challenges, they often 
remain stable functioning. The observed stability is achieved through the use of coping 
strategies which are based on self-regulation. Self-regulation is viewed as the regulation of 
the self (i.e., the individual). “The internal and external experience of stability is the result 
of adaptive processes that compensate for any changes such that the subjective and 
objective impression of being one and the same person is maintained, through change and 
dynamic processes are in fact the determining factors. The necessity of remaining flexible 
throughout our lives and the need to remain stable at the same time can be fulfilled by a 
dynamic system which is usually called the self” (Greve, 2005, p. 49). Theories and 
concepts of describing this process of self-regulation will be introduced in the next section.  
Self-Regulation 
In the context of developmental adjustment, “…self-regulation refers to those processes, 
internal and/or transactional, that enable an individual to guide his/her goal-directed 
activities over time and across changing circumstances (contexts). Regulation implies 
modulation of thought, affect, behavior, or attention via deliberate or automated use of 
specific mechanisms and supportive meta-skills. The processes of self-regulation are 
initiated when routinized activity is impeded or when goal-directedness is otherwise made 
salient (e.g., the appearance of a challenge, the failure of habitual action patterns, etc.). 
Self-regulation may be said to encompass up to five interrelated and iterative component 
phases: 1) goal selection, 2) goal cognition, 3) directional maintenance, 4) directional 
change or reprioritization and 5) goal termination” (Karoly, 1993, p.25).  
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Two meta-theoretical frameworks of adaptive processes are distinguished by 
Vancouver (Vancouver, 2000): the cybernetic approach and the decision making approach. 
The cybernetic approach is rooted in engineering science and system theory. The theories 
following the cybernetic tradition generally focus on the micro level of self-regulation, 
while theories stemming from the decision making approach to self-regulation focus on the 
macro level and are interested in regulatory process based on goals that shape individual 
development and adjustment (Bayer & Gollwitzer, 2000).  
The metaphor of the cybernetic approach is the regulatory circle which is based on 
control through feedback and adjustment according to a specific standard of functioning. 
The goal of the theories is to explain how systems regulate themselves when facing 
changes in the environment by analyzing the hierarchical structure of the regulatory 
process. The subject of interest is not goal content and its influence on regulation, but the 
regulatory system and its functioning (Lewis, 2000; Vallacher & Kaufman, 1996). Authors 
in this tradition (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998, 2000, 2002; Kuhl, 1983; Rothman, Baldwin, 
& Herte, 2004) try to capture the complexity of the regulatory process, and the models 
integrate affective, cognitive and motivational assumptions. Goals are regarded as 
behavioral standards, and are not shaped by individual desires and needs. While this allows 
the integration of goals into the model as structural components it does not make 
assumptions about behavioral implications of specific goals (Grant & Dweck, 1999). As a 
result theories focusing on the micro level of self-regulation cannot explain adjustment nor 
do they capture the ways people might differ regarding their self-regulation or the resulting 
quality of adaptation (Ryan & Deci, 1999).  
The decision making approach to self-regulation examines processes associated with 
goal content while structural components as well as dynamics of the self-regulatory 
process on the micro level are neglected. Goals are not regarded as fixed reference points 
but as cognitive representations of aspired states, which are developed, implemented and 
can also be revised by the individual (Emmons, 1996). The assumption that the person is 
the agent of regulation is central. Self-regulation is seen as crucial for the stability of the 
self-concept (Greve, 2005). The self-concept is the sum of all self-related knowledge and 
the resulting appraisal of them (Mummendey, 2006). Personal goals capture goals that are 
part of the self-concept and rooted in the possible selves, which capture how the person 
would like to be (Emmons, 1991; Hoyle & Sherrill, 2006; Markus & Nurius, 1986; 
Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2002; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Personal goals influence 
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development and well-being (Brunstein, Maier, & Dargel, 2007). Particularly, the 
adjustment of personal goals and their pursuit in a changing environment is an important 
area of research within developmental psychology (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Brandtstädter & 
Wentura, 1995; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995). Theories of self-regulation in the context of 
development are originally intended to examine the stability of the self over time. For 
example an important question is the how with increasing age people remain a positive 
self-concept and do not develop symptoms of depression despite the loss of personal 
abilities which are central to the self-concept (e.g., Brandtstädter, Rothermund, & Schmitz, 
1998). However, the processes identified that shield the self against disruption are also 
found to explain general coping behaviors and outcomes (Rothermund & Brandtstädter, 
2003; Wadsworth, Santiago, & Einhorn, 2009; Wahl, Becker, Schilling, Burmedi, & 
Himmelsbach, 2005).  
Over their life span, people have to adjust to a number of changes. The goals and 
strategies employed will shape the outcome of this adjustment process. Three theories will 
be described next explaining how people adjust to changing environmental demands to 
ensure stability of the self-concept. First, the theory of selection, optimization and 
compensation, second, the theory of optimization, primary and secondary control and last, 
the model of accommodative, assimilative and immunization processes.  
The theory of selection, optimization and compensation. 
The theory of selection, optimization and compensation is a meta-theoretical 
framework to describe development over the lifespan (Baltes & Baltes, 1990). The model 
defines successful development as the maximization of gains and the minimization of 
losses, which are defined through personal and cultural expectations associated with a 
specific age.  
The model involves three processes that are related: selection, optimization and 
compensation. The first process, selection, refers to the selection of goals and their 
structure (i.e., relationship between goals) as well as contexts in which they are pursued. 
The direction of development is shaped by the possibilities offered in the environment, 
personal capacities, incompatibility of goals and age related changes of the physiological 
functioning. As a result the selection of developmental paths either stems from the election 
of one possibility among others or it follows from the lack of possibilities and therefore is 
loss based (Baltes & Staudinger, 1999). An example of selection is the decision to learn to 
play the piano of a child brought up in a music-loving family. The opportunity to learn an 
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instrument is presented by the environment. The piano is one choice among others, thus 
learning to play the piano is based on the election of one possible instrument instead of 
others. Thus, the choice to learn the piano presents an example of elective selection. 
The second process, optimization, entails the allocation of means to achieve a certain 
goal and the enhancement of the existing means. For example, optimization can involve 
the increase of practice or the development of strategies in order to reach an aspired level 
of performance. Continuing in reference to the example of the piano, daily practice would 
result in mastering the instrument. When the child does not attain the level of mastery 
he/she aspires with regular practice, then the third process, compensation is activated 
(Baltes & Staudinger, 1999). 
Compensation refers to the process triggered in order to minimize or avoid losses in 
order to remain functioning. Two tactics are available when a selected goal cannot be 
attained: acquire new means that enable the continuing pursuit of the goal or, if new 
resources are not available and the goal seems unattainable, disengage from the selected 
goal (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; Baltes & Staudinger, 1999; Freund, 2007; Staudinger, 2000). 
In the case of the child playing the piano, an increase in schoolwork might lead to a 
decrease of free time and therefore less practice. This threatens the goal of becoming a 
piano master. The child can compensate for this loss of resources by either detaching from 
the goal to become a piano master or by increasing the available time for practice through 
decreasing the aspiration level in school. 
The theory of selection optimization and compensation presents a meta-theory in 
order to capture different adjustment processes and to locate them within a functional 
framework. The theory of selection optimization and compensation is relatively vague in 
terms of how the adjustment is actually carried out. The theory of optimization in primary 
and secondary control presents an approach focusing on the underlying mechanisms of 
adjustment. 
Optimization in primary and secondary control. 
The theory of optimization in primary and secondary control assumes that people 
experience the need to be in control and feel able to shape their surroundings. This is 
referred to as primary control. Associated with this assumption is the notion that people 
dislike losses and experience negative affect if losses cannot be avoided or their likelihood 
of occurrence is beyond one’s personal control (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Heckhausen, 
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Wrosch, & Schulz, 2010). The theory of optimization in primary and secondary control is 
grounded in the theory of perceived control proposed by Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder 
(1982). They distinguished primary control, the ability to change the situation according to 
ones preferences, and secondary control, the ability to change according to the situational 
demands. Optimization refers to the process of goal setting. Optimization in primary 
control involves mainly actions aimed at the environment, while optimization in secondary 
control is rather cognitive and aimed at the self (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995)
2
. 
It is assumed that if primary control is possible, it is employed; otherwise secondary 
control is exerted to regain primary control. When primary control is possible but 
secondary control is exerted, the adjustment is dysfunctional and secondary control is 
likely to be dysfunctional when goal attainment is possible. If the goal is not attainable, 
secondary control is functional. The likelihood to actually attain a goal determines the right 
balance of secondary and primary control and whether future primary control is likely to be 
successful or not. Expectations about the ability to achieve a goal or to gain primary 
control should shape the selection of control strategies (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; 
Heckhausen et al., 2010).  
The theory assumes “functional primacy of primary over secondary control” 
(Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995, p. 286), because ultimately secondary control presents a 
means to regain primary control by minimizing losses and to adjust in order to regain or 
increase primary control. Secondary control can aim at expectancy of goal attainment, goal 
value and attribution of causal link with behavior. Other motives as control are accepted, 
but the adjustment response is assumed to be aim at control over the situation if shifts or 
threats of shifts in primary control occur.  
                                                 
2 Primary and secondary control can either be based on selection or compensation. Primary selective control 
refers to the use of personal resources (e.g., effort and time) toward the pursuit of goals. Compensatory 
primary control, the reliance on external resources, represents another mean to gain primary control when the 
resources of the individual are not sufficient. Selective secondary control involves the increase of effort or 
the devaluation of alternatives in order to increase the value of the goal. Selective secondary control is used 
to stay on track when pursuing a primary control goal. In the face of difficulties or when a goal becomes 
impossible to reach, compensatory secondary control, the devaluation of the goal or comparison in order to 
limit self-blame, is likely to be activated. Compensatory secondary control is a mean to regain primary 
control, because through disengagement resources are made available to pursue other goals (Heckhausen et 
al., 2010). 
49 
 
The theory of selection optimization and compensation and the theory of 
optimization in primary and secondary control put forth a hierarchical view of self-
regulation, assuming that control over the environment is superior to adjustment to the 
environment. This view seems biased, because the regulatory success of striving for 
control can be limited in some situations where only adjustment to the environment might 
be functional (Rothermund & Brandtstädter, 2003). Incorporating the possible limitation of 
control, a complementary perspective as proposed by the model of assimilative and 
accommodative processes might prove beneficial to explain successful adjustment in 
contexts where control of the environment might be impossible.  
The model of assimilative, accommodative and immunization processes
3
. 
Over the course of their lives people repeatedly face discrepancies between their 
goals and their achievement. Two complementary processes of adjustment to such 
discrepancies are proposed: accommodative and assimilative processes (Brandtstädter, 
2007; Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990b; Brandtstädter & Wentura, 1995; Rothermund & 
Brandtstädter, 2003). Before accommodative and assimilative processes are activated, 
discrepancies between the aspired and the present state have to be perceived as relevant by 
the individual. This requires that self-defense mechanisms have to be overcome, which 
prevent the perception of discrepancies. These self-defense mechanisms are subsumed 
under the processes of immunization (Brandtstädter, 2001; Greve, 2000).  
Processes of immunization operate on the conceptual or data level (Brandtstädter, 
2001). To modulate the information available presents a way of data-focused immunization 
and are seen as a first line of defense against the perception of discrepancies (Greve, 2000). 
One example of an immunization process is to call into question the validity of information 
presented as evidence for a discrepancy. This is observed in studies showing that people do 
not believe test scores because they doubt the procedure in order to reduce discrepancies 
between their self-perception and the feedback from others (e.g., Markus & Wurf, 1987). 
On the other hand concept-focused immunization refers to the reinterpretation of the 
                                                 
3 The current models of accommodative and assimilative processes (see Brandtstädter, 2007) are presented 
as two factor models, however earlier publications (e.g., Brandtstädter, 2001) included immunization 
processes as well. Because immunization might play an important role in risk perception the earlier version 
of the model is introduced here. 
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standard and basis of the comparison (Greve, 2000). While processes of data-focused 
immunization are clearly distinguishable from processes of accommodation or assimilation 
on an empirical level, processes of concept-focused immunization can be difficult to 
distinguish from accommodative processes without a longitudinal approach. Immunization 
processes are assumed to be activated when people do not perceive a discrepancy as a 
problem. Immunization therefore presents a way to overcome discrepancies by eliminating 
aversive emotions without the use of self-regulation (Brandtstädter, 2001; Greve, 2000). 
Accommodative and assimilative processes are activated to resolve discrepancies 
between the aspired and the factual goal state which are regarded as significant by the 
individual. The underlying goal of both is “achieving consistency between actual and 
intended courses of development” (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990, p. 59). Both processes 
aim to reduce the discrepancy, though they employ different mechanisms according to 
their foci (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). While assimilative processes aim to 
change the environment according to one’s preferences, accommodative processes target 
adjustment of individual preferences according to the context (Brandtstädter, 2007; 
Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990b; Brandtstädter & Wentura, 1995; Rothermund & 
Brandtstädter, 2003; Wahl et al., 2005). Thus, the motive guiding assimilation is 
controlling the environment, while the motive guiding accommodation is integrating 
oneself into a given environment (Skinner, 2007). 
If the assimilative process is activated, the information processing system is focused 
on the goal. The individual tries to shield herself from distractions and suppresses 
potentially threatening information (Rothermund, Wentura, & Bak, 2001), and the personal 
agency is likely to be perceived greater than it really is (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). While 
these measures are directly aimed at the goal, it is also possible that the assimilative 
process involves the consideration of alternative ways to achieve the goal due to the goal’s 
equifinality structure (Shah, Kruglanski, Boekaerts, Pintrich, & Zeidner, 1999). If 
compensatory strategies cease to be effective or if the individual perceives the continued 
pursuit of the goal as futile the accommodative process is activated (Brandtstädter & 
Wentura, 1995).  
When the accommodative process is activated, the person is more likely to withdraw 
attention from the current goal in order to disengage from it (Brandtstädter & Renner, 
1990b; Rothermund et al., 2001). People engage in reappraisal of a perceived discrepancy 
and try to find a positive meaning in adversities (Frijda, 1988). The activation of 
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assimilative processes associated with tenacious goal pursuit, such as focus on goals as 
well as high feelings of control, and simultaneous activation of accommodative processes, 
such as devaluation of goals and information search regarding new goals, can lead to 
regulatory conflict, since both processes are independent (Bak & Brandtstädter, 1998). It is 
important to note that the theory does not assume that people deliberately choose to 
disengage from a specific goal (i.e., engage in accommodation), but rather the 
accommodative process is unconsciously activated and leads to a change in preferences 
which in turn enable disengagement or the reasoning of pros and cons in order to facilitate 
disengagement (Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). 
Conclusion. 
The three theories presented describe development and adjustment to challenges. 
According to Boerner and Jopp (2007) each model has its merit, because they differ in 
their theoretical scope (see also Riediger & Ebner, 2007). The theory of selection 
optimization and compensation is developed as a meta-theory. It describes the general 
process of goal setting and pursuing (Freund, 2007). The theory of optimization in primary 
and secondary control specifies how individuals optimize control over the lifespan and are 
able to control their environment. At first sight overlap exists between accommodation and 
some types of secondary control (Boerner & Jopp, 2007). Does the similarity of 
mechanisms imply congruence of processes? The theory of optimization in primary and 
secondary control assumes primacy of external control; adjustment with the final goal of 
achieving integration within a given situation is not part of the model. It is first important 
to note that secondary control aims to reestablish primary control, while accommodation 
focuses on adjustment and integrating within a given context (Skinner, 2007). As a result 
the concept and term accommodation should be used for strategies aiming at integration 
into a given environment, instead of secondary control. Secondary and primary control 
rather present constructs which distinguish whether the focus of adjustment is on the self or 
the environment but not whether the processes aim at controlling the situation or 
accommodating to it.  
The model of assimilative, accommodative and immunization processes does not 
assume a hierarchical structure of adjustment strategies and the underlying motive is not 
control but consistency. As a result the model of assimilative and accommodative 
processes seems more suitable to capture adjustment to an ambiguous context on the 
highest level of abstraction since it allows the integration of strategies focusing on 
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controlling the environment as well as strategies that aim to integrate within a given 
environment. The model of accommodative and assimilative processes presents a higher 
level structure of self-regulation. On a lower level of self-regulation specific behaviors and 
mechanism can be identified, and these mechanisms and behaviors are examined in the 
context of coping. 
Self-regulation, Coping and the Adjustment to Ambiguous Security 
How can the described theories explain how people adjust to living in an ambiguous 
security situation? The fields of coping and self-regulation in development are interested in 
similar processes, but the integration of both fields seems limited (Aspinwall & Taylor, 
1997; Leipold & Greve, 2009). It appears promising to integrate coping into a theory of 
self-regulation in order to provide process and structural models which can explain goal 
directed behavior. Processes underlying self-regulation such as goal pursuit and goal 
disengagement are empirically linked to coping, and coping strategies mediate the positive 
effect of goal adjustment on subjective well-being (Wrosch, Amir, & Miller, 2011). 
Coping research, however, focuses on adjustment strategies and their outcomes, and not 
the underlying processes (Costa, Somerfield, & McCrae, 1996). The research interested in 
developmental self-regulation investigates the general adjustment process. Both lines of 
research explore how people overcome challenges (Leipold & Greve, 2009). The empirical 
findings show that it is not generally tenacious goal pursuit which leads to successful 
adjustment, but that flexible adjustment and acceptance of a given situation is required. 
Resilience could function as a bridge that connects developmental self-regulation and 
coping, since it infuses meaning into coping and direction into self-regulation (Folkman & 
Moskowitz, 2000; Leipold & Greve, 2009). “Explaining the phenomenon of resilience, not 
only do risk markers and personality and situational aspects (the resilience constellation, as 
it were) need to be included, but also the micro processes involved in adjustment (e.g., 
coping), that is, the diachronically (developmental) perspective on resilience” (Leipold & 
Greve, 2009, p.48). 
Leipold and Greve (2009) propose three processes of coping: assimilation, 
accommodation, and defensive processes (i.e., immunization processes). No single strategy 
leads to coping well but the mix of coping strategies which are functional in a given 
situation or social constellation can lead to resilience. Adjustment is successful when it 
ensures continued functioning and when it enables the person to overcome problems in the 
future. What leads to resilient individuals? The answer of Leipold and Greve (2009) is to 
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integrate coping theories and developmental approaches in order to explain resilience. In 
their perspective, resilience is the outcome of specific constellations of coping responses. 
This should result in the analysis of interactions between coping strategies instead of the 
general use of bivariate correlations in order to identify which strategies are functional and 
which are futile.  
An example of where a “constellation approach” was applied is a study conducted 
among individuals who were displaced after a natural catastrophe (Wadsworth et al., 
2009). Four groups of participants were formed based on their adjustment patterns: 
resilient, delayed on set of depression, chronically depressed, recovering after depression. 
The use of primary and secondary control, coping efficacy, and religious coping were 
analyzed as predictors of which of the four groups a person would fall into. The interaction 
between primary and secondary control predicted group membership best. Only when 
primary and secondary control were both used, people were likely to be in the resilient 
group; the use of secondary control alone was associated with higher levels of depression 
and distress.  
While research on coping and adjustment can predict which individuals are more 
likely to be resilient, it does not examine how individuals change their perception of the 
threatening event that they experienced. But it seems an important question how 
adjustment influences future risk perception, because risk perception shapes future choices. 
Although the transactional model of stress states a theoretical relationship between risk 
perception and coping strategies, studies examining this relationship are not to be found. 
Are risk perception and adjustment processes related? 
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Risk Perception, Adjustment and Ongoing Threat 
In this section the research focusing on theories of risk perception and theories of 
adjustment to adversities are going to be integrated. Each field of research will be 
summarized briefly and then they will be synthesized together. Finally, the methodological 
challenges and their solution will be presented in order to explore the relationship between 
risk perception and adjustment processes empirically.  
Risk Perception 
Chapter three established that risk perception and decision making involving risk is 
influenced by the information processing of the value and probability information of the 
respective outcomes. In cases when options involve outcomes with a very low probability, 
risk perception will be influenced by whether the person has gained information about the 
risk through experience or by description. When people have gained information about the 
choice options through experience they choose as if they underweight the rare event. On 
the other hand, people who receive information from description tend to choose as if they 
overweight rare events.  
Another factor influencing information processing when judging risk is affect. If an 
outcome of a risky choice evokes strong affective reactions, then people choose as if 
probability information becomes neglected and mere possibility shapes choices. This 
suggests probability judgments may be biased in contexts where people are faced with 
threats to their personal safety when these induce emotional reactions and have a low 
probability.  
However, in quasi naturalistic settings people do not primarily search for information 
about the choice options outcomes and their probability, but look for ways to mitigate the 
possible negative consequences of a given choice. This shows that final response to risk 
does not only depend on the probability and valuation of outcomes as suggested by 
theories of risk perception but also on the available ways to act upon the consequences and 
the risky event. One characteristic of theories concerning risk perception is that they do not 
consider changes on the level of the individuals due to adjustment and its impact on 
responses to risk. Research focusing on self-regulation of adjustment suggests that 
adjustment is bi-directional – adjustment of the person (the self) and the event (the 
situation).  
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Adjustment 
It was argued in the fourth chapter that people use different strategies to adjust to 
threatening events, and those differences are influenced by the underlying processes of 
adjustment. Three processes are assumed to guide adjustment, one leading to an increase of 
flexibility of adjustment (accommodation) and the second associated with tenacious goal 
pursuit and striving for control (assimilation); however, those two processes of self-
regulation are only activated if the need of adjustment is perceived which is hindered by 
immunization processes. Successful adjustment is the result of the balancing of those 
processes according to situational demands. Adjustment strategies are distinguished 
according to their focus and then at the lowest level according to their function. The 
adjustment focus can either be on the environment (the situation), referred to as primary 
control, or on the person (the self), which is referred to as secondary control. The function 
of adjustment can be the regulation of emotions or the adjustment of the threatening event. 
Studies show that depending on the strategies applied, people differ in their response to 
traumatic events. It was found that generally a combination of strategies leads to resilient 
adjustment, guided by the complementary activation of assimilation and accommodative 
processes. However, people who show a high degree of general functioning and indicate a 
low level of stress could not use self-regulation for adjusting to the situation, because 
immunization processes are activated and as a result these individuals do not perceive a 
need for adjustment. To identify whether people engage in self-regulation of adjustment or 
not, requires to move beyond outcome measures (stress or depression) and needs to 
consider on the individual’s experience of the respective situation. 
Synthesis 
Risk perception and adjustment can be integrated into the cognitive-transactional 
model of stress explaining emotional activation in the face of threat. The cognitive-
transactional model of stress assumes that the degree of perceived stress induced by an 
event depends on the appraisal of the potential stressor (primary appraisal) as well as on 
the appraisal of available resources to cope with the stressor (secondary appraisal) and the 
coping strategy (Lazarus, 1999). Accordingly, it is assumed that the perception of personal 
safety in ambiguous security contexts is dependent on the processes described in the 
theories of risky choice as well as on processes described in the theories of adjustment to 
adversities. One characteristic of an ambiguous security situation is that the probability of a 
threatening security incident is low. Consequently the appraisal process implies decisions 
56 
 
with prospects involving rare events. Decisions involving rare events are prone to 
judgment errors due to the difficulties humans encounter using information concerning low 
probabilities (e.g., Hertwig et al., 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Slovic & Weber, 
2002; Yechiam et al., 2005). Information processing is influenced by affect and 
experience. In conditions in which rare events are associated with strong affective notions 
choices appear as if the probability information is underweighted or even disregarded (e.g., 
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Slovic & Peters, 2006; Slovic et al., 2005). Under conditions 
of high arousal emotional regulation influences decision making, while under conditions of 
low arousal decision making is governed by cognitive regulation (Séguin, Arseneault, & 
Tremblay, 2007). It can be assumed that the use of coping strategies alters the negative 
affect induced by the possible outcome. However, strategies differ regarding their 
effectiveness in regulation (Gross, 1998a; John & Gross, 2004) and as a result people differ 
in their ability to regulate emotions (e.g., Gross & John, 2003). This might explain 
differences between people in their tendency to overweight rare events with affect laden 
consequences and leads to the question of whether or not inter-individual differences of 
self-regulation can explain differences in risk perception under conditions of strong 
affective activation.  
Self-regulation and risk perception seem dependent on one another. They could be 
influenced by inter-individual differences in the perception as well as the capacity of self-
regulation, and in order to understand the assessment of personal safety under ongoing 
threat, risk perceptions and well as adjustment should be examined simultaneously. To 
date, both traditions are pursued not only in two different theoretical lanes but also with 
two different methodologies. In the next section, the difference in methodologies will be 
pointed out.  
Methodological Challenge and a possible Resolution 
Studies informing the construct of risk perception reported in chapter three, generally 
used experiments. In these experiments data was analyzed regarding differences between 
experimental groups, but inter-individual differences within groups such as strategies to 
lower the emotional impact of a given stimulus were not examined. The research on risk 
perception and decision making under risk is often based on experimental designs with a 
limited number of variables. The studies are interested in what factors lead to differences 
between judgments and choices. This is contrasted by studies which examine adjustment. 
They generally focus on the inter-individual differences regarding the strategies used and 
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the associated outcomes simultaneously. Situational and person-specific variables are 
scrutinized and it is asked how they interact and lead to specific adjustment trajectories.  
To gain insight into the adjustment to ambiguous security contexts a laboratory 
experiment does not seem suitable because the subject cannot be kept in the laboratory for 
a long period of time and the negative stimuli used in laboratory experiments can hardly 
involve physical threats. Furthermore, one goal of using an experimental setting is the 
limitation of independent variables in order to ensure the possibility for a causal 
interpretation and maximize control over the dependent variable. The direction of research 
laid out above rooted in different areas of research in order to capture the complex process 
of adjustment to ambiguous security involves more variables of interest than suitable for an 
experiment. The research on decision making under risk as well as on coping is often done 
applying quantitative methods. While quantitative studies aim to detect differences in the 
distribution of an attribute or test a hypothesis about the relationship between variables, 
qualitative studies aim to gain insight into the variations of a phenomenon. It is not the 
description of a group or a person, but the description of a phenomenon that is of interest 
(Madill & Gough, 2008; Polkinghorne, 2005; J. A. Smith & Dunworth, 2003).The decision 
as to whether or not a qualitative or quantitative approach is preferred in order to 
investigate a phenomenon ultimately depends on its characteristics (Valsiner, 2000). 
Because the individual’s adjustment and interpretation of the threatening situation is of 
interest and not only a final choice or situational appraisal, a qualitative approach seems 
promising to gain insight into the relationship between risk perception and adjustment. 
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Qualitative Interview Study 
Introduction 
In the present study the focus is how people perceive the security situation, how they 
judge their personal risk and especially why they judge the situation the way that they do. 
The use of interviews is suitable, because the central purpose of qualitative research is to 
understand experience and how it is constituted in the person’s awareness (Marchel & 
Owens, 2007). While the interviews were exploratory; the questions asked were guided by 
research questions formulated based on theories of decision making under risk and 
adjustment. The goal of the interviews was to explore the different adjustment patterns to 
ongoing threat. 
Research questions.  
First, the interview needs to clarify the perception of personal safety of the 
participants. This leads to three questions regarding risk perception: 
1. How do people who work and live in a volatile context with regards to security 
appraise their personal safety and the general risk of security incidents? 
2. What is the relationship between the general security situation and personal 
perceived risk? 
Second, strategies of coping behavior and their underlying processes need to be 
identified in order to answer the following questions: 
3. What strategies do people use to cope with ambiguous security situations?  
4. Are differences in the coping strategies related to differences regarding the degree 
of activation of accommodative, assimilative and immunization processes? 
Third, while appraisal and coping are structurally distinct, they are viewed as 
interdependent (e.g., Lazarus, 1999) and both are assumed to be governed by self-
regulative processes, which leads to the question:  
5. Is there a relationship between risk perception and the accommodative, 
assimilative and immunization processes? 
To understand the impact of security incidents and ongoing threat on humans one can 
turn to examining people that already work in such contexts: humanitarian aid workers. 
The UN and numerous international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) respond to 
countless humanitarian disasters around the globe. The nature of the events makes it 
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necessary for staff to be deployed in areas that yield a security environment that, at best, 
could be characterized as ambiguous, and the work and living environment during the 
deployment involves the possibility of victimization. 
Describing the environment of the interview participants. 
The work environment of humanitarian aid workers is similar to that of military 
peacekeepers, but humanitarian aid workers lack military training and safety equipment to 
engage threats (ECHO, 2004; King, 2002; Runge, 2004; Sheik et al., 2000; Slim, 1995; B. 
Smith, 2002). Relief work is often carried out in camps of displaced people where the 
security situation is highly uncertain. In order to reach areas to deliver aid, it is often 
necessary to travel through areas that are considered “law free” in which ambushes, 
kidnappings and car hijackings can occur. Even the compounds of humanitarian aid 
organizations do not represent safe harbors; they become targeted by robbers or violence 
deliberately aimed at foreigners (Danieli, 2002, Sheik, 2000 #457). Humanitarian aid 
workers are targeted in armed conflicts, because they are assumed to support the opposing 
group in a conflict by providing aid or their assets are valuable to the parties involved in 
the conflict (Stoddard et al., 2009; Stoddard, Harmer, & Haver, 2006).  
A study focusing on the perceptions and the reactions of humanitarian aid and relief 
workers to the security situation during deployment analyzed the influence of demographic 
variables, country of deployment and experiences during the deployment on the perception 
of security and personal safety. Overall the sample participants generally felt unsafe, and 
the perception of safety was not dependent on the security situation of the country, but on 
personal experiences (Fast & Wiest, 2007).  
Turning to the number of security incidents in the period from 2006-2008, if 
Somalia, Afghanistan, and the Sudan are excluded from the analysis, 2.4 in 10,000 
humanitarian staff members became victims of violence per year worldwide. For the same 
period an attack rate of 408 per 10,000 humanitarian staff members in Somalia, and in the 
Sudan’s Darfur area 27 per 10,000 was observed (Stoddard et al., 2009).  
For the statistical analysis and comparison of countries relative numbers are 
informative. But to capture the psychological meaning of numbers in terms of experience it 
seems more pertinent to look at absolute numbers. They reflect how often the humanitarian 
aid worker will be confronted with the stories told by his colleagues and rumors about 
latest incidents. In the Sudan about 90, in Afghanistan about 78 and in Somalia about 67 
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incidents of major violence targeting humanitarian aid workers are reported. In all three 
countries armed conflicts are ongoing frequently covering large areas, and aid is delivered 
to the victims of these conflicts. As a result people working for NGO’s deployed in 
Afghanistan, the Sudan and Somalia were likely to be confronted with news about 
incidents affecting a colleague. 
An indicator of the psychological impact of the security situation is the development 
of PTSD among humanitarian aid workers. Individuals are diagnosed with PTSD when 
they fulfill three criteria: unwilling revisitation of traumatic events in flashbacks or 
nightmares, hypervigilance, and retreat from life and relationships ("Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders: DSM-IV,"). Civilian interpersonal violence, the 
kind that humanitarian staff commonly experience, was likely to carry greater risk for 
PTSD than other traumatic events (Ozer , Best, Lipsey, & Weiss, 2003). This claim is 
supported by studies assessing the prevalence of PTSD syndromes after the deployment of 
humanitarian aid and relief personnel (Eriksson et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2006; McFarlane, 
2004; Salama, 1999). The studies show a positive correlation between the experience of 
traumatic events and cumulative stress with the prevalence of post-deployment PTSD 
symptoms. Within the samples of the studies, 16% to 29% of the participants showed at 
least two of three symptom clusters of PTSD, which indicates they suffered at least from a 
partial PTSD (Eriksson et al., 2001; Jones et al., 2006; McFarlane, 2004; Salama, 1999).  
Method 
Study participants. 
The interviews were carried out with expatriate humanitarian aid and relief workers 
working in the Sudan. The participants were employed by different agencies, and worked 
in two different areas: the capital, Khartoum, and the region of Darfur. The two regions 
differ regarding their security and living standard. Khartoum is considered one of the safest 
cities in Africa. However, after the death of John Garang, leader of the SPLM and vice 
president of the Sudan on the 30
th
 of July, 2005 riots broke out. During the riots, fighting 
occurred between the internally displaced people from the south and local residents of 
Khartoum. In the course of the conflict at least 84 people of both sides lost their lives and 
about 800 were injured (BBC, 8/3/2005). In another incident, rebels attacked the city of 
Omdurman, which is part of Khartoum. The attack took the government by surprise, 
resulting in the rebels quickly advancing to the city center and being repulsed after three 
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days of fighting (Henshaw, 2008). Those two events demonstrate the fragility of the 
security situation in Khartoum, despite being considered safe. 
In Darfur the situation varies greatly depending on the specific location within the 
region. Areas outside of major cities can experience heavy fighting between rebel groups 
and government soldiers. Many humanitarian aid workers have projects situated within 
these regions. The areas outside of city limits are considered “lawless,” and traveling in 
those areas can end in security incidents such as ambushes. Banditry and conflicts between 
militant groups also occur in the cities. The situation is closely monitored by the UN and 
therefore expatriates are usually informed about past incidents, ongoing fighting or areas of 
expected insecurity on a daily basis.  
The interviews were conducted at the offices of participating organizations in 
Khartoum and a city in Darfur. The sampling was network based, and selection was carried 
out so that participants were from two areas of deployment, differed in regard of personal 
experiences with security incidents and their time spent in the country. The first 
participants interviewed were heads of agencies which were deployed in the capital. The 
managing directors then established contact with their colleagues in the Darfur region. The 
sample characteristics are depicted in Table 1. 
Table 1: Participants. 
Region Male 
Years spent 
in the 
country 
Age Experienced security incidents 
Darfur (N=17) 76.5% (N = 13) 3.1 (2.2) 36.1 (8.4) 52.9% (N = 9) 
Khartoum (N=7) 71.4% (N = 5) 11.5 (9.1) 59.9 (10.0) 57.1% (N = 4) 
Total (N=24) 75.0% (N =18) 5.7 (6.9) 41.1 (11.2) 54.2% (N= 13) 
 
Experience in the country, age and region of deployment were correlated. This is 
likely to confound the relationship between adjustment strategies and risk perception, 
which would make the interpretation of the data difficult if examining group differences. 
However, the current study is interested in each individual’s subjective experience of risk 
as well as their adjustment strategies, so this correlation is not regarded as problematic. 
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Interview procedure. 
To ensure that the topics of interest were raised during the interview, an interview 
schedule was developed (see Table 2).  
Table 2: Interview schedule. 
Topic Sample Questions 
Security situation How do you define risk? 
 How would you characterize the security environment that you 
work in? 
 What threats are present in your working environment? 
 How do you perceive your current personal safety? 
Risk perception What dimensions do you personally consider when thinking 
about the risk of a specific threat? 
 What role does risk and security play in your life? 
 Do you ever think about the possibility of losing your life? 
When? 
Coping How do you react to the security risks that are present in you 
work environment? 
 When do you worry about your own safety? 
 What do you do when thoughts of concern and worry come up 
in your mind? 
 To what extend is risk-taking part of your work? 
 What makes you feel safe? 
 All risks are ultimately controllable. - What do you think about 
this statement? 
Reason for risk-taking  Why do you risk your life working here? 
 
The interview process started with the clarification of the interview procedure and 
intention. Then participants were asked permission to record the interview. The interview 
itself commenced with questions about demographic information and personal information 
concerning the posting. Then questions concerning risk perception and the general security 
situation were asked. This lead to detailed descriptions of personal experiences of security 
incidents, the influence of the security situation on the daily life, strategies developed to 
cope with the security situation and arguments for personal increased safety compared to 
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the average person. After describing the security situation participants were asked about 
their justification of personal risk-taking.  
The interview process was semi-structured, but the order of questions and their exact 
formulation differed depending on the topics brought up by the participants. The 
interviews lasted 30 to 60 minutes. In one case a married couple was interviewed together, 
all other interviews were carried out individually.  
The process of data analysis. 
The recorded interviews were transcribed
4
 and then coded using the software 
package MaxQDA 2007. Before the interviews were analyzed, thematic codes were 
formulated. After distinguishing the main themes and coding the transcripts segments, the 
next layer of codes was developed. First, the segments belonging to each theme were read 
and annotated using memos. Second, the different facets of how participants described the 
security situation and their appraisal and adjustment were marked and collected. Then the 
different segments belonging to each theme were compared and theoretical constructs of 
previous research were used to structure the data. The analysis resulted in a hierarchy of 
categories with three levels. The main theme became the highest order category under 
which the data is structured; the second order categories capture the segments that reflect 
variables derived from the related theoretical construct and on the third level, the specific 
characteristic of the construct variables are coded.  
Two main themes were identified: appraisal of the security situation and adjusting to 
the security situation. Within the main theme, appraisal of the security situation, five 
categories were formulated: perceived risk, specific threats, number of threats named, 
negative affect experienced and the degree of concern about the security situation. Within 
the main theme adjustment two sub-themes were identified: answers describing adjustment 
strategies and arguments for their adequacy. This resulted in two distinct categories: self-
regulated responses to threat and reasoning about personal security. Segments of 
interviews were coded as self-regulated responses to threat when they answered the 
question: what do participants do in reaction to life threats in their environment? Answers 
                                                 
4
 The transcripts can be requested from the author. They are not made available in the general 
appendix because the information given is confidential and cannot be fully anonymized. 
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were coded as representing the category reasoning when they answered the question: how 
do the participants argue about their personal safety and the risks they face?  
The goal of the analysis was to capture how people experience a situation involving 
security risks that can lead to personal harm over an extended period of time. For this 
reason, the interpretative phenomenological analysis was applied. In the interpretative 
phenomenological analysis, the focus is on “…how people think about and understand 
significant events and people in their lives. These themes include a focus on participants’ 
meaning-making and interpretation, a concern with identity and a sense of self and an 
attention to bodily feeling within lived experience” (J. A. Smith & Eatough, 2007, p. 37). 
The interpretative step in the analysis involves the use of the experience of the researcher 
through drawing on psychological theory in order to “make sense” of the participant’s 
experience. The interpretation of the accounts given by the interviewees was guided by 
psychological theory. Interpretation refers to the act of grounding the accounts of the 
interviewees’ in psychological constructs. The findings of the interviews present a 
structured view on how the interviewees experienced ongoing threat due to an uncertain 
security situation. 
Findings 
In each part of the analysis a sequence of three steps will be followed. First, the 
respective categories will be described along with their definition and theoretical 
underpinning. Second, the range of values will be designated in individual categories. 
Third, the data will be interpreted.  
Appraisal of the security situation. 
The first step of the analysis was to characterize how the humanitarian aid workers 
viewed their security situation. The category perceived risk captures statements referring to 
the likelihood of incidents. This included the general likelihood of security incidents as 
well as specific security incidents mentioned by the participants. The different threats are 
reported along with how many threats are named. When respondents spoke about their 
affective response to the possible consequences of security incidents their statements were 
coded with the category negative affect. Segments referring to how strongly the security 
situation influences the person’s life were captured in the category concern. 
In order to assess how participants perceive the general security situation they were 
asked: “how do you perceive the general security situation?” The measure is assumed to be 
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unconditional because it did not ask for the personal risk. The consideration whether the 
risk perception is conditional or unconditional is important because differences in the 
answer might only be caused by the fact that some participants consider that it is their own 
actions that lower the risk while others refer to the risk independent of their actions 
(Brewer et al., 2007; Halpern-Felsher et al., 2001; Weinstein & Nicolich, 1993). The 
likelihood of security incidents was categorized in four sub-categories: high risk, medium 
risk, low risk and situation specific. The frequencies are displayed in Table 3. 
Table 3: Ratings of ambient risk. 
Likelihood of security incidents 
Darfur  Khartoum 
n %  n % 
high 8 47.1%  1 14.3% 
medium 3 17.6%  2 28.6% 
low 5 29.4%  1 14.3% 
situation specific 1 5.9%  3 42.9% 
Total 17 100%  7 100% 
 
From the above table it is apparent that the perceived likelihood of security incidents 
differs depending on the region the participant is deployed in. Participants in Darfur 
characterized the likelihood most often as high. Participants from Khartoum perceive it 
mostly as low, but when they travel as high. The frequency of how often participants 
named a specific security incident is represented in Table 4.  
Table 4: Type of negative events and frequency of reporting by participants. 
Type of incident 
Darfur  Khartoum 
n %  n % 
crime 8 47.1%  1 14.3% 
carjacking 2 70.6%  1 14.3% 
kidnapping 8 47.1%  1 14.3% 
crossfire 10 58.8%  1 14.3% 
other accidents 1 5.9%  1 14.3% 
direct attack on NGO 7 41.2%  2 28.6% 
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The specific security incidents named by the participants can have severe 
consequences and are mostly linked to criminal acts. It is important to note that 53.0% of 
the participants (N = 9) assume that humanitarian aid and relief organizations can become 
explicit targets of violence. 
The individuals differed regarding the number of threats mentioned. The number of 
different threats was counted and is depicted in Table 5. 
Table 5: Number of negative incidents stated by each participant. 
Number of threats named per person 
Darfur  Khartoum 
n %  n % 
0 0 0  2 28.6% 
1 2 11.8%  3 42.9% 
2 5 29.4%  2 28.6% 
3 6 35.3%  0 0 
4 4 23.5%  0 0 
 
Participants are aware of possible negative events in their working and living 
environment and participants name multiple possible threats. Particularly in Darfur, the 
overall answers show that the participants mostly appraise the general security situation as 
tense.  
The findings up to this point refer to rather analytical aspects of the risk appraisal, 
but during the interview it was also asked whether the participants experience negative 
affect associated with the possible consequences of these incidents. 
In order to assess the security perception from an affective angle, negative affect 
related to the security situation was a subject of inquiry. The term negative affect is broad; 
in the literature concerning risk perception and judgment it is often used to refer to specific 
states such as worry, fear, and uncertainty (van Gelder et al., 2009). Negative affect was 
used to refer to any negative feeling related to the security situation; this entails feelings of 
uncertainty and frustration as well as anxiety and fear. Statements answering the question 
“How do you feel about the possibility of security incidents?” or statements referring to 
affective responses were considered. In Table 6 the frequency of participants who 
experienced negative affect as a result of the security situation is displayed. 
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Table 6: Participants experiencing negative affect. 
Experience of negative affect 
Darfur  Khartoum 
n %  n % 
yes 7 41.2%  0 .0% 
no 10 58.8%  7 100.0% 
 
Seven of the participants experienced negative affect associated with the security 
situation. Only individuals who were deployed in Darfur reported negative affect related to 
the security situation. 
While the above information reflects how the participants perceive the situation, it 
does not capture to what degree the security situation influences their daily life. Accounts 
referring to the influence and importance of these adversities, and the degree to which the 
security situation presents a threat, the risk appraisal, are coded with the category 
“concern”.  
As shown above the participants are aware of the existence of personal threats in 
their working and living environment. The degree of concern among the participants is 
portrayed in Table 7. 
Table 7: Concern about the security situation. 
Concern about security 
Darfur  Khartoum 
n %  n % 
high 2 11.8%  0 .0% 
medium 4 23.5%  0 .0% 
low 8 47.1%  6 85.7% 
situation specific 3 17.6%  1 14.3% 
Total 17 100%  7 100% 
 
It is particularly interesting that in Darfur the majority of participants did not show a 
high degree of concern, since the risk perception indicated a medium or high risk for the 
majority of participants. Only two accounts of participants indicated increased occupation 
with possible security incidents. 
During the interviews the participants were asked about the strategies that they apply 
and follow for their security. All participants stated that the existence of security measures 
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was important in order to be able to work in this insecure environment and decrease the 
risk of security incidents. The strategies focusing on the negative event aim to gain control 
over the environment. It is shown in different studies that controllability of a risk is an 
important factor in risk perception and it is shown that controllable risks are perceived as 
less severe (Harris, Griffin, & Murray, 2008; Klein & Helweg-Larsen, 2002; Weinstein, 
1984). How do people develop a feeling of control over a situation which is highly 
uncertain? In the following section different accounts of interviewees strategies will be 
presented and the strategies will be categorized.  
Adjusting to the security situation. 
Adjustment is guided by coping behavior. Coping behavior refers to actions that 
attempt to ensure functioning in the face of a changing environment. Coping behavior has 
two routes: adjustment of the organism or adjustment of the environment. To distinguish 
strategies along these lines is similar to the concept of problem-focused and emotion-
focused coping in the transactional model (Lazarus, 1991, 1999), and primary (focusing on 
the situation) and secondary control (focusing on the self) in the literature concerned with 
developmental adjustment (Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Heckhausen et al., 2010). For this 
reason two distinct categories were formulated to capture adjustment strategies: strategies 
focusing on the negative event and strategies focusing on the self. 
Strategies focusing on the negative event. 
The participants named a number of strategies they used in order to influence the 
possible negative event. These strategies come very close to what is defined as risk 
defusing operators (Huber et al., 1997). “A risk-defusing operator is an action, performed 
additionally to a specific alternative, which: may prevent the negative event, interrupt the 
causal chain between event and negative outcome, or transform the negative outcome into 
an outcome state, which is more acceptable” (Huber et al., 2001, p. 410). The strategies, 
their characteristics and examples are displayed in Table 8. 
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Table 8: Strategies focusing on the negative event. 
Strategy Definition Example excerpt 
change of behavior or 
appearance 
In order to reduce the 
likelihood of 
becoming victimized, 
the person changes 
behavior in a specific 
way or stops 
performing an action 
that is considered 
risky. 
Oh the carjacking? Uhm, yeah a little bit. 
- Yes, uhm, but, we ended up putting that 
car away and we had not used the Land 
cruiser anymore. So I really feel that 
because of the type of vehicles we´ve 
chosen, that it´s very small the possibility 
that a carjacking could happen again. 
(20090525-4, 314-317) 
strive for acceptance of 
locals 
The person tries to 
become accepted and 
respected by the local 
population. 
To get to know people in the community 
around me, to try to learn the language, to 
try to be sensitive to, the local culture and 
people. And I do think that that adds an 
extra layer of protection. It may only be 
sludge, uhm but I think that also 
contributes to my, uhm not feeling 
threatened. (20090527-5, 128-131) 
monitoring The person tries to be 
informed about 
possible sources of 
threats and actively 
tries to avoid 
situations that he 
considers to be 
dangerous. 
Even if you have been told the situation is 
ok. Once you arrive in such a place which 
has had the high security risk, then äh the 
first thing to do is try to gather as much 
information as possible!. (20090407-2, 
340-342) 
protection Taking protective 
measures, which are 
intended to reduce 
the likelihood of a 
negative event or to 
reduce the impact a 
After this incident we did all this crap 
with the electric fence, oh no, I guess we 
already had that. I don’t know what else 
we did. We have the electric fence and 
barbed wire and stuff. I think nobody can 
get in easily (translated from German). 
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Strategy Definition Example excerpt 
negative event. (20090527-3, 120-124) 
  We also have tried to do target hardening, 
where if by the, the most commonly 
weapon here is the AK-47. Just make it 
that the shots with the AK-47 will not 
reach you. Put up a sand bag and that kind 
of thing yeah, so. (20090421-1, 268-271) 
worst case plans Planning responses in 
case a negative event 
occurs, in order to 
limit the negative 
effects. 
I have a plan. I wanna make sure that we 
have, we make sure that we have enough 
supplies to last for a few days if we need 
to stay inside. (20090415, 238-239) 
 
The strategies functioning as risk defusing operators affect the two central 
components of risk: the probability of the event occurrence and the negative utility of its 
possible negative outcome. The likelihood of a security incident may be decreased through 
a change in behavior or appearance, monitoring of the security situation and striving for 
acceptance among locals in order to be less likely to be targeted. Strategies that reduce the 
impact of a security incident are actions such as putting up sandbags or storing food and 
water. Protective strategies can reduce the likelihood of a security incident as well as the 
possible negative impact. 
The strategies focusing on the negative event present ways to control the 
environment. The participants argue that through specific conduct they shape the situation, 
and reduce their personal risk in a context which was mostly acknowledged as risky. This 
shows that adjustment strategies focusing on the environment present an important means 
to adapt to an ambiguous security context and increase the feeling of safety by reducing the 
risk of security incidents or their impact. Another way to shape how a situation is appraised 
can be the change of internal values and goals, which present coping strategies focusing on 
the self. 
Strategies focusing on the self. 
Strategies focusing on the adjustment of internal processes and representations are 
found in the coping literature (e.g., Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Lazarus, 1999; 
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Skinner et al., 2003) and also in developmental psychology (e.g., Baltes & Staudinger, 
1999; Heckhausen & Schulz, 1995; Rothbaum et al., 1982). Strategies aiming to adjust the 
person in accordance with a given situation are referred to as strategies focusing on the 
self. These strategies described by participants do not seem to actually decrease the risk of 
security incidents but help the participant to experience safety. For example one participant 
said: 
 I think you use probably false rationalizations like: ‘it`ll never happen to 
me because, yeah you know I´m more alert or you know I´ll see I`ll 
somehow see the perpetrator before they see me and respond correctly or 
my neighbors love me and they never let anybody you know [laughs] 
come into the house’ or you know things like that. This this kind, short 
rational narratives which you tell yourself, to try to make yourself feel 
safer. I certainly have employed those in other [?theaters] I have 
employed them here to a certain degree,…. 
20090527-5, 114-122 
Four strategies focusing on the self were distinguished, two captured ways of 
cognitive and emotional control, and the other two captured whether or not the participant 
reflected the possible consequences of the security situation. Table 9 below lists the 
strategies found, their definitions and examples. 
Table 9: Strategies focusing on the self. 
Name Definition Example 
suppress emotions/ 
thoughts 
The deliberate suppression 
and avoidance of thoughts 
concerning the possible 
negative consequences or 
suppresses negative 
feelings. 
Interviewer: Do you think about, what 
happened to your staff when you travel 
that it could be you next or-? 
Person 1: I don´t want to be next. Yeah. 
So, I don't even want to think about it. 
Yes. (20090421-3, 131-135) 
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Name Definition Example 
reappraise emotions/ 
thoughts 
The reflection of thoughts 
concerning the possible 
negative outcomes or 
negative affect. The 
thoughts and feelings are 
considered and not 
avoided, but are 
reappraised based on the 
knowledge about the 
general situation. 
I think first I try to listen to them and 
try to see if there is wisdom in 'em 
somewhere you know [laughs]. And 
then if it´s, if it´s your brain being wiser 
your spirit being wise to tell you to be 
careful in the situation then I´m gonna 
be careful. If it seems, and I also will 
evaluated to see if it´s just - scared 
´cause you don´t know or, whatever. I 
think then I, I find a way to, not let that 
thought . to at least dominate me. 
(20090524, 187-191) 
 
reflection of 
consequences 
The possible negative 
outcomes are known and 
considered. The possible 
negative consequences 
influence the evaluation of 
the security situation. 
One because I just recently attended a 
seminar on äh . field safety and: - 
there´s an increase in carjacking, 
kidnapping, and that´s there were 
focusing on and that´s we focus on, 
avoiding! and what to do. So maybe 
naturally that´s what´s on my mind I 
don´t know. (20090525-3, 126-129) 
 
no reflection of 
consequences 
The possible negative 
consequences are not 
considered. The possible 
negative consequences do 
not influence the 
evaluation of the security 
situation. 
No not really. I sometimes think about 
it when I talk about such things, 
security and stuff, then I think about it, 
but not otherwise (translated from 
German). (20090527-4, 131-134) 
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How participants experience the degree of risk does not only depend on the objective 
situation, but also on how they self-regulate their internal response to the given situation. 
Some participants voiced that they do not consider the fact that they could suffer severe 
negative consequences others stated that they are aware of how they personally could be 
affected by security incidents. Thus, the first step was to identify whether or not the 
participants reflected on the possible consequences and then secondly, to examine how 
they reacted to them. While some participants chose not to reflect on the possibility of 
incidents and personal victimization, for others the reflection and the “keeping in mind” 
was important in order to be aware of the context and behave according to the situational 
needs. 
The willingness to reflect the consequences associated with negative outcomes was 
influenced by whether people relied on strategies of suppression or reappraisal. For 
example, one participant said:  
I think first I try to listen to them [fears] and try to see if there is wisdom 
in ‘em somewhere you know [laughs]. And then if it’s (.) if it’s your brain 
being wiser your spirit being wise to tell you to be careful in the situation 
then I’m gonna be careful. If it seems, and I also will evaluated to see if 
it’s just - scared ´cause you don´t know or, whatever. I think then I, I find 
a way to, not let that thought to at least dominate me. Give it to God or I 
don't know how you wanna say it but combat! fear with truth. . ."To live 
with Christ to die is gain". I don’t know you know think to your your 
verses or, or what’s important to you but, I don´t wanna let fear rule 
me.” (187-194) 
 […] 
You hear bombing in it three streets over or four streets over. ‘Who is it? 
What is it? Is somebody exploding ordinances because they found some 
landmines? Is it, bombing coming from REBEL FACTION 2 that is 
attacking the city? Was it a car backfiring? Is it- ?’ You know ‘What’s, 
what’s the sound? Not knowing!, is the thing that causes, fear. So know 
as much as you can. Understand as much as you can. And then your fear 
is appropriate. When you’re afraid you should! be afraid. When you 
don’t! know, you can live afraid all the time. So be as informed as you 
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can, and your fear is gonna be, like fear should be.” (358-365) 
20090524 
The quote presents an example for cognitive reappraisal as a means to regulate 
emotional reactions to the situation. The respondent considers the possible negative 
development of the situation and uses his past experiences to judge its likelihood. One 
important aspect of cognitive reappraisal is that the immediate emotional response is 
acknowledged and its validity is questioned. It seems that one precondition to engaging in 
cognitive reappraisal is to allow the reflection of the possible outcomes of the situation and 
to consider the different possible courses of action. Reflection and reappraisal involve the 
acknowledgment of personal vulnerability, which is not the case when thoughts or 
emotions associated with negative consequences and personal vulnerability are suppressed.  
Research on emotion regulation suggests that emotions can be altered through 
suppression and reappraisal of the situation. Reappraisal involves cognitive processes in 
order to change the appraisal of a situation and thereby change the emotional response, 
contrary suppression aims to control the emotional expression (Gross, 1998b). Empirical 
findings support the assumption that both processes differ and that regulation based on 
suppression and control is less beneficial than regulation based on reappraisal (Gross, 
1998; Richards & Gross, 2000; Gross & John, 2003; John & Gross, 2004). For this reason, 
how people modulated their emotional responses, as well as whether they allowed 
themselves to think about the implications of the security situation for them, presented an 
important difference when capturing strategies focusing on the self.  
It seems that both the use of reappraisal or suppression lead to an increased feeling of 
safety. Although in the case of suppression, this might be more likely to be connected to a 
lower perceived risk than the actual risk. The perception of safety is more likely to be 
accurate and according to the level of risk when relying on reappraisal. As a result, 
adjustment strategies focusing on the self are important determinants for the congruence of 
a given security situation and perceived safety.  
Conclusion. 
The previous two sections showed that humanitarian aid workers deployed in an 
insecure context used different strategies to adjust and to feel safe. It was argued that 
strategies can be distinguished according to their focus. One class of strategies focuses on 
the situation and tries to limit the probability of security incidents as well as their severity 
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in case they occur, while another class of strategies focused on internal adjustment and the 
individual’s reaction to the situation. The verbal accounts show that for the participants the 
reflection of possible negative outcomes and the regulation of the cognitive and emotional 
responses to them represent important means to influence how they perceive the situation. 
Thus, functional adjustment to living and working in an environment yielding ambiguous 
security not only requires strategies focusing on the negative event but also strategies 
focusing on the self.  
When analyzing accounts focusing on the internal adjustment, it was apparent that 
the participants differed greatly in their willingness to reflect on the implications of 
security incidents for them personally. But why do some participants seem to acknowledge 
the possibility of personal harm while others do not? Some answers to this question were 
given by the respondents during the interview, when they reasoned about the risk and their 
personal security situation. 
Interpretation  
In their answers the participants described their response to the insecure situation, but 
also gave arguments and justifications for their risk perception as well as their concern 
about their personal security. It seems that often interviewees did not agree with the 
assumption of the interviewer that their behavior implies risk-taking. Sections were 
identified in which the participants talked about how they feel about the risks and to what 
degree the risks in the environment have an effect on them and why. Different views on the 
personal risks were apparent in the reasons brought forth to justify the personal feeling of 
safety. The ways of reasoning will be described in the first part of this section, then it will 
be argued that the ways of reasoning can function as indicators for the processes 
underlying coping. 
During the interviews different ways of reasoning were found, and are depicted in 
Table 10. Ways of reasoning were named according to the general content of reasons, for 
example the account above falls into the category “trust in measures and strategies”, then 
the category is defined and an example presented. 
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Table 10: Ways of reasoning about personal risk. 
Name Definition Example 
Trust in 
measures and 
strategies 
The participant argues that 
through the use of the security 
measures his/her personal risk is 
reduced to a minimum. The 
participant is confident that due 
to the measures that he/ she is 
safe. Thus, the deployment is 
not actually considered risk-
taking. 
Sure there´s a possibility something 
goes wrong and something happens. 
You know we´ve had our areas 
attacked, we´ve had, you know 
maybe four times in the last year 
maybe more we had a clinic overrun. 
We thought we had a guard who was 
killed. I just thought that one guard 
killed and the second went missing at 
first and eventually we found out that 
everybody was ok. You know I mean 
those are possibilities! and they´re 
weighty!. . . But I think at some level 
you be smart . you act wisely. But 
you also trust, then what the results 
´cause you can´t, control everything. 
(20090524, 294-300) 
Focus on 
goal 
The participant is aware the 
he/she is taking a risk, but the 
reason is a higher goal. Thus, the 
negative event is mitigated.  
Again you know you have not to get 
distracted by this stuff. You have to 
keep your eye on the goal and not be 
side tracked. (20090415, 266-268) 
   
Acceptance The participant argues that 
he/she is well aware of the risk 
and the possibility of being 
victimized. The risk is 
deliberately taken and the 
possible consequences are 
accepted. 
People are there, they need the 
services, but for you to deliver the 
services you have to take the risk. So, 
my, the risks I take, are if I kind of 
see one, child who was shaken with 
malaria smiling because it has been 
healed. People who have starved, 
getting food. That´s worth all! the 
risk. [laugh], Ja ja. So that´s it. 
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Name Definition Example 
(20090421-1, 300-304) 
Denial The participant argues that the 
perception of the interviewer is 
wrong, and that the risk to the 
participant is actually low. Thus, 
for him/her being in the context 
is not regarded as taking a risk. 
I think if people lose control in 
Darfur I wouldn´t work there. They 
wouldn´t want me there so. My 
service I´m afraid of death so I 
wouldn´t want myself to get killed 
there also. But those situations are 
also not common, right? [laughs]. 
(20090421-3, 439-444) 
Fatalism The participant voices that the 
risk is present; however, there is 
nothing to be done about it an 
ultimately the chances of 
becoming a victim is a matter of 
luck. For this reason the 
existence of the risk and its 
implications are not generally 
thought about.  
Interviewer: -- Do you think that you 
take a risk being here. I mean, for 
these … 
Person 1: Of course, but when I am in 
Hamburg/Hambach and I cross the 
street I am taking a risk there too, or 
if I were sailing that would be a risk 
too. Risks are everywhere. One has 
to, I mean I see it very relaxed, I 
think.  
 (20090525-2, 189-192) 
 
Often one way of reasoning was not exclusive, for example some people stated that 
they trust in security measures but also stated that they accept a certain degree of risk and 
see it as part of their work. The following example portrays the relationship between the 
reasoning about risk and the appraisal of the personal security. 
Person 1: Well the risk is always there, you know. But, like what I´ve 
mentioned, if the risk is manageable and you know, and . I think I´ll be 
I´ll be; because there is always a trigger point wherein your life is really 
in a real danger and you have to leave. That´s that´s my personal belief. 
(269-272) 
[…] 
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Interviewer: So you would, has your feeling of safety increased because 
you know, the security measures?  
Person 1: No not really increased. But you feel a little bit comfortable. 
Because you know what! to do. But it doesn´t gives you, it doesn´t give 
you the guarantee that you would be safe you know. I know I´m safe here 
but! it äh gives you a little bit of you know I I you know.  
Interviewer: So you feel more comfortable ´cause you know what to do 
and-  
Person 1: You know what to do and things come and this happens you 
know when when these things happen what to do. Instead of looking for 
answers.  
Interviewer: Did you have security training?  
Person 1: Ja, I had one. When I was in Afghanistan.  
Interviewer: Did it change did it change your perception and your-?  
Person 1: Yeah I [? some of these other things]  
Interviewer: What did it change?  
Person 1: Well like, you know. You have, the do´s and the don´ts right 
and you have a - if you are taking hostage what do you do? You know 
you know. Or how to avoid, I mean, you don´t provoke your captors or 
whatever you know something like that. But at, at the end of the day you 
also have to, ah, you go to such areas like like this one. You have to 
prepare yourself. You have to have a mindset. (348-375) 
200904021-2 
The account shows that while the participant is aware of the possibility of security 
incidents, the training and preparation increased the feeling of confidence in the ability to 
handle these situations and thereby reduced the personal risk of suffering negative 
consequences in case security incidents occur. Furthermore, the account shows that the use 
of security measures induces a sense of security and that the analytical reflection of the 
personal risk mitigates the concern. Participants differed regarding their statements about 
the effect of security measures. For some it was a way to remove the risk of personal 
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victimization whereas for others it was only a way to reduce it. Those two different ways 
of reasoning are reflected in the two following quotes: 
For me personally, I think it is the most probable to walk into a shooting 
in the market, or when I am too late on the street run into a robbery, 
because currently there are a lot of robbers stealing mobile phones. And 
these incidents are probably the most threatening when I have my 
children along. I still take them along to the market, and so far I have 
never been afraid and God always protected us that we did not walk into 
any dangerous situation. It is important to me to still leave the house and 
that the children see other people and that they do not grow up in fear 
and confined (translated from German). (28-36) 
20090528 
And 
Person 1: Uh, quite a few of my colleagues were ambushed on this 
stretch from Kat to Nyala, and when three or four of them had been, uh, 
it was kind of like, I mean in those days it had been quite frequent within 
two weeks [] I think we all got aware that this could happen to anyone, 
and also because some of them happened not very far out of Nyala, so of 
course there were a lot of restrictions on how we moved and we tried to 
protect ourselves [] we got trained in ambush and how to act in those 
situations, uh, and there was training also organized by WFPM how to 
handle stress and [], um we tried to protect ourselves also because they 
were after mobile phones, cash, computers, laptops so when we travelled 
we tried to have as little as possible [] kind of make sure that you don't 
have things that you become a target, but in general terms, I don't think, I 
wouldn't say that I felt insecure when I was in Darfur. (41-52) 
[…]  
for me it has a lot to do with how you handle situations and we had a 
really, really good boss and took security very seriously (75-77) 
[…] 
its really also the rare occasion that something happens to international 
people, like if you look at the statistics of people or how many are killed 
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through the year for the (something) figures (didn't understand) ever time 
it happens, but it’s very few times that it actually happens to compared to 
the amount of people who live there, like in places like perhaps not now 
in Darfur but like last year or the year, so I guess also there is some kind 
of like rat-, rationality and also I know that one of, I mean information 
and have access to analysis of the, understanding the conflict is 
extremely important… (201-208) 
20090414 
In the first quote the interviewee acknowledged the personal risk indicated by the 
affirmation of the likelihood of security incidents, and the randomness of victimization. 
However, instead of showing high concern about personal safety the goal to “keep calm 
and carry on” was pursued despite the obvious risks. In the second quote the responder 
stated that security incidents occur but moved on to explain why they are unlikely to 
happen to him. From those two quotes, two ways of reasoning stand out. First, the 
affirmation of personal risk and its acceptance and second, denial of the personal risk due 
to security measures as way to mitigate the risk and using statistics as a mean to refute the 
assumption held by the interviewer that the situation involves threats to personal security. 
Often the interviewees perceive the risk of security incidents and resulting personal harm 
as controllable: 
It is not that they [security incidents, note by the author] happen all the 
time. You can sense them coming. But with proper planning you can 
avoid them. (301-303) 
20090407-2 
All of the participants stated that the risk of a security incident and possible personal 
harm can be avoided through protective actions and personal adjustment. The participants 
argue that it is not the perception of the risk per se, but the assessment and reflection of 
possible responses that determine their reaction to the threat: 
I thought I would feel very insecure before I came there, I thought it 
would be horrible because I had heard so many bad things, but I think it 
was actually a quite secure environment (56-58) 
[…] 
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I was one of the only international women at the office, and there were 
very few other international, I mean perhaps 10 international staff and 
children but lots of local staff, and had a lot of really good support and a 
lot of information with sharing with them also what was going on (59-63) 
[…] 
for me it has a lot to do with how you handle situations and we had a 
really really good boss and took security very seriously and he was firm 
in his negotiations [?] so in that sense I felt that often our concerns were 
listened to and acted on. (75-78) 
20090414 
It is assumed that when discrepancies between aspired end state and present state 
occur three processes can be distinguished which function as a mean to reduce the 
perceived discrepancy (for a detailed description see Section 0 where the model of 
accommodative, assimilative and immunization processes is introduced). Processes aiming 
to move the present state closer to the aspired state through actively changing the present 
state are referred to as assimilative processes. Another way to reduce the discrepancy 
between can be through processes that adjust the aspired end state and thereby remove the 
discrepancy. However, those self-regulative processes are only activated if the discrepancy 
is actually perceived as such, which is hindered by immunization processes (Brandtstädter, 
2001; Greve, 2000). The pattern of strategies participants reported and their ways of 
reasoning are used to infer on these three processes, immunization, assimilation and 
accommodation. It was argued in chapter 0 that strategies used to adjust the self in the face 
of challenges had to foci: the self and the negative event. While the focus of strategies 
already give some insight into the processes, particularly the reasoning of the participants 
about why certain strategies reduce their concern seems insightful to understand how self-
regulation might mediate the relationship between risk perception and concern for personal 
security.  
The participants vary regarding their flexibility to change strategies according to 
situational demands. For example in the case of the category “change of behavior or 
appearance” some participants indicated that they only avoid an area during specific times 
and try to adjust their behavior according to their assessment as the following statement 
shows: 
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I guess I look at I have this ability what happens and sense security 
incidents. And I do think about where the risks come from and what they 
are. Based on that!, I guess it´s combination of, what do I see happening 
to other people, and what do I see happening around me. And then I 
make deductions based on that. I make deductions from that, you know. 
220 carjackings last year. Three weeks ago, in another City two 
carjackings occured, one guy shot and killed at his gate, one guy had a 
carjacking but he wasn´t armed. I am processing all that. I am thinking 
about my situation, "ok sometimes I have a car sometimes I don´t". When 
I drive it into the gate it´s a very short turn and the gate is very narrow. I 
normally have to stop to get out to open it, so it´s a very vulnerable, time 
for a carjacking so that could happen to me. - but then I I consider my 
surroundings "Do I ever see anybody you know who looks, threatening or 
do I feel threatened?" you know, yeah. So that´s one way”. (252-263)  
20090527-5 
While others state that they never take any risk and therefore restrict their movement 
in general: 
Interviewer: - So you would say Region 1 is actually pretty safe, for 
foreigners? 
Person 1: Yes. It´s it´s a safe when you you just keep yourself safe.  
Interviewer: Hm - which means that that you don´t go out you don´t-  
Person 1: Ja. W- we are careful all the time. We stay within ähm, the 
green zones. That´s all. You´ll be ok. (316-324)  
20090421-3 
Both statements indicate control, but yield an important difference. In the first 
statement the risk is assessed and the actions taken aim to reduce personal vulnerability to 
an acceptable level. In the first example, the strategies employed do not eliminate the risk 
and the participant is aware of this, he chooses to limit the personal risk, but still is willing 
to take the risk of using a car, but in doing so is aware of the possible negative event. The 
second statement is different for two reasons: first, it is assumed that specific strategies, in 
this case limitation of movement, leads to perfect safety. Second, the participant tries to 
avoid risks, even if this means not leaving the compound, which is referred to as the green 
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zone. Both strategies show a high level of striving for control. But they differ in respect to 
the degree of risk accepted as part of the environment. Considering the two processes, 
accommodation and assimilation (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990a), it could be assumed 
that both participants show a high level of assimilation, since both attempt to control the 
environment. The two participants differ in respect to their level of accommodative 
processes. While the first participant seems to show a higher level of activation of 
accommodation, indicated by the acceptance of the increased risk, the second quote 
indicates that the other participant, while yielding a high degree of assimilation too, by 
selecting the safe environment indicates a low degree of accommodation. A constellation 
of strategies proposed to indicate each process is depicted in Table 11. 
Table 11: Pattern of strategies and reasoning as indicator of adjustment process. 
Process Strategies of adjustment focusing on Reasoning 
 Self Situation  
Immunization Suppression of 
emotion and thoughts 
 Denial (+) 
 no reflection of 
consequences 
 Fatalism (+) 
Accommodation Reappraisal  Acceptance of 
residual risk (+) 
 reflection of 
consequences 
 Trust in measures 
and strategies (-) 
 Shifting of personal 
standards 
  
Assimilation  Change of behavior Control (+) 
  Protection Focus on goal (+) 
  Monitoring  Fatalism (-) 
  Worst case plans  
*. (+) indicates a positive and (-) a negative relationship of the reasoning and the 
respective process. 
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Immunization processes are assumed to be activated in the current study when 
participants do not regard the security as a problem which is indicated by a low rating of 
risk, even when deployed in the Darfur region. Those participants denied that the security 
situation could present a problem to them personally and they reacted with fatalism. In 
those cases it is assumed that neither assimilative nor accommodative processes are 
activated, because participants do not perceive a discrepancy between their aspired end 
state and the present state. Only if participants perceived a discrepancy, self-regulation is 
activated and guided by accommodative and assimilative processes (Brandtstädter, 2001).  
When people indicate that on the one hand they regard the risk of security incidents 
as high but on the other hand do not show a high concern for their personal security then 
this could be due to a high level of assimilation together with a high level of 
accommodation. Assimilative strategies mitigate actual personal risk through actions 
which reduce the personal susceptibility to security incidents and as a result decrease the 
discrepancy between aspired and experienced security. The activation of assimilation is 
assumed to be indicated by reasons that focus on the means available to reduce the 
personal risk. The identification of assimilative processes is straightforward. Assimilative 
processes involve conscious acts employed to enable the person to achieve an aspired end 
state. This involves the selection of agreeable environments, using self-control in order to 
focus attention or to concentrate on goals as well as draw on compensatory means. The 
identification of accommodative processes is more difficult since they are assumed to be 
unconscious (e.g, Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). Accommodative processes are 
manifest in the reframing of goals or standards, as well as the shifting of reference frames 
and comparison groups and the change of standards can only be observed over time. Thus, 
without observations over time, the inference on the activity of accommodative processes 
is tentative. The acceptance of the security situation and statements referring to the shift of 
personal references due to the security situation are seen as indicators of accommodation. 
Furthermore, the comparison of participants who left the area due to high concern when at 
the same time using the same security measures and other assimilative strategies indicate 
that the low concern for personal security when judging the risk as high might be due to 
accommodative processes in the group of participants who stayed.  
Furthermore participants who demonstrate a high risk perception but indicate lower 
concern seem to acknowledge the risk of security incidents but employ strategies of self-
regulation to limit their concern. On the other hand, some participants ridiculed the 
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assumption put forth by the interviewer that their working context involves a high risk. 
One difference between those groups was whether they chose to work in the context of 
humanitarian aid specifically to help others or not. When looking at the reasoning for the 
appraisal of the security situation, one finding in the analysis of the interviews indicates a 
relationship between risk perception, resulting concern about personal security and the 
implication of risk-taking for another person. The following quote is an example of a 
participant who considers the benefit of their risk-taking: 
Person 1: Why am I here? Ahm -- partly because I wanted to be able to 
reach out and help people. And so, even if I´m doing finances I feel that 
I´m part of something that is helping people. - And part of it is to reach 
out to, ahm, with the news. I´m knowing that I´m part of that. So, kind of 
the bigger picture is the reason why I´m here. The the how we can, reach 
out to the needs and the, and what these people need to to to hear and to 
bring change in their life and all that. So yeah. Yeah that´s that´s 
definitely a very, very high benefit bonus thing as to, äh I would take on 
the difficulties and challenges and the frustrations and the pressures 
because, being able to bring benefit to people is is really rewarding. 
(353-362) 
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On the other hand some participants do not consider the benefit of their risk-taking 
for other as the following account shows: 
Interviewer: Do you, hm. . Why do you why do you do it then? Why do 
you risk your life?  
Person 1: For me it´s a career. - [laughs] It´s the - ähm I started working 
as an APO, I don't know whether you know that APO, Associate 
Professional Officer for the UN, like a junior professional and that was 
for three years and I was based in Tanzania. Then afterwards when my 
contract finished, I had to look for, an alternative. International posting 
and äh this organization called me for this job. (279-290) 
20090421-3 
To find out whether the view on risk-taking as a way of helping leads to differences 
in the risk perception and concern , risk perception and concern ratings of participants who 
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stated helping as an explicit motive were compared to the ones who did not state this. To 
control for the differences in security risk depending on ambient risk of security incidents 
as an explanation of differences between participants, only participants from Darfur are 
examined. Immunization processes are considered to be reflected by a low risk perception, 
because the risk of security incidents at the time of the interviews was generally high and 
all participants named threats which can affect them.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 5: Ratings of perceived risk and ratings of concern for personal safety grouped 
according to the focus of the goal for participants deployed in the Darfur region. 
Figure 5 shows an interesting pattern. It is assumed that the degree of ambient 
insecurity is the same for all participants deployed in the Darfur. The majority of 
participants in both groups yield a medium or low concern for personal security. But the 
difference in ratings of risk perception between the participants who focus on others and 
those who do not indicates that immunization processes seem more prevalent in the latter 
group. Are participants who consider the positive outcomes of their risk-taking for others 
(i.e., who engage in helping) willing to take higher risks than the participants who do not? 
The interviews seem to suggest that this is the case. Before examining the relationship 
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between helping and risk-taking closer in the next sections, the findings of the interviews 
are discussed next. 
Discussion 
This section will sequentially answer the questions which were guiding the 
interviews and will relate the findings to the literature. The first two questions were: how 
do participants who work and live in a context yielding a volatile security appraise their 
personal safety and the general risk of security incidents? And what is the relationship 
between the general security situation and personal perceived risk? The interviews show 
that a substantial number of participants (N = 8) assessed the general security situation 
yielding a high risk of security incidents. However only two participants deployed in the 
Darfur region reported high concern while the others (N = 6) reported a low concern for 
personal security. This group is contrasted by other participants (N =5) who also were 
deployed in Darfur but stated that the environment is not very risky and argued that 
security is not a problem that concerns them. To find the asymmetry between the risk 
perception and the appraisal of the personal safety in the first group was surprising.  
The second set of research questions focused on the strategies used to adjust to the context 
yielding volatile security. What strategies do people use to cope with the ambiguous 
security situation? Participants use coping strategies which aim to reduce the risk of 
security incidents and possible negative consequences as well as strategies focusing on 
their reaction to the environment. The interviews show that coping strategies identified in 
the literature to cope with stress or general life challenges are also effective means to 
reduce the negative effect of a risky environment on general functioning. Coping behavior 
is apparent in the strategies focusing on internal process as well as in strategies focusing on 
the regulation of the situation. It seems that coping strategies influence the perception of 
risks that induce strong affect as well as the judgment of susceptibility to risks.  
In the interviews some participants indicated that they experience negative affect 
associated with the consequences of security incidents. Previous studies carried out using 
an experimental paradigm gave rise to the assumption that affect laden consequences 
appear to lead to choices that appear as if negative consequences are overweighted in the 
final choice (Loewenstein et al., 2001; Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001; Finucane & Holup, 
2006; Slovic & Peters, 2006). This general effect is questioned by some interviewees who 
argue that in order to shield themselves from irrational decisions due to the emotional 
reaction they engage in emotion regulation (i.e., coping behaviors focusing on the self). 
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Some participants suppress emotions and they do not experience them, while others use 
reappraisal. Reappraisal refers to the cognitive reevaluation of the situation given the 
specific emotional activation. Depending on the additional information available to them 
they either “follow their gut” or they discount their emotional reaction. The accounts of the 
participants therefore question the assumption that affect generally functions as a heuristic 
to judge risks (for an overview see Slovic & Peters, 2006), and suggest it could be limited 
to instances where no further information about a specific threat is available and personal 
differences in emotion regulation are not considered. Besides the influence of coping on 
the emotional component of risk perception, coping or anticipated abilities of coping seem 
to affect the analytical component of risk perception as well. 
The interviewees argued that their personal risk to experience security incidents and 
suffer from negative consequences of them is not equal to the general risk of security 
incidents. The participants argued that the personal risk of security incidents is depending 
on the strategies available of the person to reduce the likelihood of incidents or their 
severity (i.e., coping behaviors focusing on the situation). This is in line with the findings 
that people do not only search for information about probabilities and outcomes when 
judging choice option but also search for ways to affect the threatening event as well in 
order to be able to choose an option that yields the more advantageous favorable outcome 
(Huber et al., 2001; Huber & Huber, 2003, 2008). 
One goal of the interview study was to identify the proposed underlying processes of 
self-regulation accommodation, assimilation and immunization (Brandtstädter, 2001; 
Greve, 2000). The underlying processes were inferred through an interpretation of the 
individual patterns formed by the reasoning and the reported strategies used. The results 
have to be treated as preliminary for at least two reasons. First, whether accommodative 
processes are active or not can only be determined when personal standards, reference 
points or the importance of goals shift, which is an explicit characteristic of 
accommodation, since accommodative processes are not initiated consciously 
(Brandtstädter & Rothermund, 2002). Change can only be observed over time and thus the 
identification of accommodative processes requires a longitudinal design. This also affects 
the ability to distinguish between accommodation and immunization. While in the current 
interpretation of the interviews the denial of risk of security incidents was seen as an 
indicator of immunization, it might as well be the result of accommodative processes and 
the resulting downward adjustment of what is considered safe. Second, the use of strategies 
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which control the personal susceptibility and vulnerability to ambient risks of security 
incidents was seen as an indicator of assimilative processes. Since the humanitarian aid 
workers interviewed received pre-deployment staff training and had to abide by security 
guidelines, it is at least questionable if in all cases this presents a reliable indicator of 
assimilative processes. These problems were attempted to be tackled by considering the 
reasoning of the participants as well as the relationship between risk perceptions and 
concern together with the coping strategies.  
The findings suggest that participants who indicated a high activation of assimilation 
and low accommodation perceived the ambient risk as high and showed high concern for 
their personal security, even leaving the area of deployment in two cases due to extreme 
distress. Participants striving for control when assimilative strategies could not achieve 
control experienced distress. This presents a possible disadvantage of a high activation of 
assimilation and a low degree of accommodation in contexts where a specific goal is 
blocked and disengagement is not possible (Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990b; Brandtstädter 
& Rothermund, 2002; Carver, 1996). Another pattern found were participants which 
seemed to show a high activation of assimilative and accommodative processes. Those 
participants indicated that the ambient risk is high, but they experienced low personal 
concern. They relied on control strategies to limit personal susceptibility to security 
incidents and at the same time were aware of the remaining risk and adjusted what they 
considered safe accordingly. Those participants were distinguished from participants that 
were assumed to show immunization processes based on the appraisal of the ambient risk 
for security incidents. While the former group admitted the risk was high, the participants 
assumed to be affected by immunization processes appraised the ambient risk as low, and 
in turn had no reason to be concerned.  
It assumed that a complementary activation of assimilative and accommodative 
processes leads to functional adjustment to challenges (Baltes & Baltes, 1990; 
Brandtstädter & Renner, 1990; Brandtstädter & Wentura, 1995). For an activation of 
assimilative and accommodative processes the activation of immunization processes need 
to be low to ensure that people perceive a discrepancy between aspired end state and 
present state (Greve, 2000). If immunization processes are activated people are likely to 
perceive the risk of security incidents as low as well as indicate low concern. It remains an 
open question how immunization processes influence adaptive functioning over time. 
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While immunization could be beneficial to reduce experiences of stress and insecurity, it 
could also lead to reckless behavior and a lack of vigilance.  
It seems an important goal of future research to examine the implication of the 
processes underlying self-regulation particularly in uncertain contexts involving threats 
and how they affect adjustment. For example the activation of assimilation is associated 
with increased feelings of control (Taylor & Gollwitzer, 1995). Feelings of control are 
associated with an optimistic bias of one’s own susceptibility to threat (Klein & Helweg-
Larsen, 2002; van der Pligt, 1996; Weinstein, 1984). This could lead to an increase in risk-
taking and actually increase the likelihood to experience negative events. On the other 
hand it was found that when the feeling of control is high more danger signals are attended 
to (Brandtstädter, Voss, & Rothermund, 2004). This could mean higher levels of stress in 
an ambiguous situation because situations are more likely to be identified as threat, but 
also higher vigilance and a lower likelihood to become victimized. 
One surprising finding of the analysis of the interviews was that a low activation of 
immunization was associated with the view that personal risk-taking functions as a way to 
help others. It was found that when grouping participants according to whether they see 
risk-taking as a necessary means to help others or not, the second group seems to include 
more participants who also indicate a high activation of immunization processes. Maybe 
for participants who saw their work as a means to earn a living the interview activated 
conflicting cognitions concerning their security situation and their goal of risk-taking 
which induced a feeling of dissonance (Festinger, 1957). In order to reconcile these 
conflicting cognitions participants named strategies and reasons why they moved into an 
objectively dangerous context without experiencing distress or denied the dangers of the 
context all together. This would suggest that for the participants who saw their risk-taking 
as a way of helping, the goal was perceived as “more valuable” than just pursuing self-
interest. How does a person’s willingness to take risk change when one must take a risk to 
help others? This question will be focused on next.  
91 
 
Prosocial Behavior and Risk-Taking 
Do humans dare because they care? The results of the interviews suggest that 
motives and risk perception are linked and that acting on behalf of another person may lead 
to a greater threshold for risk. This is in line with the observation of another interview 
study reporting that the feeling of “being needed” led to higher risk-taking among 
humanitarian aid workers, such as staying in regions where the security situation is 
deteriorating (Bronner, 2000). Are people willing to take higher risks when risk-taking is 
necessary to help another person?  
Actions aiming to increase the well-being of others (e.g., helping, sharing and 
cooperation) are considered prosocial behavior (Bierhoff, 2002). As a result it would be 
considered prosocial behavior if a person would be willing to take a higher risk in order to 
benefit another person, than the person would when alone.  
Risk-taking to help others presents a special case of prosocial behavior. The research 
on prosocial behavior has a long tradition in psychology and was influenced by the studies 
of Latané and Darlene (Latané & Darley, 1968) which examined situational factors for 
helping in emergency situations. The findings indicated situational factors such as group 
size, and social influence clarity of responsibility for the well-being of another person were 
determinants of helping (Latané & Darley, 1968). The studies generally used experiments 
which involved “real” helping situations. On example for an experiment is that a 
confederate drops a valet in front of a participant who is attending another experiment and 
whether the person helps or not is recorded. Using similar studies to explore bystander 
helping behavior found that helping is most likely to occur when a person cannot deny 
responsibility for another person, the need for help did not arise as a result of the persons 
actions, and the cost of helping is lower than the cost of not helping (for an overview see 
Piliavin & Hong-Wen, 1990). A psychological process increasing the willingness of people 
to help even if they do not gain from is empathy (e.g., Batson et al., 1991; Batson, Bolen, 
Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986). However, helping is just one example of prosocial 
behavior which is contradicting assumption that people only maximize self-interest with 
personal rewards. Studies focusing cooperation and fairness in economic settings tested the 
assumptions of rational choice proposed in utility theory directly and found that prosocial 
behavior is not as uncommon as it was previously assumed (Güth, Schmittberger, & 
Schwarze, 1982; Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1986). In order to build on the research 
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using economic settings as a way to examine choices, the focus now will be on ways how 
to explore prosocial behavior using experiments.  
First, three experimental tasks (referred to as games) used in behavioral economics to 
examine prosocial behavior will be described and experimental results will be reported. 
Second, research aiming to explain prosocial behavior based on personality, internal 
processes and situational variables will be described. Then other-regarding preferences will 
be introduced to explain prosocial behavior within the framework of expected utility 
theory. Finally, research examining choices under risk which affect others will be 
reviewed. 
Prosocial Behavior in Experiments 
The influence of others’ payoffs on risk-taking will be explored in an experimental 
paradigm using real monetary payoffs. Experimental tasks are generally referred to as 
games, and three types of games are commonly used to examine prosocial behavior in 
experiments: public good games, ultimatum games and dictator games. In a public good 
game a group is randomly created consisting of n members that have an individual 
endowment of    tokens. Each subject can choose to keep her endowment or contribute it 
partly to a common project (the public good)    with    [     ] . The contributions   of 
the whole group are summed up and then multiplied with an efficiency factor    with     
and then split up between the group members. Each member receives a transfer from the 
collective wealth, independent of her choice to contribute or not. The final payoff of each 
subject    is determined by           
 
 
∑   
 
   . Consider the following example for 
a public good game: A group consists of four members (   ). Each of the members 
receives and endowment of one (           ). The efficiency factor of the group is 2 
(    ). If we assume that every member contributes to the public good (          ) the 
following payoff would result for a given member: 
To calculate the payoff for participant 1 we take the above stated formula        
   
 
 
∑   
 
   , and enter the given parameters. This leads to a payoff for a given member 
of:     
 
 
 (       )   . If the same member would have contributed nothing, 
her payoff would be     
 
 
 (     )     . If behavior follows the rational 
maximization criteria of personal payoff the person should not contribute any of her 
endowment to the public good. 
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The self-interest hypothesis would predict that nobody contributes to the public 
good, but takes home the initial endowment plus the amount contributed to the public good 
by the group members. The dilemma in the public good game is that collective interest and 
personal interest are conflicting. While on a group level high contributions are efficient, 
not to contribute at all is efficient at the individual level. Thus, standard economic theory 
would predict “free riding” which means receiving the benefit from the collective project 
but not contributing to it. However, empirical data challenges this assumption: voluntary 
contributions occur and are significantly above 0 (e.g., Fischbacher, Gächter, & Fehr, 
2001; Gächter, 2007; Ledyard, 1995). What happens if people are not faced with a choice 
that influences their group but another person? The ultimatum game captures the behavior 
of people in a dyadic exchange. 
In an ultimatum game two participants are randomly grouped and one is given the 
role of a proposer and one the role of a recipient. The proposer has to decide how a given 
endowment should be split between the two actors. The recipient then decides whether to 
accept or reject the split. If the recipient chooses to reject the offer, both participants 
receive nothing. Standard economic theory would predict that the proposer offers the 
lowest possible amount which the recipient would accept. However, it was found that fair 
splits are proposed and that recipients are likely to reject offers that are very low (Güth et 
al., 1982). A meta-analysis surveying 37 articles yielding 75 ultimatum games reported 
that on average 40% of the endowments of the proposers are offered to respondents and 
16% of the offers are rejected (Oosterbeek, Sloof, & Van de Kuilen, 2004). It remains 
unclear if the offer of a fair split is driven by benevolence or by fear of rejection. In order 
to distinguish both motives the dictator game was developed (Forsythe, Horowitz, Savin, 
& Sefton, 1994).  
In a dictator game the setup is similar to an ultimatum game, the only change being 
that the recipient cannot reject offers from the proposer. While this set up enables the 
selfish player to act according to her preference and offer nothing without fear of rejection, 
it does not limit the benevolent player to offer as much as she wants. Standard economic 
theory predicts that the proposer keeps the endowment for herself. Challenging this 
prediction empirical evidence suggests that participants on average give away 25% of their 
endowment (e.g., Andreoni, Harbaugh, & Vesterlund, 2007; Camerer, 2003).  
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These findings suggest that the assumption that individuals only gain utility from 
maximizing personal monetary payoffs falls short of capturing human behavior. How can 
the prosocial behavior in experiments be explained? 
Explaining Prosocial Behavior 
A central question of research interested in prosocial behavior is whether the 
underlying motive is self-interest or altruism. The term altruism goes back to Auguste 
Comte, and traditionally described behavior that is completely selfless and where the actor 
does not benefit in any way from the action (Kitzrow, 1998). Contemporary definitions of 
altruism are less restrictive. Altruistic behavior is now defined based on three 
characteristics: it is voluntary, intentional and without the expectation of any external 
rewards (Bar-Tal & Raviv., 1982). Altruism is “a motivational state with the ultimate goal 
of increasing another’s welfare” (Batson, 1991, p. 6), this definition does not exclude the 
possibility that behavior driven by altruism can lead to positive feelings and other intrinsic 
rewards. But when there are no extrinsic rewards to explain behavior (i.e., rewards 
provided by the environment) the prosocial behavior is referred to as altruistic. Altruism 
and prosocial behavior are not the same and the terms cannot be used synonymously. 
Altruism is the motive underlying prosocial behavior, but not all prosocial behavior is 
necessarily linked to altruistic motives.  
Expected utility theory suggests that if prosocial behavior is observed it should be 
driven by the intention to maximize personal utility over personal monetary payoffs. This 
perspective is underlying traditional economic thought and shapes the perception of the 
homo oeconomicus. However, recent theoretical developments in economics suggest that 
cooperation and other prosocial behaviors, which might not lead to maximization of 
personal income, can still maximize personal utility.  
The findings and explanations for prosocial behavior will be described next. Three 
foci of explanations can be distinguished: personality, processes and the situational 
incentive structure. Each will be described individually in this next section. 
Personality and prosocial behavior. 
When approaching prosocial behavior from a personality psychological direction, the 
focus is on the question: to what degree can prosocial behavior be explained based on 
personality dispositions? Factors found associated with the “altruistic personality” were: 
control attribution of the cause, goals and motives and action readiness as a function of 
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competency to help, as well as responsible acting in general (Amato, 1985; Eisenberg et 
al., 1989; Rushton, Chrisjohn, & Fekken, 1981). A number of correlates of the “altruistic 
personality” were identified by comparing people who protected Jews during the holocaust 
and those who did not. The two groups could be distinguished based on their current 
disposition of locus of control, autonomy, risk-taking , social responsibility, tolerance, 
authoritarianism, empathy and altruistic moral reasoning (Midlarsky, Jones, & Corley, 
2005). These studies indicate that generally the disposition for empathetic concern, 
perceived social responsibility and personal morale convictions correlate with actual 
prosocial behavior. However, it is questionable if these studies actually inform us as to 
whether or not the underlying motive of prosocial behavior is altruism. In experiments, 
personality variables generally associated with altruism do not predict prosocial behavior 
when controlling for alternative egoistical motives (Kirman & Teschl, 2010; Ma, 
Sherstyuk, Dowling, & Hill, 2002).  
The studies of Amato (1985), Rushton et al. (1981) and Ma et al. (2002) 
operationalize the personality disposition towards altruistic behavior by assessing general 
prosocial characteristics as well as past prosocial behavior. For example Ma et al. (2002) 
used items from the Person Meaningful Profile (Wong, 1998) such as: I care about other 
people; I relate well to others; I am liked by others or I contribute to the well-being of others. 
The older scales of Amato (1985) and Rushton et al. (1981) assess only past behavior such 
as I donated money to an organization or agency which gives assistance to needy people 
(Amato, 1985) or I have offered my seat on a bus or train to a stranger who was standing 
(Rushton et al., 1981). While these scales could predict helping behavior in a number of 
studies (for an overview see Bierhoff, 2002; Carlo, Eisenberg, Troyer, Switzer, & Speer, 
1991; Piliavin & Hong-Wen, 1990), when used in conjunction with experiments examining 
prosocial behaviors such as cooperation or giving, they fail to do so. For example inter-
individual variance of contributions in a public good game could not be explained with the 
personality disposition for empathy. Furthermore participants classified as empathetic were 
not associated with systematically higher contributions. The high intra-individual variance 
is assumed to be rooted in the actions of the other and the fluctuation is due to the 
interactive character of public good games (Kirman & Teschl, 2010; Ma et al., 2002).  
When examining the interaction between personality and situational factors it was 
found that dispositional altruism (i.e., past helping) is correlated with motivational altruism 
(i.e., helping without expecting anything in return) only in weak situations, and when the 
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evocation of empathetic concern is strong (Carlo et al., 1991). Since the data leading to the 
concept of an altruistic personality is based on surveys, it does not allow the control of the 
situational context and extrinsic incentives for prosocial behavior cannot be ruled out. 
Furthermore the items used are very specific for the context of helping as one example of 
prosocial behavior, while in experiments generally other forms of prosocial behavior are 
exhibited such as cooperation or giving. Using a broader conception to capture inter-
individual differences that affect behavior might be fruitful.  
It is assumed that personal goals influence behavior and choices (e.g., Ajzen & 
Madden, 1986; Carver, 1996; Forgas & Vargas, 1999; Oettingen & Gollwitzer, 2002). 
Personal goals are linked to personal values. Criteria which people use to select and justify 
actions and judge them are referred to as personal values (Schwartz, 1992). Values serve as 
standards and values guide the selection or evaluation of actions, policies, events, and 
people, including evaluation of the self. As bases of self-evaluation, values are central to 
the self-concept (Rokeach, 1973). At first sight personal values seems similar to attitudes, 
however while attitudes are situation specific and refer to the valuation of a specific 
behavior (Ajzen & Madden, 1986), values influence behavior and the perception of 
situation across contexts (Schwartz, 1992). One central aspect of values is their 
motivational nature. Personal values lead to the formation of personal goals and thereby 
shape the perception and selection of actions and situations (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).  
The theory of basic human values by Schwartz (1992, 1994) proposes ten value 
types, which are recognized as distinct across cultures: benevolence, universalism, self-
direction, stimulation, hedonism, achievement, power, security, conformity and tradition. 
The validity of the proposed values has been supported in numerous studies analyzing data 
from 20 countries (e.g., Schmidt, Bamberg, Davidov, Herrmann, & Schwartz, 2007; 
Schwartz et al., 2001; Vauclair, Hanke, Fischer, & Fontaine, 2011). It is assumed that 
specific values or specific goals are associated with value clusters which are captured by 
motivational types. For example social recognition presents a specific value or goal and is 
considered part of the value cluster of power. Table 12 displays the value types and their 
associated motivational goals as well as specific values which are held by each individual.  
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Table 12: Value types, motivational goals and specific values (see Schwartz, 1992, 1996). 
Value type Defining goals Specific values 
Universalism understanding, appreciation, 
tolerance, and protection for the 
welfare of all people and for nature 
broadminded, social justice, 
equality, world at peace, world 
of beauty, unity with nature, 
wisdom, protecting the 
environment 
Benevolence preserving and enhancing the welfare 
of those with whom one is in frequent 
personal contact (the ‘in-group’) 
helpful, honest, forgiving, 
responsible, loyal, true 
friendship, mature love 
Tradition respect, commitment, and acceptance 
of the customs and ideas that one's 
culture or religion provides 
respect for tradition, humble, 
devout, accepting my portion in 
life 
Conformity restraint of actions, inclinations, and 
impulses likely to upset or harm 
others and violate social expectations 
or norms 
obedient, self-discipline, 
politeness, honoring parents and 
elders 
Security safety, harmony, and stability of 
society, of relationships, and of self 
social order, family security, 
national security, clean, 
reciprocation of favors 
Power social status and prestige, control or 
dominance over people and resources 
authority, wealth, social power 
Achievement personal success through 
demonstrating competence according 
to social standards 
ambitious, successful, capable, 
influential 
Hedonism pleasure or sensuous gratification for 
oneself 
pleasure, enjoying life, self-
indulgent 
Stimulation excitement, novelty, and challenge in 
life 
a varied life, an exciting life, 
daring 
Self-Direction independent thought and action--
choosing, creating, exploring 
creativity, freedom, choosing 
own goals, curious, independent 
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Values differ regarding their content and priority. While value content is determined 
by the associated goals, the priority of values is determined by the individual. Value 
priority captures the individual importance of each value and the responding value type.  
In order to establish the ten value types Schwartz used the method of multi-
dimensional scaling in a two dimensional space. Openness to change was contrasted with 
conservation on one dimension, and on another dimension self-enhancement was 
contrasted with self-transcendence. This resulted in a circular arrangement of the value 
types and the associated specific values and reflects an underlying motivational continuum. 
The compatibility of values and associated goals and behavior are assumed to decrease 
with growing distance between them. Values at opposing sides of the circle are also 
assumed to lead to opposing goals and actions. The structure of the basic human values is 
depicted in Figure 6 
 
Figure 6: Theoretical structure of value types and underlying motivational dimensions (taken 
from Schwartz, 1992, p. 45).  
Besides assuming the existence of the ten basic human values, the theory also 
proposes specific relationships between them. Value types can either be conflicting or 
compatible depending on how the behaviors and goals stipulated by the personal values 
affect one another. For example behaviors aiming to satisfy the goal of pleasure, which are 
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associated with the value type hedonism, can evoke behaviors which are contrary to the 
values associated with universalism, pursuing goals such as social justice. In this case 
pursuing one value would undermine the likelihood to achieve another.  
Personal values are associated in the predicted fashion with political voting 
(Schwartz, Caprara, & Vecchione, 2010) the perception of ecological risks (Slimak & 
Dietz, 2006) as well as trait empathy (Balliet, Joireman, Daniels, & George-Falvy, 2008). 
Furthermore personal values associated with self-transcendence, benevolence and 
universalism, were found to be associated with more cooperative choices when deciding 
how to split a given pot of money, while values associated with self-enhancement, power, 
hedonism and achievement, were negatively correlated (Schwartz, 1996). These findings 
support the assumption about value priority and its impact on behavior and that personal 
values influence people’s tendency to act prosocially across contexts. But is an individual’s 
tendency to behave prosocially the same in all situations? The next section will introduce 
one important process that might be triggered by situational characteristics: the ability to 
experience how another human being feels in a given situation which is referred to as 
empathy. 
Internal processes: Empathy. 
In order to explain prosocial behavior a number of emotions are considered as seen 
in the following quote from Bowles and Gintis: “Prosocial emotions are physiological and 
psychological reactions that induce agents to engage in cooperative behaviors [. . .]. Some 
prosocial emotions, including shame, guilt, empathy, and sensitivity to social sanction, 
induce agents to undertake constructive social interactions; others, such as the desire to 
punish norm violators, reduce free riding when the prosocial emotions fail to induce 
sufficiently cooperative behavior in some fraction of members of the social group” (2003, 
pp. 432–433). Batson and collaborators (e.g., Batson et al., 1988; Batson & Shaw, 1991) 
present evidence in a number of studies that when inducing empathy, empathy being 
understood as feeling of sympathy for another person, prosocial behavior becomes more 
likely. Based on empirical evidence Batson argues in a number of articles that the prosocial 
behavior induced via empathy is based on altruism. He refers to this link as the empathy-
altruism hypothesis (e.g., Batson et al., 1991; Batson & Moran, 1999; Batson et al., 1997).  
The central question in the discussion concerning the empathy-altruism hypothesis, 
which lasted over a decade, was if prosocial behavior evoked by empathy is free of self-
interest and purely altruistic. A number of alternative explanations for the link between 
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empathy and prosocial behavior drawing on egoism have been found. For example, the 
empathy specific reward hypothesis argues that if empathy is induced helping is 
intrinsically rewarding to the helper, because it relieves the negative state, is norm 
congruent and therefore positively reinforced by society (Cialdini, 1991; Cialdini, Kenriek, 
& Baumann, 1982; Cialdini et al., 1987).  
The discussion led Batson to clarify that the altruism he refers to is not the only 
motive present, but it is one of many (Batson & Shaw, 1991). The difficulty of ruling out 
all other motives and identify a purely selfless giver is hard to test, because to rule out that 
a prosocial act is intrinsically rewarding seems impossible. For example, giving itself can 
have intrinsic utility (Andreoni, 1990). For this reason, in the current study when prosocial 
behaviors appear to be governed by the goal to increase the well-being of the other and 
extrinsic incentives can be ruled out, it is possible to assume that the underlying motive is 
altruistic, although impure, because intrinsic motives cannot be ruled out.  
Situations and prosocial behavior.  
Research focusing on situational determinants of prosocial behavior was begun by 
Latané and Darlene (1968). The findings indicated that not personality dispositions of 
helpers but situational factors such as group size, social influence and clarity of 
responsibility for the well-being of another person were determinants of helping (for a 
review see Bierhoff, 2002; Kitzrow, 1998; Piliavin & Hong-Wen, 1990).  
People might act prosocially in order to look good in the eyes of others (Baumeister, 
1982). If others are not present in that moment they might even engage in prosocial 
behavior to look good in their own eyes. The reason for this is if selfish acts are conflicting 
with one’s self-identity and personal norms, prosocial behavior is chosen, in order to avoid 
cognitive dissonance (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2007). Image motivation includes 
both the desire to look good in one’s own (self-image) and/ or in another person’s eyes 
(social image). While social image motivation is closely related to impression 
management, which refers to creating a desirable social image through ones behavior, self-
image motivation refers to the motivation to adhere to one’s personal desired image, one’s 
self-identity (Tetlock & Manstead, 1985).  
Models focusing on self-identity argue that self-image motivation is a cause of 
prosocial behavior. Whether a person behaves prosocially or not depends on the salience of 
internalized social norms, rules about what is considered appropriate, and how valuable the 
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prosocial behavior is to signal personal moral standing. When receiving financial 
incentives for good deeds, others do not see the behavior as signaling the decision makers’ 
moral standing. Furthermore, the extrinsic incentives crowd out the intrinsic incentive to be 
considered a good person in one’s own eyes, because cooperation could also be explained 
through the extrinsic reward, thus, not to cooperate does not violate self-identity and 
cooperation decreases (Bénabou & Tirole, 2004).  
The role of social image motivation as motivation for prosocial behavior in 
experiments is apparent in studies which manipulate whether choices are public or private 
(Dana, Cain, & Dawes, 2006). If ambiguity about personal responsibility for the outcomes 
of others exists people use this room to act more selfishly (e.g., Dana, Weber, & Kuang, 
2007). Furthermore, it is shown that prosocial behavior in social contexts is influenced by 
the assumed norm (Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009). Following from the findings related to 
image motivation, when observing prosocial behavior it needs to be scrutinized whether it 
can function as a valuable signal for others or for oneself, in order to distinguish altruism 
from self-interest as motive for prosocial behavior. While one is able to rule out social 
image motivation as a driving force of prosocial behavior in an experimental setting by 
creating anonymity and privacy, to completely rule out self-image motivation seems rather 
difficult.  
Another factor leading to prosocial behavior without altruistic motives is reciprocity. 
Reciprocity is given when a behavior is reaction to a specific action of the other or intends 
to stipulate a specific reaction of the other (Fehr & Schmidt, 2005). If prosocial behavior is 
driven by reciprocity, it is therefore dependent on expectations about the other and her 
reaction. The influence of reciprocity in a public good game can be found if the tendency 
to cooperate is conditional on the expected rate of cooperation of the other players (e.g., 
Fischbacher et al., 2001; Gächter, 2007). Another example is the tendency of the proposer 
in an ultimatum game to propose a split that is close to 50:50, because the responder, 
whose decision determines the outcome, is expected to honor this “fair” choice by 
accepting it.  
As the summary of findings show people are motivated to behave prosocially when 
their actions are visible to others or when they are in a reciprocal relationship. However, 
even when ruling out the influence of reciprocity, by removing the power to turn down the 
offer by the responder in the ultimatum game and transforming it into a dictator game, 
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participants still transfer positive amounts to the now powerless recipient. This can be 
explained through other-regarding preferences. 
Other-regarding preferences. 
Other-regarding preferences explain behavior that deviates from individual utility 
maximization when another person is affected by one’s choices, which is not in line with 
the self-interest hypothesis, in a utility theory framework. Fehr and Schmidt (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 2005) name altruism, spitefulness and envy as other-regarding preferences. These 
are not bound to any precondition such as actions or intentions, but only dependent on the 
payoff structure of a given choice. Models of altruism would predict that prosocial 
behavior is independent of the distribution of payoffs; however, studies show that while 
participants behave prosocially in one context, they will act as if they are guided by self-
interest in another. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) explain the 
contradicting findings by drawing on the economic environment and its interaction with 
the individual’s tendency for kindness and envy. The assumption underlying the theory of 
fairness (Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) is that people not only care about their absolute but also 
their relative payoffs when in social contexts. These concerns are captured by so called 
other-regarding preferences. Parameters that capture kindness in order to explain prosocial 
behavior as well as spitefulness in order to explain anti-social behavior are entered in the 
utility function. Depending on those traits people gain utility from other people’s payoffs. 
In this manner, concerns about the other person’s payoffs can be captured as preferences 
within a utility theory framework. Other regarding preferences are treated like any other 
type of preferences and are therefore measurable. Furthermore, they become part of a 
rational choice model and can be aligned among other preferences.  
The theory of fairness (Fehr & Schmidt) explains why people choose to cooperate in 
one context but compete in another. The general idea within both theories is based on the 
assumption that people generally dislike inequality. The dislike of advantageous inequality 
(i.e., feeling discomfort about being richer) is referred to as benevolence or kindness and 
depicted with β. Disliking disadvantageous inequality (i.e., feeling discomfort about being 
poorer) is captured by α. It is assumed that      , because a person gains more from her 
own payoff than from the payoff of another person, no matter how nice they are. The 
utility in a two player game for player   is captured by 
  ( )          (       )       (       )       
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This means that the utility of a given payoff   does not only depend on the absolute 
value, but also on whether the second player gets more (second term) or less (third term). 
The utility of a given payoff is maximized if the difference between payoffs is zero (Fehr 
& Schmidt, 1999, p.822). 
The theory suggests that prosocial behavior is not necessarily shaped by altruism, but 
can also be motivated by equality concerns. This means that it is not the concern for the 
other that leads to an increase of the payoff for the other person, but the fairness of the 
distribution is the motivation. However, this model does not capture behavior when people 
choose distributions where the other receives more than them. This behavior shows a 
desire for efficient payoffs (Engelmann & Strobel, 2004, 2006) and contradicts the 
assumption         
When motivated by efficiency concerns, the maximization of joint payoffs will lead 
to prosocial behavior which maximizes payoffs for passive partners instead of maximizing 
equality (Charness & Rabin, 2002). In this case it can be difficult to unravel efficiency 
concerns from altruism, because the behavioral responses are the same.  
Conclusion. 
Research in economics as well as psychology yields numerous studies that find 
prosocial behavior. The underlying processes and motives leading to behavior that 
increases the well-being of another person are the subject of research from both disciplines. 
Psychologists argue for the influence of personal values, personality traits and empathy, 
and assume the underlying motive of prosocial behavior is often altruistic. Economists see 
prosocial behavior as a function of the incentive structure which induces actions that are 
guided by self-interest but can also lead to prosocial acts, such as cooperation. While in 
many instances prosocial behavior seems to be guided by self-interest and external 
rewards, there is still room for altruism as a motive for prosocial behavior where external 
rewards can be ruled out.  
Outcome based other-regarding preferences assume that people care for the 
outcomes of others. Three reasons why they might care for others can be formulated: they 
gain utility directly when the well-being of the other is increased (pure altruism), utility 
partly increases because the increasing well-being of the other produces a good feeling or a 
“warm glow” (impure altruism), and the utility that one gains depends on the difference 
between one’s own well-being and that of the other (theories of inequality aversion). 
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The pure altruism model was criticized because studies examining crowding out still 
found that people give even when their contributions are not necessary to increase the 
public good and they could free-ride on the contributions of others, which leads to the 
assumption that giving itself increases utility and therefore prosocial behavior is not totally 
self-less or pure (Andreoni, 1990). Psychological studies support the hypothesis that 
prosocial behavior is at least partly related to negative-state relief, guilt reduction or self-
reward (for a review see Bierhoff, 2002). Empirically pure altruism is difficult to identify, 
since self-interest can never be completely ruled out, so altruism in this thesis will 
therefore refer to impure altruism. 
The research on prosocial behavior focuses on situations that involve certainty or 
strategic uncertainty. Strategic uncertainty refers to situations in which an actor’s personal 
outcome is not only determined by her choice but dependent on the choice of another 
player, as it is the case in an ultimatum game or public good game. However, uncertainty 
can also be structural when it is part of the environment, as in lotteries. How does 
structural uncertainty influence choices in interpersonal contexts?  
Risk-taking in Social Contexts 
The theories interested in risky choice generally focus on individual decision making 
or examine decisions about risky options yielding consequences only for others. For 
example, in a study participants were asked to choose between different decision tasks 
which varied in their difficulty. If they had to choose for themselves they picked more 
difficult problems than when they chose problems for another person. When the choices 
were made in a group then the problems chosen for others were not easier than the 
problems chosen for oneself. This finding instigated research on the question whether 
personal responsibility triggers cautious behavior, while the diffusion of responsibility as 
given in a group setting does not (Wallach, Kogan, & Bem, 1964). Zaleska and Kogan 
(1971) observed that when people made choices between gambles where the outcomes 
affected others, their choices reflected a higher degree of risk aversion than when the 
outcomes affected themselves. Furthermore, they found that if groups made the decision 
they displayed more risk-taking. One important factor influencing this shift towards a 
stronger risk aversion is accountability, because people do not want to be responsible for 
bad choices influencing others (Tetlock & Boettger, 1994). The findings indicate that being 
responsible for the outcomes of others leads to more cautious behavior in order to avoid 
blame. In general participants show a higher degree of risk aversion when deciding for 
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others than for themselves. The studies examined cases where the risky choice either 
affected themselves or the other, but did not examine conditions where choices affected 
themselves and the other.  
Charness (2000) argues for the influence of responsibility if one is performing an 
action which influences another’s outcome. The responsibility alleviation hypothesis 
assumes that “shifting responsibility for an outcome to an external authority dampens 
internal impulses toward honesty, loyalty, or generosity” (Charness, 2000, p. 376). 
Charness (2000) shows that in line with the responsibility alleviation hypothesis, if the 
responsibility for joint outcomes can be placed on a third person, effort decreases 
compared to a situation where there is no third party influence. This finding indicates that 
changes in behavior can be achieved through small changes in perceived responsibility. 
This finding can also be interpreted in another way: if the actor feels more responsible for 
the outcomes of the employee, then higher effort is exerted. 
Charness and Jackson (Charness & Jackson, 2009) found support for the assumed 
influence of responsibility by directly examining how feelings of responsibility influence 
decisions in a strategic environment, where risk-taking influences participants themselves 
and another person. They show in a stag hunt game
5
 that when a subject was making 
decisions influencing personal payoffs and the payoffs of a silent partner, risk-taking 
decreased compared to the individual decision.  
In the study of Charness and Jackson (2009) both participants formed a group and 
received the same payoffs, as a result there is no inequality of payoffs. It is assumed that if 
                                                 
5 A stag hunt game presents a coordination game. Both players can choose between two options to stag hunt 
(stag) or to hare hunt (hare). Rousseau explained this game in the following way: If two people agree to hunt 
stag, they will end up with more food than when each by themselves decided to hunt hare alone. However if 
you decide to hunt stag and the other hare, you will go hungry. The payoff matrix is: 
  Player 2 
  Stag Hare 
Player 1 Stag  9,9 1,8 
Hare 8,1 8,8 
In pure strategies two Nash equilibria exist, either both players choose stag or both choose hare. However to 
choose hare is assumed to be the „riskless“ alternative, since it always has an outcome of 8.  
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economic decisions involve another party, other-regarding preferences influence choice 
(Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000). The theoretical construct of other-regarding preferences 
captures behavior as if driven by envy and kindness, and present a departure from the 
general assumption that humans act driven by pure self-interest when faced with economic 
decisions.  
Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) carried out an experiment where they presented 
participants with a safe and a risky choice, the risky choice yielding two payoffs with a 
50% probability. The lottery payoffs for each choice problem and the results are depicted 
in Table 13. 
Table 13: Choices option and results of Bolton and Ockenfels (2010). 
  Decision maker options and associated payoffs (euros)  Frequency 
of risk-
taking (out 
of 26 
observations
) 
Choice 
Problem 
Safe 
 Risky  
 50 percent  50 percent  
Decision 
maker Recipient  
Decision 
maker Recipient  
Decision 
maker Recipient 
 
Low safe 
payoff 
(L) 
1 7 -  16 -  0 -  18 
2 7 7  16 16  0 0  15 
3 7 16  16 16  0 0  19 
4 7 0  16 16  0 0  15 
5 7 7  16 0  0 16  13 
6 7 16  16 0  0 16  20 
7 7 0  16 0  0 16  16 
           
High 
safe 
payoff 
(H) 
1 9 -  16 -  0 -  11 
2 9 9  16 16  0 0  9 
3 9 16  16 16  0 0  14 
4 9 0  16 16  0 0  10 
5 9 9  16 0  0 16  7 
6 9 16  16 0  0 16  9 
7 9 0  16 0  0 16  11 
 
The choices presented to the participants differed systematically between-subjects in 
regard to their distributional equality. The results generally indicated less risk-taking if risk 
was extended to another person. However, when the certain option was disadvantageous 
for the decision maker, the risky option was chosen. Overall the study found that in one-
person contexts people behave more risk seeking then when the risk also affects another 
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person. It is found that when the risky option is advantageous for the decision maker the 
benefit for the other is neglected. In the study of Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) two 
mechanisms could drive behavior: inequality considerations and responsibility. When 
taking out inequality considerations by introducing equal payoffs in the safe and the risky 
option for the decision maker and the recipient, choices indicate a higher degree of risk 
aversion and support the assumption the responsibility leads to greater caution (Pahlke, 
Strasser, & Vieider, 2010). Studies show that the choices of individuals change when they 
yield outcomes for others. When choosing for another person, individual risk-taking 
decreases. While studies examine risk-taking for oneself or another person, it was found 
that studies examining interpersonal choice in the sense of choosing for one’s self and 
another person are rare.  
The next chapter will describe two experiments aiming to fill this gap. The first 
experiment examines how risk-taking changes when people make choices that influence 
another person. The second experiment examined if empathy can explain the finding of the 
first experiment. Additionally it is examined to what degree the salience of personal losses 
in the risky choice influences the propensity for risk-taking in interpersonal choices. 
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Experiment 1 
Do humans dare because they care? The choices examined in the studies cited above 
do yield safe payoffs
6
 (henceforth certain payoffs, see footnote) which benefit the decision 
maker as well as the recipient. However, how does risk-taking change when the certain 
option does not benefit the recipient and leads to inequality? The strongest experimental 
evidence that prosocial behavior could be motivated by altruism is found in dictator games. 
In the basic version of the dictator game one player (the dictator) receives an endowment 
and is asked to propose a split of the endowment between herself and another randomly 
assigned person (recipient); the recipient cannot reject the proposal. When playing a 
version of this game the first time under experimental conditions (Kahneman et al., 1986), 
the surprising finding was that participants chose to give up part of their endowment in 
such a game without any reciprocity or other explanations. This sparked numerous 
experiments. A review of the literature up to the year 2010 yielded 129 publications 
reporting 616 dictator games treatments (Engel, 2010). Across all dictator games the 
receiver payoff averaged 28.3% of the whole sum of endowments. It was found that 
16.74% of the dictators were willing to give up 50% of their endowment, 13.07% gave 
away even more than 50% and only 36.11% kept everything (Engel, 2010, p. 6). Can these 
findings also be generalized to the situation encountered by the aid worker? 
One major difference between economics and psychology is the way that 
experiments are conducted (Lopes, 1994; Ortmann, 1997; Ortmann & Hertwig, 2001). 
There has been an extensive discussion between psychologists and economists on how to 
conduct experiments so that they have external validity (e.g., Ortmann & Hertwig, 2001). 
For psychologists the psychological “authenticity” of the situation is necessary in order to 
achieve external validity. This is achieved through experimental tasks that present a 
meaningful part of reality, for example through hypothetical scenarios. Because in the 
current study the payoff structure can meaningful resemble the problem, a behavior 
economic paradigm is used. For this reason the incentive structure of the real problem is 
identified and then this specific structure must be reflected by the experimental task in 
                                                 
6 The term safe payoff used in previous studies will be replaced by the term certain payoff because certainty 
is the opposite of risky rather than safety. Furthermore certain payoffs are the outcome of choosing a certain 
option.  
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order to ensure external validity. The use of the incentive structure also means that 
participants receive real monetary payoffs. 
In economic experiments, experimental tasks are created by so-called games. In 
economic games the structure of a given applied decision problem is defined by the payoff 
structured, the so called incentive structure which guides behavior. In order to examine this 
question a game which has the defining factors of the situation described in the interviews 
needs to be created. The necessary components are the agents, the relationship between the 
agents, and the state of nature influencing them. 
The decision maker resembles the aid worker in the interview, while the other person 
personalizes the beneficiary, which in reality is a group of people. For reasons of simplicity 
only two agents are considered, the actor (henceforth decision maker) and the other person 
(henceforth recipient) affected by the decision maker’s choices. 
The relationship between them is unidirectional and anonymous. In the interviews it 
was shown that the humanitarian aid worker delivers aid to a group of beneficiaries, who 
cannot and do not offer anything in return. As a result, the decision maker’s choice 
influences the recipient, but the recipient does not influence the decision maker in any way 
and anonymity is given.  
In the applied context the capacity of the humanitarian aid worker to provide help is 
constrained by the security situation, which depends on the state of nature. If security 
incidents occur they affect the humanitarian aid worker directly and also lead to a decrease 
in aid received by the beneficiaries. However, if the humanitarian aid worker decides not to 
expose him or herself to the possibility of security incidents, no help is provided. As a 
result the context yields a choice with two options: a risky one to engage in providing aid 
in the field which could lead to either success or a security incident depending on the state 
of nature, or to stay in safety. While the fates of the humanitarian aid worker and the 
beneficiary are shared in the risky option, because both experience negative outcomes in 
case a security incident occurs and positive outcomes if not, the certain option yields 
independent fates. This constellation can be captured by the basic choice between a lottery 
with two outcomes (risky option) and a certain outcome (certain option), where the risky 
option and the certain option yield outcomes for the decision maker and the recipient.  
The resulting choice situation can be depicted as a gamble with a certain and a risky 
option yielding two outcomes, one for the decision maker and one for the recipient. In the 
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applied context the probabilities for the positive or negative course of events are not known 
and are depicted with   (  [   ]). The choice the decision maker faces can then be 
formulated as the gamble depicted in Table 14. 
Table 14: The situation of humanitarian aid workers as gamble. 
 Certain Option  Risky Option 
 Certain Outcome  Positive outcome Negative outcome 
 Decision 
Maker 
Recipient  Decision 
Maker 
Recipient Decision 
Maker 
Recipient 
Outcomes 1 0  1 1 -1 0 
Probability 1       
 
While in the certain option the decision maker receives positive outcomes, the 
recipient receives nothing and their fates are diametrical. In the risky choice their fate is 
shared and for both at the same time positive or negative, because they share the same 
probabilities. While the recipient can only gain from the risky choice of the decision 
maker, the decision maker himself can actually lose when choosing the risky option. The 
abstract situation is defined by the interpersonal choice context and the asymmetrical risk. 
The structure of a dictator game is similar to the proposed asymmetric risk situation 
faced by humanitarian aid workers in the field. The decision maker has no obligations 
towards the recipient, they are anonymous and therefore reciprocity should not exist 
between them. Furthermore, in the asymmetric risk situation as well as in the standard 
dictator game, granting payoffs to the recipient leads to shortening one’s own final payoffs. 
However, there is also an important difference between the dictator game and the 
asymmetric risk situation. In the dictator game whatever is given up and transferred is truly 
lost, while in the asymmetric risk situation only in case of a negative outcome the decision 
maker loses parts of the possible final wealth. In case of a positive outcome, he or she 
receives a higher final payoff as well as the recipient. The game is therefore not a zero sum 
game as the standard dictator game, where the loss of one is the gain of the other, but a 
positive sum game. Are decision makers willing to risk personal payoffs in order to benefit 
an anonymous recipient? The research so far does not give a clear answer to this question.  
Previous studies did not assess the degree of risk aversion of individuals but only the 
proportion of choices on an aggregated level (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Charness & 
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Jackson, 2009; Loewenstein et al., 1989). In other cases, the procedure used in the 
interpersonal and the individual task were not paired (Bradler, 2009), raising the question 
of whether the scores of risk aversion can actually be compared. Thus, it seems promising 
to combine the approach of Loewenstein et al. (1989) with the use of multiple price lists to 
evoke certainty equivalents (Andersen, Harrison, Lau, & Rutström, 2006), and to compare 
lottery pairs, which only differ in the aspect that another persons’ payoffs are added while 
everything else stays the same. 
Research Questions 
Because the theories of other-regarding preferences are not meant to also predict 
behavior under risk, no hypothesis but “informed” research questions are formulated. 
1. Does the individuals’ degree of risk aversion differ between individual risk-taking 
and interpersonal risk-taking?  
According to expected utility theory (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947) risk 
aversion in the interpersonal choice task should be the same as in the individual choice 
task, because utility is only derived from the decision maker’s payoff, which is the same in 
the individual and the interpersonal lottery. Contrary to this assumption previous studies 
show that choices lead to an increase of risk aversion when others receive positive payoffs 
in the risky as well as in the safe choice option (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Charness & 
Jackson, 2009; Pahlke, Strasser, & Vieider, 2011). In the current study, only the other 
benefits from risky choices. If the decision maker holds other-regarding preferences, such 
as altruism or inequality aversion, the risky option should be more attractive in the 
interpersonal choice and result in prosocial behavior in the form of a lower degree of risk 
aversion than when alone.  
Inequality aversion and altruism lead to the same behavioral response, but the 
underlying mechanisms differ. If altruism or maximizing joint payoffs is the driving 
motive, then the risky option is preferred because it yields payoffs for the other person. If 
inequality aversion drives choices, then the risky option is preferred because the certain 
option leads to extreme inequality. In the case of expected equal payouts, it cannot be 
determined if inequality aversion or altruism drives risk-taking in interpersonal choices. 
However, when expected payoffs are unequal, this can be determined, which results in the 
question:  
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2. Does the relative distribution of payoffs in interpersonal choices in the risky option 
influence choice?  
The change in risk-taking should depend on the distribution of payoffs if prosocial 
behavior is driven by inequality aversion. It is expected that if inequality aversion drives 
choices over outcomes, then lotteries leading to equal outcomes should be more attractive 
than lotteries with unequal payoffs. On the contrary, if altruism drives prosocial behavior, 
then there should be no differences in the changes of degree of risk aversion across the 
different payoff distributions.
7
 
3. Does the framing of the certain option (as price for the lottery vs. as sure gain) 
influence the risk attitude?  
Prospect theory proposes that the framing of a decision problem leads to a reversal of 
attitudes (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). It is unclear whether the expression of the certain 
option as a price of the lottery induces a loss frame or not. If it does not change the framing 
of the decision problem, no differences should be found between the degree of risk 
aversion depending on whether the certain option is the price of a lottery or a sure gain. 
4. Can the change of risk-taking in the interpersonal choice context compared to the 
individual choice context be predicted with giving in a dictator game? 
5. Does the framing of the certain option influence the strength of association between 
change of risk-taking and giving in a dictator game?  
One problem of studies interested in risky choice in interpersonal compared to an 
individual context and the relationship with other-regarding preferences under certainty is 
the frame of the certain option. In a dictator game the question the dictator is asked is, 
“How much of your endowment do you give to the other player?” and the question 
requests a decision about how much to lose. In the lotteries, the question asked is, “Which 
of the two possible gains do you prefer?” and the question requests a decision about how 
much to gain. The influence of framing on risk aversion has been a major topic of research 
                                                 
7 Assuming linear expected utility functions and implementing the proposed utility function of Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999) with the parameters of       and     .6 proposed by Binmore and Shaked (2010) leads to 
the predion that if the certain option yields extreme inequality the risky option should always be preferred in 
case of equal or advantageous expected payoffs. When disadvantageous payoffs are expected then people 
should even be more risk averse than when deciding only for themselves. 
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(e.g., Tversky & Kahnemann, 1981). In order to find out how the framing of the choice 
influences the degree of risk aversion in the individual and the interpersonal choice 
context, the influence of both frames should be examined. It is expected that when people 
are aware of possible losses, they become loss averse and are more prone to choose the 
certain option. 
Two exploratory questions focusing on personality are also important. First, how do 
personal values influence risk-taking in the interpersonal choice context? When judging 
environmental risks it has been shown that personal values play an important role when 
judging risks (Slimak & Dietz, 2006). For these reasons personal values will be assessed 
using items from the Portray Value Questionnaire (PVQ) measure of Schwartz (Schwartz, 
1994, 2007). Second, how does the subjective importance of responsibility for the other, 
the other’s payoff and personal payoffs influence risk-taking in the interpersonal choice 
context? 
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Method 
Participants. 
A sample of 120 participants took part in this lab-based study. Due to a technical 
problem, however, only 90 of those participants were able to fill out the additional 
questionnaire assessing demographic variables after the computer based experiment was 
carried out. As a result, behavioral data of 90 participants can be complemented with data 
from a self-report measure of values and demographic information. 
Table 15: Participants. 
N = 90 Gender Age  Monthly disposable income 
Male female M SD M SD 
 20.0% 80.0% 21.41 2.53 418.77 € 308.56 € 
 
Design. 
In the experiment each individuals risk attitude was elicited for four individual and 
four interpersonal lotteries. The interpersonal lotteries led to four different distributions in 
the risky option (equal, disadvantageous for the decision maker, advantageous for the 
decision maker and equality of payoffs but high variance).Thus, the experiments yields two 
within-subjects factors with two and four treatment levels respectively, resulting in four 
lottery pairs. 
The treatments differed between participants regarding two factors: the salience of 
possible personal losses was varied through the presentation of the certain option as a gain 
or as price of the lottery. Furthermore, the groups differed as to whether the importance of 
the outcome of the interpersonal choices was assessed or not in order to control for 
possible effects on the subsequent measures. The manipulations will be described in detail 
below. 
Choice context. 
Participants faced choices between lotteries and certain outcomes in an individual 
and an interpersonal choice context. In the individual choice context choice options only 
involved payoffs for the decision maker. The interpersonal choice context involved 
consequences for the decision maker and for another randomly assigned participant of the 
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experiment. The interpersonal choice options were created through adding consequences 
for another person while keeping everything else constant. In order to create a situation 
involving asymmetric risk, the other person received a payoff of zero in the certain option 
and a positive payoff in the risky option. When participants faced choices between options 
that only had consequences for themselves, choices are referred to as choices in the 
individual choice context. When participants made choices between options that had 
consequences for themselves and another person (the recipient), choices are referred to as 
choices in the interpersonal choice context. 
Distributional equality of payoffs. 
By keeping the payoff of the recipient constant across all four choice tasks while the 
payoff levels for the decision maker changed with each choice task, the distributional 
equality of payoffs in the interpersonal choice context varied. The risky outcomes in the 
interpersonal choice task lead to equal (choice task 1), disadvantageous (choice task 2), 
advantageous (choice task 3) and equal payoffs with higher variance (choice task 4) for the 
decision maker compared to the recipient. The different payoff levels are depicted in Table 
16. 
Table 16: Lotteries and distribution of outcomes. 
Choice Task Distribution of payoff Risky choice 
  Decision maker Recipient 
1 Equal 1500 vs. 2500 1500 vs. 2500 
2 Disadvantageous 1000 vs. 2000 1500 vs. 2500 
3 Advantageous 2000 vs. 3000 1500 vs. 2500 
4 Equal – high variance       1 vs. 3999       1 vs. 3999 
 
Henceforth the term lottery refers to an option with two possible payoffs. In each 
multiple price list, only one lottery is depicted. The term choice task refers to a multiple 
price list, and the term decision or choice refers to a row in a multiple price list where the 
decision maker has to choose between a certain option and a lottery. 
Framing of the certain option. 
The framing of the certain option was varied between-subjects. If the certain option 
was framed as a gain, the participants chose between a lottery with a risky outcome and a 
certain outcome with a certain positive payoff (sure gain). In the case in which the certain 
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equivalent was framed as price of the lottery, the participants chose between buying a 
ticket to participate in a given lottery or to “save” the money of the lottery ticket, to keep it 
as their payoff, and not to participate in the lottery.  
Materials. 
The study consisted of two main parts: an experiment and a questionnaire
8
. The 
experiment was carried out in the laboratory, and the questionnaire was administered 
online three days later.
9
 
Dependent Variable Measures 
The dependent variable was the individual’s risk attitude. The preference for the 
risky option in a given gamble is referred to as risk preference. The risk preference is used 
to measure individual’s risk attitudes. Risk attitudes were measured in choices between 
options yielding lotteries (henceforth lotteries) and options yielding certain outcomes 
(henceforth certain options) with consequences for the choosing person (individual 
choice), and choices between lotteries and a certain options with consequences for the 
choosing person and another person (interpersonal choice).  
In order to identify the risk attitude of a person, the certainty equivalent is used 
(Eisenführ & Weber, 2003). The certainty equivalent of a given lottery is identified when a 
person    with   (       ), is indifferent between a lottery    with   (       ), and 
a certain payoff  . The lottery has    outcomes with   (       ) and each outcome has 
an associated probability of    with   (       ) and it holds that ∑     
 
   . The 
certain payoff Y is then regarded as the certainty equivalent of    and     (  ). It is 
assumed that the utility of the certainty equivalent is equal to the expected payoff of the 
lottery,  (  (  ))      (  )   
Arrow and Pratt (Eisenführ & Weber, 2003) assume that the shape of the slope of a 
utility function mirrors the risk attitude. The shape is defined using the Arrow-Pratt 
Measure of risk attitude  ( ): 
                                                 
8
 Detailed instructions of the experimental tasks and questionnaire items of the PVQ are presented in 
the Appendix A - Appendix I. 
9 It was planned to administer the questionnaire right after the experiment, however, due to technical 
difficulties this was not possible. 
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 ( )   
   ( )
  ( )
  
The above formula requires that the utility function has at least two derivatives and 
that the first derivative is different from zero. While the formula above depicts a measure 
of the absolute risk attitude the relative risk attitude is calculated by multiplying the 
formula above with the respective consequence. This leads to the measure of relative risk 
attitude  ̇( ): 
 ̇( )   
   ( )
  ( )
    
It is assumed that  ( ) is constant across payoff levels; this means the sum of the 
investment should not influence the risk attitude. Whether this assumption is correct is an 
important subject of research.  
The approach described above makes specific assumptions about the shape of the 
underlying utility function. For example, the use of the Arrow-Pratt Measure is only 
possible if the utility function has two derivatives. One example of a utility function that 
satisfies this requirement would be a logarithmic utility function  (     )    (∑    
 
   
  ). While in an individual uncertain choice context this utility function is used often and 
seems to model utility quite well (Harrison & Rutström, 2008), it is unclear if this is the 
case in an interpersonal context. The preference for the risky option in a given gamble is 
referred to as risk preference. The risk preference is used to measure individual’s risk 
attitudes. In order to limit the necessary assumption of the underlying utility function, the 
approach of Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992) is chosen, because they propose a linear 
utility function, which is theory free, of the form   ( )  ∑     . In this case the risk 
attitude can be calculated for lottery   and each individual as   ( )  
 (  )  
 (  )  
 . Based on the 
ratio of the expected utility of a lottery and its respective certainty equivalent the 
individual’s choices can reflect three general risk attitudes: for  (  )    risk neutrality, 
for  (  )    risk seeking and for  (  )    risk aversion (Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992). 
A person is assumed to be risk neutral if she is indifferent between a lottery yielding the 
same expected value as a given certain option. A person is assumed to be risk averse 
whenever she prefers a certain option yielding the same expected value as a lottery over 
the lottery itself. If she prefers the lottery over a certain option yielding the same expected 
value she is considered risk seeking. According to this definition risk aversion and risk 
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seeking are relative terms, and a decrease in risk aversion is equivalent to an increase in 
risk seeking. 
In order to elicit the certainty equivalent for a given lottery, each lottery and certain 
options were presented in a multiple price list format. A multiple price list presents choices 
between alternatives in a list format. In each row of the list the individual has to decide 
between two options. Due to their convenience, multiple price lists are used in 
experimental economic research in order to elicit risk preferences or individual’s 
willingness to pay or willingness to accept prices (Binswanger, 1981; Holt, 2006; 
Kahneman, Knetsch, & Thaler, 1990). For example, a multiple price list can be used to 
elicit the price of apples. In this case the decider has to choose between two options, 
money vs. apples, and in each row apples and money are offered. The experimenter could 
keep the number of apples in each choice constant (each row), while the money offered in 
each row moving down increases, the point where the decider switches from apples to 
money will tell us at which point the individual is indifferent between apples and money 
indicating the value associated with apples. The multiple price list format has three 
possible disadvantages (Andersen et al., 2006): it can only elicit intervals of values, not 
precise values, participants can switch back and forth between the two options making it 
impossible to identify one value and the method might be susceptible to framing effects. 
However, it has been shown that despite these possible limitations the use of the multiple 
price list design is robust and reliable to elicit the individual degree of risk aversion 
(Harrison & Rutström, 2008). 
In each multiple price lists eleven rows were presented. In each row of the table the 
participants had to decide between a lottery with two outcomes determined by a coin toss 
and a certain outcome. The outcomes and probabilities of the lottery were held constant 
throughout all eleven choices of one table, while the certain outcome increased with each 
choice moving down in the table. The certain outcome   for a given multiple price list, 
increases by 100 points moving down a row  . The rule for the certain payoff was:  
                                       (     )       
Table 17 presents an example of a multiple price list to elicit the individual’s risk 
attitude. The participant is asked to decide in each row, whether she prefers Option A or 
Option B. 
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Table 17: Example of lottery choices presented in a multiple price list format. 
 
The point where the participant switches from Option B to Option A indicates the 
interval in which the participant is indifferent between Option A and Option B and yields 
the certainty equivalent for the given lottery      (              ). This interval is used 
to estimate the participants risk preference in the above described manner. The lottery 
   depicted in the example in Table 17 yields an expected utility of  (  )         
          . A risk neutral participant would switch from Option B to Option A in the 
third decision, a risk averse participant would choose Option A in an earlier decision while 
a participant switching in a later decision would be described as risk seeking.  
Ancillary Measures 
Other regarding preferences. 
Besides the risk preferences, other-regarding preferences were elicited using a 
dictator game. In a dictator game, a participant (dictator) is endowed with a sum of money. 
She then is asked how much of this endowment she is willing to give to another participant 
(recipient). The recipient cannot decide to take or to leave the offered sum. Dictator games 
were developed in order to disentangle strategic and altruistic motives that could both lead 
to fair transfers in an ultimatum game (Engel, 2010). The transfer in a dictator game is 
considered a measure of altruism because the recipient is powerless and any social control 
through others of dictator behavior is ruled out and self-interest would dictate to give 
nothing (Andreoni et al., 2007; Brandstätter & Güth, 2002; Fehr & Fischbacher, 2003).  
In the dictator game the participants had to choose how they want to distribute a 
given amount between themselves and another participant. The action space of a dictator 
was presented in a multiple price list presenting all possible distributions of a division of 
Decision 
Number 
 
Option A 
 Option B  
Do you prefer A or B?   Heads Tails  
1  100  100 500  A / B 
2  200  100 500  A / B 
3  300  100 500  A / B 
4  400  100 500  A / B 
5  500  100 500  A / B 
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2000 tokens between the dictator and the recipient in steps of 100. The participants had to 
state which distributions they accepted and which they refused to accept.  
Measuring personal values. 
In order to assess the personal values, the German version of the Portray Value 
Questionnaire (PVQ) was used (Schmidt et al., 2007). The questionnaire presents 40 
statements describing a person, e.g.: It is important to him to respond to the needs of 
others. He tries to support those he knows. Participants rate their similarity to the described 
person on a scale from one to six. High values indicate high levels of similarity while low 
values indicate low levels of similarity.  
The Portray Value Questionnaire assesses a person’s value priorities among the 
following ten values: power, performance, hedonism, stimulation, self-determination, 
universalism, benevolence, tradition, conformism, and security. The score for a personal 
value is calculated based on the mean score of all portrays considered to reflect a specific 
value type. Table 18 presents the reliability of the scales measuring each value type and 
mean scores across the whole sample, showing that the scales of the PVQ yield satisfactory 
reliabilities.  
Table 18: Reliability of scales assessing personal values in Experiment 1. 
Value type  Number of 
participants 
Number of 
Items 
Cronbach’s Alpha M SD 
Power 90 3 .76 3.21 1.01 
Performance 90 4 .78 4.17 .89 
Hedonism 90 3 .79 4.63 .89 
Stimulation 90 3 .70 4.10 .95 
Self-determination 90 4 .65 4.95 .69 
Universalism 90 4 .65 4.47 .75 
Benevolence 90 4 .69 4.93 .72 
Tradition 90 4 .49 3.17 .78 
Conformism 90 4 .55 3.87 .75 
Security 90 5 .58 3.94 .73 
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Measuring subjective importance of situational aspects. 
In order to increase the salience of the other person in interpersonal tasks and to 
activate altruistic motives before the interpersonal choice task a measure of the weight 
given to the outcomes of the other person was carried out. 
The measure consisted of the following three questions which were rated regarding 
their importance on a six point scale: 
1. How important is it for you that your choices in the next task have consequences 
for another person?  
2. How important is it for you to make choices in the next task, which can be 
particularly advantageous for you? 
3. How important is it for you to make choices in the next task which are particularly 
advantageous for the other person?  
Procedure. 
The study was conducted at the Hermann-Ebbinghaus-Laboratory at the University 
of Erfurt. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants 
were invited using the ORSEE database (Greiner, 2004). Altogether 13 sessions were 
carried out in which four treatment conditions were examined and participants were 
assigned randomly to the treatment conditions.  
When entering the laboratory all participants were randomly assigned to isolated 
terminals where they received the same written instructions, stating the general rules and 
procedures of the experiment. These instructions were read aloud to the participants and 
questions regarding the procedure were answered. They were informed that their payment 
at the end of the session would consist of a 2.50 € show-up fee plus the payoff from the 
experiment paid in real money. The unit of experimental money was Taler and 1250 Taler 
equaled 1 €. The conversion rate was announced to the participants at the beginning of the 
experiment. Average earnings amounted to 8.05 € (SD = 1.43 €). The participants were 
seated in separated cabins and were not able to communicate with one another after the 
experiment started. The experiment consisted of three parts: four interpersonal choice 
tasks, four individual choice tasks and a dictator game (see Figure 7).  
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Figure 7: Sequence of events during the experimental session. 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants had to answer two questions to 
make sure that they understood the general instructions correctly. Each of the three parts of 
the experiment commenced with instructions presented on the screen. The rules and 
procedure of the subsequent choice problems were explained. The instructions were 
followed by control questions, assessing whether the participants understood the rules of 
the task. After answering all control questions correctly, the participants were informed 
that they now face choice problems which would determine their final payoffs.  
The experiment consisted of interpersonal and individual choice tasks. The order of 
individual choice tasks and interpersonal choice tasks were counterbalanced. The 
individual choice tasks and the interpersonal choice tasks were alike, differing in only one 
respect: in the first, participants were only presented lotteries with a possible outcome for 
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them personally, but in the second, participants were presented with possible outcomes for 
themselves and possible outcomes for another participant. The other participant was 
anonymous and randomly assigned to the decision maker.  
All participants first played the role of the decision maker and then became a 
recipient. They were not aware of that role change when they had the role as decision 
maker. They were informed about both roles at the end of the experiment. 
In order to avoid portfolio effects, the participants were informed that from each part 
one choice would be drawn randomly and played out. They received the information about 
their personal payoffs after all parts of the study were completed. After completing one 
part of the experiment the participants saw a message on their screen telling them that one 
of the decision problems was picked randomly and its outcome determined by an 
electronic coin toss.  
After making all the choices in the three stages (individual choice task, interpersonal 
choice task and dictator game) the participants were informed that they were now 
recipients and would receive a gift from another participant, first in the interpersonal 
choice task and second in the dictator game. The participants were randomly paired as 
recipients in the interpersonal choice task and again for the dictator game.  
At the end of the experiment participants were informed about the outcomes of the 
randomly picked choice problem and about their final payoffs. They were asked to create a 
personal code in order to be able to merge their behavioral data and the data from the 
questionnaire. Finally, they were paid privately in their terminal and then took their leave. 
Three days after completing the experiment an online survey assessed the 
participants’ personal values with the German version of the Portray Value Questionnaire 
(PVQ) (Schmidt et al., 2007) and their demographic information.  
Results 
How often a person decided to pick the certain option in each choice task indicates 
the switching point and thus her certainty equivalent for a given lottery. At choice number 
six the payoff of the certain option is equivalent to the expected payoff of the gamble. As a 
result, a risk neutral person would always choose the gamble up to decision number six, be 
indifferent between the gamble and the certain option for choice number six, and switch to 
the certain option in choice number seven, resulting in five safe choices (i.e., choices of the 
certain option).  
124 
 
Each individual lottery and the interpersonal lottery yielding the same payoffs for the 
decision maker are considered lottery pairs. The proportion of safe choices across all 
participants for each decision in each choice task were aggregated and are depicted for 
each of the four lottery pairs, distinguishing the choice contexts (individual vs. 
interpersonal) in Figure 8 and the classification of participants can be found in Appendix J. 
On the y-axis the proportion of safe choices for each decision is plotted, on the x-axis 
each decision, which is one row in each multiple price list, is plotted. When moving from 
left to the right on the x-axis, the certain option increases while the lottery payoffs as well 
as the probabilities were kept constant. Figure 8 shows plots of the proportion of safe 
choices for each lottery pair and the choices predicted under the assumption of risk 
neutrality. 
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Figure 8: Proportion of safe choices for each paired individual and interpersonal choices and 
risk-neutral prediction. 
The plots show that the majority of the participants made decisions that reflect risk 
aversion. The proportion of safe choices is lower in the interpersonal lotteries than in the 
individual ones and the difference between the proportion of safe choices in the individual 
and interpersonal choice context differs between the lotteries. This suggests that payoffs of 
another person as well as the distribution of these payoffs among the decision maker and 
the other person influence the risk attitude of the decision maker.  
The frequency of choosing the sure outcome indicates the switching point between 
the certain option and the lottery. The switching point presents the interval in which the 
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participant is indifferent between a certain payoff and the lottery which presents the 
certainty equivalent for the given lottery. The certainty equivalent was used to calculate a 
parameter for the risk attitude of each individual    through standardizing the certainty 
equivalent of each individual’s    for a given lottery    using the expected value of the 
given lottery   (  ): 
   
   (  )
  (  )
; {
                   
                    
                 
} 
Consistency of choices. 
One downside when using the multiple price list format as elicitation method is the 
requirement of consistent responses from the participants. This means that after choosing 
the certain option, a subject should not switch back to the risky option, if the certain option 
increases (Eisenführ & Weber, 2003). However, when using the multiple price list format 
as elicitation method without forcing consistency on participants inconsistencies occur 
(Harrison & Rutström, 2008). There does not seem to be a general best practice how to 
handle inconsistent responses to choices embedded in multiple price list designs. While 
Holt and Laury (2002), who introduced multiple price list designs to measure risk attitudes, 
propose keeping inconsistent cases and comparing a dataset with and without inconsistent 
cases. Andersen, Harrison, Lau and Rutström (2006) propose to consider inconsistencies 
not as mistakes but as expressions of indifference. This would lead to broader intervals of 
indifference. The general question underlying the problem is whether inconsistencies are 
mistakes or true preferences. While in the case of mistakes it would seem best to use Holt 
and Laury’s (2002) approach, under the assumption that inconsistency reflects a true 
preference Andersen et al.‘s (2006) method would be suitable, which means viewing 
inconsistency as an indicator of indifference. This would lead to larger intervals of 
indifference indicated by multiple switching points.  
Inconsistencies can be informative (Tversky, 1969) and in the current study, choice 
inconsistencies might be due to mistakes or due to strategizing. Mistakes would mean the 
case when participants clicked on A when they meant to click B. Strategizing would mean 
the people assume that they could beat chance, which would manifest itself in 
inconsistencies. Inconsistent choices could be problematic in the present study if they are 
systematically related to the choice context (individual vs. interpersonal). If strategic 
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considerations would be guiding choices, the inconsistencies would be observed across all 
lotteries and would depend on the choice context.  
Before the effects of the experimental conditions on the dependent variable were 
analyzed, the choices were screened regarding their consistency. The sample consisted of 
120 participants. In the interpersonal choice task 82.5% of the participants made consistent 
decisions in the interpersonal choice task. Inconsistent choices in one interpersonal choice 
task were observed in 10.0% of the cases, inconsistent choices in two interpersonal choice 
tasks were observed for 3.3%. Furthermore 3.3% made inconsistent choices in three 
interpersonal choice tasks and .8% chose inconsistently in all interpersonal choice tasks. 
In the interpersonal choice task 84.2% participants made consistent decisions in the 
interpersonal choice task. Inconsistent choices in one interpersonal choice task were 
observed in 8.3% of the cases, inconsistent choices in two interpersonal choice tasks were 
observed for 3.3%. Furthermore 2.5% made inconsistent choices in three interpersonal 
choice tasks and 1.7% chose inconsistently in all interpersonal choice tasks (tables are 
presented in the Appendix K and Appendix L). The choice context did not significantly 
differ regarding the frequency of inconsistent choices, a Wilcoxon signed rank test yielded, 
                Because inconsistent choices are unsystematic they are viewed as 
mistakes. This means in order to control for the possible mistakes of participants, but also 
prevent the reduction of the sample, the statistical analysis of the results will be carried out 
twice. This approach is the same as reported by Holt and Laury (2002).  
Analysis of treatment effects were conducted twice, once for a complete sample and 
once for a sample in which inconsistent choices in one lottery where coded as missing 
values. In the first step the mean risk attitudes of the consistent and inconsistent sample are 
compared. The mean risk attitudes of the corrected and the original sample were compared 
and analyzed with a MANOVA. On average the risk attitudes in the sample consisting only 
of consistent cases was generally         points lower than the average risk attitudes in 
the whole sample and yielded no significant differences regarding the mean risk attitude in 
any choice task (see Table 19).  
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Table 19: Sample means of risk attitude with and without inconsistent cases. 
Choice 
context 
Choice 
task 
Only consistent 
cases 
N Descriptive 
Statistics 
MANOVA 
   M SD       
  
Individual  1 Yes 92 0.91 0.12 
0.54 .464 < .01 
  No 120 0.92 0.11 
 2 Yes 92 0.89 0.16 
0.46 .498 < .01 
  No 120 0.91 0.17 
 3 Yes 92 0.93 0.10 
0.44 .508 < .01 
  No 120 0.94 0.10 
 4 Yes 92 0.79 0.17 
0.56 .454 < .01 
  No 120 0.81 0.17 
Interpersonal  1 Yes 92 0.97 0.16 
0.67 .416 < .01 
  No 120 0.99 0.16 
 2 Yes 92 0.91 0.27 
0.37 .546 < .01 
  No 120 0.93 0.27 
 3 Yes 92 0.98 0.14 
0.51 .478 < .01 
  No 120 1.00 0.14 
 4 Yes 92 0.86 0.20 
0.34 .561 < .01 
  No 120 0.87 0.21 
 
Results of the based on the original sample without corrections will be presented in 
the text, the “corrected” analysis in foot notes. 
The Influence of choice context and framing of the certain option on risk 
attitudes. 
In order to establish whether these effects are significant and how the framing of the 
certain option affected the individual choices, individual risk attitudes were calculated and 
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compared within a Mixed Design ANOVA (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
10
 The within-
subjects factors entered were the choice context (interpersonal vs. individual choice 
context) and distribution of risky payoffs in the interpersonal lottery (equal vs. worse off 
vs. better off vs. equal/ variance high). The presentation of the certain option (sure gain vs. 
price to pay) was entered as between-subjects factor.
 11
 The descriptive statistics are 
depicted in the Appendix M. Effect sizes are reported as   
 . The rule of thumb in order to 
qualify the effect is according to the following classification:   
      small effect, 
      
     medium effect, and   
     a large effect (Kinnear & Gray, 2004, p.250). 
Effects with a medium size that are not significant will be reported. 
The results are graphically depicted in confidence intervals. Confidence intervals 
involve distributional and statistical information. The length of the error bar depicts the 
95% confidence interval of the mean. The overlap of less than 25% of the error bars 
indicates a significant difference at        (Cumming & Fidler, 2009; Cumming & 
Finch, 2005; Masson & Loftus, 2003).  
On the left side of the graph the confidence intervals of the individual risk aversion 
parameter are depicted for choices where the certain option was presented as a sure gain. 
On the right side are listed the individual risk aversion parameters elicited in choices where 
the certain option was presented as a price to pay. The y – axis depicts the mean individual 
degree of risk aversion. On the x-axis choice tasks are depicted and are labeled according 
to the choice task number and in the interpersonal choice task they lead to different payoff 
distributions between the decision maker and the recipient. The risky outcomes in the 
interpersonal choice task lead to equal (choice task 1), disadvantageous (choice task 2), 
advantageous (choice task 3) and equal payoffs with higher variance (choice task 4) for the 
decision maker compared to the recipient. The confidence intervals for the mean risk 
attitude in decisions of lotteries in the individual choice context are depicted with solid 
                                                 
10 Whether the measure of the importance of situational aspects was carried out before the interpersonal 
choices or not, did not affect individuals risk attitude,  (     )                  
      . For this 
reason it was left out as a factor in the analysis.  
11 Mauchly’s Test indicates that the assumption of sphericity has to be refuted for the within-subjects factor 
distribution of payoffs,    ( )              . As a result the degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity for the main effect of the distribution of payoffs and for the 
interaction of distribution of payoffs and choice context.  
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bars and the confidence interval for the mean risk attitude in decisions involving lotteries 
in the interpersonal choice context is depicted with dotted lines. The 95% confidence 
intervals where calculated based on the between-subjects variance in each respective 
condition. 
 
Figure 9: 95% Confidence intervals depicting mean risk attitude depending on the choice 
context and the distribution of payoffs. Confidence intervals were calculated based on the between-
subjects variance in the respective condition. 
The first research question was: Does the degree of risk aversion differ between 
individual risk-taking and interpersonal risk-taking? The findings show that when 
comparing all choice tasks, participants were significantly less risk averse in the 
interpersonal choice context than in the individual choice context,  (     )  
                 
 
       .12 An interaction with a medium effect size of the choice 
context and the framing of the certain option was not significant,  (     )         
      
 
     .13 
                                                 
12 The choice context yielded a significant main effect,  (    )                 
     . 
13 The interaction effect of frame of certain option and choice context was not significant,  (    )  
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The second question was: How does the relative distribution of payoffs in 
interpersonal choices in the risky option influence choice? The mean risk attitude differed 
significantly depending on the distribution of payoffs between the decision maker and the 
recipient in the lotteries,  (     )                 
 
     .14 In the individual choice 
context the three lotteries yielding equal variance of payoffs overlap. This was not the case 
in the interpersonal context. Here the degree of risk aversion in lotteries leading to equal or 
advantageous payoff distributions participants was lower than in interpersonal lotteries 
which lead to disadvantageous payoffs for the decision maker. Furthermore, when 
participants were faced with lotteries that yielded a high variance in payoffs, but equality 
of the distribution in the interpersonal lottery, they were generally more risk averse, but 
also willing to take a higher risk in the interpersonal choice. However, the interaction 
between the choice context and distribution of payoffs was not significant,  (     )  
             
 
     .15 
The third question was: Does the framing of the certain option (as price for the 
lottery vs. as sure gain) influence the risk attitude? The experimental groups differed in 
their general degree of risk aversion depending on the frame of the certain payoff in the 
certain option. When in the certain option the certain payoff was depicted as sure gain, 
average risk aversion was significantly lower across all lotteries than when it was depicted 
as price to pay for the lottery,  (     )                
 
     .16 The means and 
standard deviations of the individual risk attitude for each factor level are depicted in the 
Appendix M for uncorrected data and Appendix N for the corrected data. 
Relationship between individual risk attitudes and person specific 
variables. 
As shown in the previous section a significant difference was found between risk 
attitude in the interpersonal choice context and individual choice context. In order to 
                                                 
14 The distribution of payoffs had a significant effect on the mean risk attitude,  (     )          
       
      . 
15 The interaction between the choice context and distribution of payoffs was not significant,  (     )  
              
     . 
16 The experimental groups differed significantly in their mean risk attitude depending on the framing of the 
certain option,  (    )                
     . 
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examine the influence of person specific variables on the propensity to take higher risks 
when others are affected a change score was calculated for each individual. The change of 
risk attitude was expressed as percent of change in the interpersonal choice context 
compared to the risk attitude in the individual choice context for each choice task. As a 
result the change score is calculated as change in percent according to the following 
formula:  
                                             
                    
        and {
                      
                         
                     
} .  
For example a participant with        yields a 10% higher risk attitude in the 
interpersonal context of a given choice task than in the individual context of the same 
choice task of the given expected value.  
Results from the dictator game. 
The proposed split in a dictator game (i.e., giving) presents a measure of fairness or 
altruism (Engel, 2010; Forsythe et al., 1994; Kahneman et al., 1986). The results of a 
dictator game and their relationship with the change of risk aversion are examined. The 
relative frequency for all possible splits is depicted in Appendix O. In Figure 10 on the x-
axis the proportion of endowment given to the recipient is portrayed in steps of 5%. The y-
axis captures what percentage of participants proposed a given split. For example, 3.7% of 
the participants gave 25% of their endowment to the recipient. 
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Figure 10: Relative frequency of the pie-size transferred to the recipient. 
The results show that the participants differed greatly in their willingness to share 
their endowment with the recipient assigned to them in the dictator game. It was found that 
24.8% of the participants were willing to give half of their endowment to the recipient 
while another 24.8% transferred nothing. Furthermore 16.5% were willing to give even 
more than half of the endowment to the recipient.  
The third research question was: Is the change of the risk attitude in the 
interpersonal choice context compared to the individual choice context related to giving in 
a dictator game? In order to answer this question a linear regression was carried out. The 
predictor was the proportion expressed in percent of the endowment given to the recipient, 
the change of the risk attitude in each lottery pair was the criterion. The regression was 
carried out individually for the experimental group in which the certain option was 
portrayed as sure gain and the group in which the certain option was portrayed as price to 
pay to participate in order to identify whether the framing of the certain payoff in the 
certain option influences the predictive value. The unstandardized Beta’s, standard errors, 
R
2
 and p values are depicted in Table 20. Scatter plots with regression slopes can be found 
in the Appendix P - Appendix W. 
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Table 20: Regression coefficients for the change of risk attitudes with giving in the dictator 
game for each . 
Distribution of 
payoffs in 
interpersonal 
lottery 
Framing of the Certain 
Option B std. Error R
2
 sign. 
equal Sure gain .34 .09 .184 .000 
Price to pay .10 .10 .019 .324 
Disadvantageous Sure gain .36 .22 .042 .098 
Price to pay -.01 .16 .000 .959 
Advantageous Sure gain .10 .09 .017 .293 
Price to pay .07 .04 .045 .123 
High variance - 
equal 
Sure gain .11 .16 .007 .493 
Price to pay .04 .11 .003 .711 
 
When the certain option is framed as sure gain then the percentage transferred to the 
recipient in the dictator game can significantly predict the change of risk-taking in the 
impersonal choice task where the risky option leads to equal payoffs. The data suggests 
that the framing of the certain option as well as the distribution of risky outcomes 
influences the predictive value of giving in a dictator game for changes in risk-taking in 
interpersonal contexts. 
In the next section the results of the self-report measures for the subjective 
importance of situational aspects in the interpersonal choice context, and general personal 
values are reported. 
Self-report measures. 
Personal values of each participant and the importance of situational characteristics 
were assessed in order to find out to what degree these person specific variables can 
explain variation of risk-taking. In order to examine the relationship the change score 
described above was used. A positive relationship indicates that a high score on the 
personal variable is associated with a higher positive change of the risk attitude (i.e., more 
risk seeking).  
Half of the participants had to respond to three questions concerning the lottery in the 
interpersonal choice context between the stages where they learned about the choice task 
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and before they made their actual choices. This measure is referred to as importance of 
situation aspects. The items measured the subjective importance of situational aspects on a 
six point Likert-scale; the importance increased with increasing value. The mean scores 
indicate that in the interpersonal choice context the importance of a high individual payoff 
(              ) was on average more important to the participants than the 
responsibility for the other person (              ) and her payoff (  
            ). A bivariate correlation was calculated for the score on each of the three 
items and the change of risk attitude in the interpersonal lotteries. In the experimental 
group, where the certain option was portrayed as sure gain, a positive correlation between 
the importance of the payoff of the recipient and the change of risk attitude was found for 
the first (       ) and second choice task (     ). When the certain option is framed as 
a sure gain and payoffs lead to equality or disadvantageous inequality then decision makers 
who place importance on the payoffs expected to be received by recipients are associated 
with an increase of risk-taking. The correlation matrix is depicted in the Appendix X and 
Appendix Y for each data set (uncorrected and corrected). 
In order to assess the personal values the German version of the Portray Value 
Questionnaire (PVQ) from Schwartz was used (Schmidt, Bamberg, Davidov, Herrmann, & 
Schwartz, 2007). In the questionnaire 40 different portraits of people are described and the 
participant is asked to rate how similar they are to the described person. In the 
questionnaire ten personal values were assessed. Participants had to rate how similar they 
are to the portrayed individual, prototypical for a specific value, on a scale from one to six. 
High values indicated high levels of similarity while low values indicate low levels of 
similarity. The score for a personal value was calculated based on the mean score of all 
portrays considered to reflect a specific value type. 
A correlation analysis was carried out between the change of the risk attitude and 
personal values. Correlations were calculated for each experimental group independently 
(certain option as gain vs. certain option as price to pay). In the group where the certain 
option was framed as price to pay a significant negative correlation was found between the 
personal value benevolence and change of the risk attitude in the third choice task (  
    ). In the experimental group where the certain option was framed as a sure gain four 
significant correlations were found. A positive correlation was found between the change 
of the risk attitude in the interpersonal choice task leading to advantageous payoff 
inequality with benevolence (     ) and universalism (     ). Universalism was also 
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associated with the change of the risk attitude in interpersonal choice task leading to equal 
payoffs but yielding a high variance (     ). A negative correlation was found between 
the value stimulation and the change of the risk attitude in the interpersonal choice task 
leading to disadvantageous payoff inequality (      ).  
These correlations show that a change in the risk attitude towards more risk seeking 
is positively associated with benevolence and universalism when risky options lead to 
advantageous outcomes in the group where the certain option was framed as sure gain. 
Surprisingly, when the certain option was framed as price to pay, high value priority of 
benevolence was associated with lower changes of the risk attitude when the risky option 
leads to advantageous payoff distributions. Only in cases where the certain options framed 
as sure gain, high priority of the value universalism is associated with higher risk seeking 
when risky options yield equal outcomes with a high variance. Also, only in the group 
where the certain option was framed as sure gain high value priority for stimulation was 
related to a decrease of risk-taking in interpersonal choices leading to disadvantageous 
inequality was related to less risk-taking. The correlation matrix for both experimental 
groups is depicted in the Appendix Z for the uncorrected and Appendix AA for the 
corrected data set. 
Discussion 
Participants were less risk averse in choices involving others than in choices that 
only involved payoffs for them. The willingness to take higher risks was affected by the 
distribution of the payoff distribution of the risky choice, which suggests that prosocial 
behavior was driven by inequality aversion and/ or altruism. Furthermore, when people 
made decisions between lotteries and a sure gain they showed lower degrees of risk 
aversion than when they chose whether they wanted to buy a lottery or keep the money 
which had to be paid to play. 
The change in risk-taking in interpersonal choices compared to individual choices 
could only be predicted with the giving in a dictator game in cases where the certain option 
was framed as gain and when the distribution of payoffs in the interpersonal lottery was 
equal between decision maker and recipient. People with higher levels of giving in a 
dictator game are more likely to show decreasing risk aversion in lotteries where the 
outcome distribution is equal. Personal values were not systematically associated with the 
change of the risk attitudes of the participants. 
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The observed risk-taking in individual and interpersonal contexts differs; this is in 
line with previous studies (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2010; Charness & Jackson, 2009; 
Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). The change of risk preferences seems to 
depend on the payoff structure and the decision maker’s consideration of the benefit of the 
dependent other and does not generally reflect higher risk aversion in interpersonal 
contexts as found in previous studies (e.g., Charness & Jackson, 2009; Pahlke et al., 2011; 
Zaleska & Kogan, 1971). This shows that people dare because they care. However, this 
general finding has to be qualified.  
Is altruism the driving motive underlying the observed effect? While the decision 
makers seem to be willing to take higher risks even when inequality in the certain option is 
advantageous for them, this is less so when the decision maker’s expected payoff is lower 
than the expected payoff for the other. This suggests that inequality aversion influences the 
willingness to take risks benefitting another person, although this does not rule out that 
altruism as a motive for some. About 35% of the sample still take a higher risk if another 
person is affected by their choice even if the other gets more than they would if they would 
choose only for themselves. However, the distribution of payoffs significantly changes the 
amount of people willing to take a higher risk from 42% to 46% in the conditions where 
the expected payoffs are distributed equally or in favor for the decision maker. This 
suggests that a substantial amount of participants were influenced by inequality aversion 
over expected outcomes. 
The notion that inequality concerns over outcomes lead to less risk-taking in cases 
where the expected payoffs are disadvantageous for the decision maker is supported by the 
finding that giving in the dictator game only predicts the change of risk-taking when the 
distribution of expected payoffs is equal. Giving in the dictator game might be more 
strongly driven by considerations of fairness norms than altruism (Andreoni & Bernheim, 
2009), and as a result people who value fairness are not willing to take a higher risk for a 
distribution which they consider “unfair”. Furthermore, this would explain why personal 
values associated with altruism showed limited association with change in risk-taking. On 
the other hand, the limited association of self-report measures and behavior is in line with 
the findings in literature, that personality measures are limited to predict behavior in 
laboratory experiments (e.g., Ma, Sherstyuk, Dowling, & Hill, 2002).  
The general question of the experiment was: are people are willing to take risks in 
order to benefit another person? The results show that if another person benefits from a 
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risky choice people’s risk aversion decreases, but not when the distribution of the benefits 
of risk-taking are disadvantageous for the decision maker. This suggests that envy crowds 
out prosocial behavior, when it is driven by inequality aversion, which seems to be the case 
in the current study.  
One important factor of prosocial behavior is empathy (Batson, Chang, Orr, & 
Rowland, 2002; Batson et al., 1997; Batson & Shaw, 1991; Cialdini et al., 1987; Eisenberg 
& Miller, 1987; Midlarsky et al., 2005). Empathy is defined as “the ability to put oneself in 
another person’s shoes” (Kirman & Teschl, 2010, p. 1) i.e., to be able to take the 
perspective of another person. Altruism is supposed to follow from empathetic concern 
(Batson & Shaw, 1991). Maybe empathetic people are more likely to reduce their risk 
aversion due to altruism since they gain utility from the payoff of the other than someone 
who is not empathetic and only gains utility from personal payoffs? This question was 
pursued in the second experiment. 
Limitations  
Some participants could be driven by the desire to satisfy the expectations of the 
recipients and appear fair rather than be fair. Their behavior is driven by image motivation. 
“Image motivation, or signaling motivation, refers to individuals’ tendency to be motivated 
partly by how others perceive them. Image motivation therefore captures the rule of 
opinion in utility which is the desire to be liked and respected by others and by the self. If 
individuals are looking for social approval in their behavior, then they should try to signal 
traits which are defined as “good” based on social norms and values” (Ariely, Bracha, & 
Meier, 2009, p. 545). This questions the assumption that other-regarding preferences lead 
to more risk-taking when expected outcomes have positive consequences for another 
person. It is shown that if nature can be rendered responsible for the outcomes of one’s 
actions, some people cease to behave in a fair manner (Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Dana 
et al., 2006). One way to rule out image motivation is to carry out the choices which affect 
others and offer a silent exit option (Dana et al., 2006). In the second experiment a silent 
exit option will be implemented in order to find out if image motivation influences risk-
taking in interpersonal choice contexts. 
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Experiment 2  
In the first experiment it was found that people are willing to sacrifice personal 
payoffs in order to increase the chance of benefitting the recipient. While some participants 
behaved as if motivated by altruism others seemed to be motivated by inequality aversion. 
The data from the interviews indicated that particularly participants who were motivated 
by the concern for the recipients seemed to be willing to accept higher risks and were less 
concerned about their personal safety despite their risk perception. One possible 
explanation could be that the participants behaving as if motivated by altruism experienced 
empathy towards the beneficiaries which, according to the empathy-altruism hypothesis 
(Batson et al., 1989; Batson et al., 1986), leads to a higher tendency to help. Possibly 
empathy was also activated in the participants in the first experiment who took a higher 
risk in order to benefit the other.  
On the other hand, the increased risk-taking in the interpersonal choice context could 
be due to social image motivation. It has been shown in economic experiments, that the 
presence of another person, even under conditions of anonymity leads to higher rates of 
prosocial behavior than when choices are made in private or when the behavior of the 
decision maker and its impact on the outcomes of the other can be obscured (Dana et al., 
2006; Dana et al., 2007). These findings are explained with social image motivation and 
the desire of people to behave according to the expectations of the other participant 
(Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009). Social image therefore seems to present 
an important incentive to behave prosocially when making choices that affect another 
person. It was found that when given the opportunity to introduce ambiguity about the 
causal relationship between the other’s payoff and the action of the decision maker, a 
substantial amount of participants chose it. This shows that offering a silent exit option 
may help to reduce the likelihood of social image motivation as a driving force of prosocial 
behavior (Dana et al., 2006).  
In order to find out if this is the case, the second experiment has two objectives. First, 
to find out whether empathetic concern is related to risk-taking in interpersonal choice 
tasks. Second, to rule out image motivation as motive of increased risk-taking in the 
interpersonal choice context.  
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Research Questions 
1. Does empathetic concern lead to increased risk-taking (i.e., more risk seeking) in 
interpersonal asymmetric risk situations?  
The empathy-altruism hypothesis suggests that in a situation where a decision maker 
faces asymmetric risk, an empathetic decision maker should be willing to bear a higher risk 
than a non-empathetic one. Empathy should lead to an induction of altruism, and the 
outcomes for the other should influence the utility of the decision maker. If the decision 
maker is motivated by altruism the risky option becomes more attractive because the other 
benefits from risk-taking disproportionally higher than the decision maker profits from 
choosing the certain option.  
2. Do people use the silent exit option to avoid responsibility for the outcomes of the 
recipient?  
The introduction of an exit option rules out image motivation as another motive 
guiding prosocial behavior and introduces nature as possible explanation for outcomes of 
the recipient (Andreoni & Bernheim, 2009; Ariely et al., 2009). It is expected that 
participants choose not to use the exit option when making choices only affecting 
themselves, while when making choices affecting another person and given the option to 
exit they will use it. Furthermore, it is expected that the cost of the exit option influences 
whether people use it or not.  
Moreover, it is assumed that people who feel empathetic concern for the other are 
driven by altruism and not image motivation when acting prosocially and as a result should 
not use the exit option independent of its cost. However, people whose prosocial behavior 
is guided by self-interest should choose the exit option more when it is free. Because the 
cost of exiting is lower than the cost of taking higher risks in order to behave according to 
the expectations of the recipient.  
In the previous experiment reported above no systematic relationship between 
increasing risk-taking in interpersonal context and personal values associated with 
prosocial behavior were found. In order to influence behavior, personal values have to be 
activated (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). One possible explanation could be that the 
decision making task did not activate personal value. It is assumed that when empathy is 
activated personal values associated with prosocial behavior are more likely to influence 
behavior (Schwartz, Mikulincer, & Shaver, 2010).  
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3. Is the relationship between risk-taking and personal values moderated whether 
people feel empathetic towards the other or not? 
In order to answer these questions a second experiment was conducted. 
Method 
Participants. 
Participants were recruited using the online Recruitment System ORSEE (Greiner, 
2004), although some participants showed up without receiving an invitation. Altogether N 
= 128 participants attended the laboratory session.  
Table 21: Participants demographic information. 
N =128 Gender Age Monthly disposable income 
male female M SD M SD 
 24.2% 75.8% 22.57 3.23 464.38 249.16 
 
Design. 
The experiment had two factors that varied within-subjects: the choice context 
(interpersonal vs. individual choice context), and distribution of the payoffs between 
decision maker and recipient in the interpersonal lotteries. The interpersonal lotteries led to 
four different distributions in the risky option: equal, disadvantageous for the decision 
maker, advantageous for the decision maker and equality of payoffs but high variance. 
Between subject factors included empathy (high vs. low) and ease of exit (easy vs. 
difficult), which were varied.  
Each individual choice task was transformed into an interpersonal choice task by 
adding consequences of the choice for another person and keeping everything else the 
same. The consequences for the second person did not differ between choice tasks. The 
order of individual choice task, and the interpersonal choice task and the order of the 
lotteries were counterbalanced for each treatment. The other participant was anonymous 
and randomly assigned to the decision maker.  
The use of perspective taking as a means to induce empathy and the use of an exit 
option resembled research of Batson, which was characterized by the use of a two factorial 
between subjects design: empathy (high vs. low) induced via perspective taking and the 
exit from the situation (easy vs. difficult) (Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 
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1981; Toi & Batson, 1982). In order to be able to charge participants for the exit option an 
endowment of 3000 Taler was given for each choice context and its four choice tasks. 
Materials. 
The materials used in the second experiment were identical to the first one, except 
the manipulation of the ease of exit and empathy. The study consisted of two main parts: 
an experiment and a questionnaire, both administered in the laboratory. The dependent 
variable was the individual degree of risk aversion. Risk aversion was measured in choices 
between lotteries and a certain option with consequences for the choosing person 
(individual choice) and in choices between lotteries and a certain option with consequences 
for the choosing person and another person (interpersonal choice). The choices in each task 
were presented in multiple price lists. The subject made choices whether they wanted to 
participate in a given lottery or not. The framing of the certain option was as price to pay to 
participate in the lottery, which was also used in the first experiment. 
Empathy manipulation. 
Empathy was manipulated via perspective taking (Batson, 1991; Batson et al., 1981; 
Batson et al., 1988; Batson & Moran, 1999). Subjects in the high empathy condition were 
instructed before and during the interpersonal choice task: “While you are working on the 
next task, imagine how the other person feels. Try to take the perspective of the other 
person and imagine the situation from her perspective and how she feels depending on the 
possible outcomes.” While participants in the low empathy condition received the 
following instruction: “While you are working on the next task concentrate on the provided 
information. Don’t let yourself be influenced by how the other feels or how she feels 
depending on the possible outcomes.” After the empathy manipulation the participants 
were informed that they now entered the phase of the task which is important to their and 
the others payoff.  
Manipulation check for empathy. 
In order to check if empathy was induced using the perspective taking instruction a 
list of 21 emotion adjectives were rated on a 7-point unidirectional scale (1 - not at all and 
7 - extremely). The list of adjectives that had been used in previous research to measure 
empathy are (Batson, 1999): sympathetic, warm, compassionate, softhearted, tender, 
moved, friendliness, responsibility and feeling of togetherness. The consistency of the 
scale was satisfactory with a Cronbach’s Alpha of      .  
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Ease of exit. 
Subjects were asked if they wanted to silently exit the game or if they wanted to 
carry on. Ease of exit was manipulated via the cost of the exit option. Subjects in the easy 
exit condition could choose to exit the task without acquiring any cost; in the difficult exit 
condition participants had to pay 500 tokens of their endowment of 3000 tokens in order to 
exit the game.  
Personal values. 
Personal values were assessed after the experiment using the German version of the 
Portray Value Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schmidt et al., 2007). The PVQ was described in the 
method section of Experiment 1. In the second experiment only value types assumed to be 
associated with prosocial behavior in risky contexts were assessed. The reliability of each 
value scale and mean values and standard deviations observed in Experiment 2 are 
depicted in Table 22. 
Table 22: Reliability of scales assessing personal values in Experiment 2. 
Value type  Number of 
participants 
Number of 
Items 
Cronbach’s Alpha M SD 
Universalism 128 5 .78 4.6 .87 
Benevolence 128 4 .67 4.7 .77 
Security 128 5 .61 4.0 .83 
Stimulation 128 3 .65 4.0 1.00 
Self-determination 128 4 .67 4.8 .82 
 
The scales of the PVQ assessing the value type’s universalism, benevolence, 
security, stimulation and self-determination yield satisfactory reliabilities.  
Procedure. 
The study was conducted at the Hermann-Ebbinghaus Laboratory at the University 
of Erfurt. The treatment was programmed using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). Participants 
were invited using the ORSEE database (Greiner, 2004). Altogether eleven sessions were 
carried out in which four treatment conditions were examined and participants were 
assigned randomly to the treatment conditions.  
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When entering the laboratory all participants were randomly assigned to isolated 
terminals where they received the same written instructions, stating the general rules and 
procedures of the experiment. These instructions were read out aloud to the participants 
and questions regarding the procedure were answered. They were informed that their 
payment at the end of the session would consist of a 2.50 € show-up fee plus the payoff 
from the experiment. The unit of experimental money was Taler, 1250 Taler equaled 1 €. 
The conversion rate was announced to the participants at the beginning of the experiment. 
Average earnings amounted to 8.07 € (SD = 1.26 €). Once the experiment started the 
participants were seated in separate cabins and were not able to communicate with one 
another. The experiment consisted of three parts: four interpersonal choice tasks, four 
individual choice tasks and a dictator game (see Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11: Sequence of events during the experimental session. 
At the beginning of the experiment, all participants had to answer two questions to 
make sure that they understood the general instructions correctly. Each of the three parts of 
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the experiment commenced with instructions which were presented on the screen 
explaining the rules and procedures in the subsequent choice problems. The instructions 
were followed by control questions, assessing whether the participants understood the 
rules. After answering all control questions correctly, the participants were informed that 
they would now face choice problems which would determine their final payoffs.  
The experiment consisted of interpersonal and individual choice tasks. The order of 
individual choice tasks and interpersonal choice tasks, and the presentation of options were 
counterbalanced in each treatment. Individual choice tasks and interpersonal choice tasks 
were alike and differed only in one respect: in the first the participants were only presented 
lotteries with a possible outcome for them personally, while in the second the participants 
were presented with possible outcomes for themselves and possible outcomes for another 
participant. The other participant was anonymous and randomly assigned to the decision 
maker.  
All participants first played the role of the decision maker and then became a 
recipient. They were not aware of that role change when they had the role as decision 
maker. They were informed about both roles at the end of the experiment. 
At the beginning of each payoff relevant stage they were informed about their 
endowment which they could use to buy lotteries and pay the exit fee. At the end of each 
stage an electronic coin toss was carried out. 
In order to avoid portfolio effects within each part of the study the participants were 
told that for each task group one choice problem would be drawn randomly and played out 
and they received the information about their personal payoffs after all parts of the study 
were completed. Thus, after completing each part the participants saw on their screens that 
one of the choices was picked randomly and its outcome determined by a coin toss. 
However, the participants were not told which choice was picked until the end of the 
experiment.  
The perspective taking instruction was provided only in the interpersonal task. 
Before each multiple price list with interpersonal choices the perspective taking 
instructions were presented. The first perspective taking instruction was given when 
entering the payoff relevant part. The manipulation check was carried out after the 
participants read the instructions of the choice interpersonal choice task in the payoff 
relevant stage. The manipulation check was only carried out once.  
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The exit option was provided after finishing all the choice tasks in one choice. When 
participants opted to exit the respective task, they moved on to the next without the 
electronic coin toss.  
After all participants completed the choice tasks they filled out the Portray Value 
Questionnaire and provided their personal information. After completing the questionnaire 
the participants were informed about the outcomes of each choice problem that was picked 
randomly, and their final payoffs. Finally, they were paid privately in their terminal and 
took their leave. 
Results 
The number of times a person chose the certain option in each choice task indicates 
the switching point and thus, her certainty equivalent for a given lottery. At choice number 
six the payoff of the certain option is equivalent to the expected payoff of the gamble. As a 
result, a risk neutral person would always choose the gamble up to decision number six, be 
indifferent between the gamble and the certain option for choice numbers six, and switch 
to the certain option in choice number seven, resulting in five safe choices.  
Each individual lottery and the interpersonal lottery yielding the same payoffs for the 
decision maker are considered lottery pairs. The proportion of safe choices across all 
participants for each decision in each choice task were aggregated and are depicted for 
each of the four lottery pairs, distinguishing the choice contexts (individual vs. 
interpersonal) in and the classification of participants can be found in the Appendix AA. 
On the y-axis the proportion of safe choices for each decision is plotted, on the x-axis 
each decision, which is one row in each multiple price list, is plotted. When moving from 
left to the right on the x-axis, the certain option increases while the lottery payoffs as well 
as the probabilities were kept constant. Figure 12 shows the proportion of safe choices for 
each lottery pair and the choices predicted under the assumption of risk neutrality. 
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Figure 12: Proportion of safe choices, data averages for each paired individual and 
interpersonal choices and risk-neutral prediction. 
In all four pairs the number of safe choices increases with increasing certainty 
equivalents and comparing plots of proportion of safe choice in the individual and 
interpersonal context yield no differences. The plots show that the majority of the 
participants made decisions that reflect risk aversion. The plots show that across all 
treatment conditions the proportion of safe choices in the individual choice context and the 
interpersonal choice context did not differ.  
Consistency of choices. 
The sample consisted of 128 participants. In the interpersonal choice task 88.3% of 
the participants made consistent decisions in the interpersonal choice task. Inconsistent 
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choices in one interpersonal choice task were observed in 3.9% of the cases, inconsistent 
choices in two interpersonal choice tasks were observed for 3.1%. Furthermore 1.6% made 
inconsistent choices in three interpersonal choice tasks and 3.1% chose inconsistently in all 
interpersonal choice tasks.   
In the interpersonal choice task 89.1% of the participants made consistent decisions 
in the interpersonal choice task. Inconsistent choices in one interpersonal choice task were 
observed in 4.7% of the cases, inconsistent choices in two interpersonal choice tasks were 
observed for 2.3%. Furthermore 1.6% made inconsistent choices in three interpersonal 
choice tasks and 2.3% chose inconsistently in all interpersonal choice tasks. The choice 
context did not significantly differ regarding the frequency of inconsistent choices, a 
Wilcoxon signed rank test yielded,                Moreover, cross tabs and a 
McNemar test show that most participants who made inconsistent choices in one decision 
context did not do so in the other,                     . The tables are found in 
the Appendix CC and Appendix DD.  
Because inconsistent choices are unsystematic they are viewed as mistakes, the 
handling of inconsistencies follows the same rationale as in the first experiment. Analysis 
of treatment effects were conducted twice, once for a complete sample and once for a 
sample in which inconsistent choices in one lottery where coded as missing values. In the 
first step the mean risk attitudes of the consistent and inconsistent sample are compared.  
In order to find out if inconsistencies affect the risk attitude the mean risk attitudes of 
the corrected and the original sample were compared and analyzed with a MANOVA. The 
results and respective means are depicted in Table 23. 
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Table 23: Comparison of sample means of risk attitude with and without inconsistent cases. 
Choice 
context 
Lottery Only 
consistent 
cases 
N Descriptive 
Statistics 
MANOVA 
  M SD       
  
Individual  1 Yes 106 0.87 0.14 
0.19 .665 < .01 
  No 128 0.88 0.14 
 2 Yes 106 0.83 0.20 
0.45 .504 < .01 
  No 128 0.85 0.21 
 3 Yes 106 0.91 0.11 
0.56 .456 < .01 
  No 128 0.92 0.11 
 4 Yes 106 0.80 0.19 
0.15 .703 < .01 
  No 128 0.81 0.19 
Interpersonal 1 Yes 106 0.88 0.14 
0.22 .643 < .01 
  No 128 0.89 0.15 
 2 Yes 106 0.84 0.24 
0.03 .859 < .01 
  No 128 0.85 0.24 
 3 Yes 106 0.92 0.11 
0.35 .553 < .01 
  No 128 0.93 0.12 
 4 Yes 106 0.81 0.19 
0.22 .639 < .01 
  No 128 0.83 0.19 
 
The average risk attitudes in the sample consisting of only consistent cases were 
generally         lower than the average risk attitudes in the whole sample, the 
differences were not significant in any choice task as depicted in Table 23. For this reason 
and results of the based on the original sample without corrections will be presented in the 
text, the “corrected” analysis in foot notes. 
Analyzing treatment effects of experiment 2. 
The first research question was: Does empathetic concern lead to increased risk-
taking (i.e., be more risk seeking) in interpersonal asymmetric risk situations? In order to 
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answer this question one group of participants was instructed to take the perspective of the 
recipient when making decisions (empathy high) and the other group was instructed to 
focus on the numerical information (low empathy). As a manipulation check the degree of 
empathy towards the recipient was calculated as a compound score of the ratings of eight 
adjectives associated with empathy (Batson & Moran, 1999). In the group receiving the 
instruction to take the perspective of the recipient the participants rated the adjectives 
associated with empathy higher (             ) than the participants instructed to 
focus on the objective information (             ). This difference was not 
significant (                   ). Perhaps the perspective taking manipulation 
directly influenced the individual risk preferences? In order to examine the influence of 
perspective taking on risk-taking , individual risk attitude were calculated and compared 
with a Mixed Design ANOVA.
17
 
In the analysis the factor choice context (interpersonal vs. individual choice context) 
and distribution of risky payoffs in the interpersonal lottery (equal vs. worse off vs. better 
off vs. equal/ variance high) were entered as within-subjects factors. The perspective 
taking instruction (focus on other vs. focus on objective information) was entered as 
between-subjects factor. The results are graphically depicted in 95% confidence intervals 
displayed in Figure 13. The descriptive statistics are depicted in the Appendix EE for the 
uncorrected data set and Appendix FF for the corrected data set. 
                                                 
17 The influence of the exit option was left out of the analysis since the exit option was provided after 
making the choices and it therefore should not influence the choice. 
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Figure 13: 95% Confidence intervals depicting risk attitudes depending on the choice context 
and the distribution of payoffs. Confidence intervals were calculated based on the between-subjects 
variance in the respective condition. 
The individual risk attitude was significantly influenced by the payoff levels of the 
lotteries,  (     )                
 
     . However, no difference was found 
between the individual risk attitude in individual and interpersonal choice contexts, 
 (     )             
 
     . Also, the individual risk attitude was not different 
between the groups,  (   )              
 
     . The findings show that perspective 
taking did not lead to a change of the individual risk attitude.  
The second research question was: Do people use nature in order to deny 
responsibility for the outcomes of the recipient? In order to control for social image 
motivation, an exit option was introduced allowing participants to choose not to take part 
in the gamble without the other participant knowing an exit option was used. When 
participants chose to exit, all choices in the respective task were regarded as safe choices. 
The exit option differed between-subjects in regard to the price, which functioned as a 
manipulation of ease of exit. The frequency of exiting is depicted in Table 24. 
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Table 24: Frequency of choosing the exit option depending on experimental conditions. 
 Participants exit 
 Individual Context Interpersonal Context 
Empathy Exit Yes No Yes No 
high 
 
difficult 1 29 1 29 
easy 0 33 0 33 
low difficult 0 27 2 25 
easy 2 27 2 27 
 
The exit option was hardly chosen in any condition irrespective of the empathy 
manipulation or ease of exit in the individual as well as in the interpersonal context. 
Comparing experiment 1 and 2. 
The second experiment resembled the first one in that risk aversion was measured in 
individual and interpersonal choice tasks using certainty equivalents. The introduction of 
an exit option did not influence choice behavior since it was provided after the choice task. 
The experiment aimed to replicate the findings of the first experiment and provide insight 
into underlying psychological mechanisms. However, the findings show that this endeavor 
failed. Why? 
The findings of the second experiment were rather inconclusive and did not reveal a 
relationship of empathy and increased prosocial behavior. One important question of the 
experiments was: Are people willing to sacrifice personal payoffs for the sake of another 
person? While we assume that dictator games indicate that the answer would be yes, it is 
questionable whether participants really feel like they “loose” money when they propose 
an equal split. This assumption is supported by the finding that the framing of the certain 
option moderates the relationship between giving in a dictator game and changes of risk-
taking in interpersonal lottery tasks in the first experiment. Maybe the salience of possible 
loss that participants can acquire differs depending on the framing of the certain option. 
For example, when people receive an endowment loss-aversion is induced, which is not the 
case when people only gamble for gains (Kahneman et al., 1991; Thaler et al., 1997). This 
suggests that the degree of salience of possible losses influences risky choices. In the first 
experiment the certain option was portrayed as sure gain in one and as price of the lottery 
in the other condition. In the second experiment the certain option was portrayed as price 
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of the lottery and the participants received an endowment before the task. Combining the 
two experiments leads to a three level manipulation of the factor salience of possible 
personal losses. In the condition when the salience of personal losses is lowest the certain 
option was portrayed as a sure gain. When the salience of personal loss was medium the 
certain option was portrayed as price of the lottery. When the salience of personal loss was 
high the certain option was portrayed as price of the lottery and the participants had an 
endowment which was used to pay.  
To answer the question how the salience of personal losses influences risk-taking in 
an interpersonal context, it was analyzed how the within-subjects factor choice context 
(interpersonal vs. individual), the distributional equality of expected payoffs (equal vs. 
disadvantageous vs. advantageous vs. equal – high variance) and the between-subjects 
factor salience of losses (low vs. medium vs. high) influenced the risk preferences of the 
participants. This resulted in a 3x2x4 mixed-design ANOVA.
18,19
  
                                                 
18 The number of participants in the conditions was not equal. In the second experiment, the condition where 
the certain option was framed as price and an endowment was given, the number of participants was N = 119. 
However, the difference of participants was not due to the treatment and the other two groups were 
sufficiently large.  
19 Mauchly’s Test indicates that the assumption of sphericity has to be refuted for the within-subjects factor 
distribution of payoffs,   ( )               . As a result the degrees of freedom were corrected using 
Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity for the main effect of the distribution of payoffs.  
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The effects are displayed using 95% confidence intervals based on the between-
subjects variance in Figure 14. Individuals’ risk attitude was the dependent variable; it is 
plotted on the x-axis. The within-subjects factor, the distribution of possible payoffs, is 
plotted on the y-axis. The between-subjects factor, the three levels of salience of personal 
loss, are each depicted in an individual diagram.  
 
Figure 14: 95% Confidence intervals depicting mean risk attitude depending on the choice 
context and the distribution of payoffs for each level of salience of personal loss. Confidence intervals 
were calculated based on the between-subjects variance in the respective condition. 
Figure 14 shows that when the salience of personal losses was low participants 
showed higher levels of risk seeking than in the medium and the high salient condition 
independent of the choice context. The salience of personal losses influenced the degree of 
risk aversion significantly,  (     )                
 
    .20  
The participants yielded the lowest degree of risk aversion when the distribution of 
expected payoffs were to their advantage, this was followed by the equal distribution, 
where risk aversion was higher than in the disadvantageous condition, the highest degree 
of risk aversion was observed in the condition with equal payoffs but high variance. The 
main effect for the distribution of payoffs was significant,  (           )          
       
 
     .21 
                                                 
20 Significant main effect for salience of personal loss,  (     )                
     . 
21 Significant main effect for the distribution of payoffs,  (           )                 
     . 
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When making choices in the interpersonal choice context participants risk attitude 
displayed a lower degree of risk aversion than in the individual choice context. This main 
effect was significant,  (        )                
 
      .22 This main effect was 
qualified by a significant interaction of choice context and the salience of possible personal 
losses,  (       )               
 
      .23 When the salience of personal losses 
increased participants were less likely to decrease their risk aversion when in the 
interpersonal context compared to their choice in the individual context. 
When comparing the first and second experiment it was found that the risk attitude 
changed in the interpersonal choice context and was overall more risk seeking which 
indicates social preferences. However, the interaction effect of medium size suggest that a 
risk attitude that is more risk seeking depends on the salience of personal losses. Thus, the 
findings indicate that prosocial behavior in risky contexts is moderated by the salience of 
personal losses. 
Relationship between individual risk attitudes and personal values. 
To examine if personal values and the change of risk-taking in interpersonal choice 
contexts are related, a bivariate correlation analysis was carried out for each experimental 
group individually. A positive relationship indicates that a high score on the personal value 
is associated with a higher positive difference score. As a result as a positive correlation 
indicates that the more a person values a specific characteristic the more it increases risk 
seeking in the interpersonal context.  
No significant correlations were found in the experimental group which was told to 
take over the perspective of the recipient. In the experimental group which was instructed 
to consider only the information given, a significant negative correlation was found for the 
value stimulation with the change of the individual risk attitude in choice task one (  
    ) and choice task two (      ). This indicates the value stimulation was associated 
with a lower increase of risk-taking interpersonal choices when they lead to equal or 
                                                 
22 Significant main effect for the choice context,  (        )                  
     . 
23 No significant interaction effect between choice context and salience of personal loss,  (        )  
             
     . 
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disadvantageous payoff distributions. All correlation coefficients are depicted in the 
Appendix GG for the uncorrected data set and Appendix HH for the corrected data set. 
Discussion Experiment 2 
The participants did not change their degree of risk aversion when making choices 
that influenced another participant and as a result the findings of the first experiment were 
not replicated. The personal values show no systematic relationship with the tendency to 
change the risk-taking when moving from individual decision to interpersonal decisions. 
Furthermore, the manipulation check indicated that the perspective taking manipulation did 
not lead to empathetic concern and the exit option was not used independent of its 
difficulty.  
Inducing empathy via perspective taking. 
Perspective taking in the current experiment did not induce empathetic feelings. This 
finding was surprising. Kirman and Teschl (2010) define empathy as “the capacity to put 
oneself in someone else’s shoes and thus to share the sentiments or thoughts of that 
person” (p. 313). As can be seen, this definition proposes that perspective taking is an 
integral part of empathy. The method of perspective taking used to induce empathy was 
successful in the past (e.g., Batson, 1997; Batson et al., 1991; Cialdini et al., 1987; 
Hoffman, 1991). 
In previous studies empathy was related to feelings of sympathy for a person who 
was in pain or sad. These feelings present distinct emotional states known to the 
experimental participants. It was shown that the answers in a questionnaire assessing the 
empathetic capabilities correlated highly with the activation of areas of the brain associated 
with the affective component of pain when inducing empathy towards the person 
experiencing pain (Singer et al., 2004). The focus of the perspective taking manipulation in 
the experiment was on how the recipient will feel in the situation during the experiment 
and with the outcomes. Did this choice context and the incentive structure also evoke 
strong and clear emotions? The instructions for the perspective taking manipulation in the 
high empathy condition did not yield any words referring to emotions, while this was done 
to avoid reactance, it might have led the participants to not feel anything at all. Monetary 
outcomes are considered to have low affective valence (Loewenstein et al., 2001; 
Rottenstreich & Hsee, 2001). This issue was overlooked while designing the experiment 
since two studies using social dilemmas showed that perspective taking induced empathy 
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when payoffs were movie tickets or lottery tickets (Batson et al., 1995; Batson & Moran, 
1999). However, in those two studies the perspective taking was explicitly not focusing on 
the outcomes of the exchanges, but on the emotional state of the exchange partner. In both 
cases the exchange partner (i.e., recipient) was described as “upset” due to an end of an 
intimate relationship. As a result it can be assumed that the incentive structure of the game 
in terms of payoffs alone did not motivate choices, but as a means as to cheer up the other.  
In the current experiment the use of such a manipulation was not suitable for at least 
three reasons. First, the question guiding the research is about the influence of the incentive 
structure and how this influences choice and not on how outside conditions do, such as the 
mood of the recipient. Second, the description of the other leads to a decrease in anonymity 
and as a result reduces control over the experimental treatments. Third, in the studies of 
Batson, the recipient was not real and required the use of deception. In the experiment 
reported here an economic experimental paradigm was adopted. As a result deception was 
not allowed and exchanging information between the participants about how they feel in 
the face of the incentive structure would have breached anonymity.  
While the above argumentation suggests that the perspective taking instructions did 
not induce empathetic feelings because the monetary consequences did not induce 
emotions, another explanation could be that because the situation entailed a conflict 
between maximizing personal profit and profit for the other, participants did not feel 
empathetic due to self-interest. In the experiment, the perspective taking instruction was 
received after learning the task and the payoff structure. Future research should examine if 
perspective taking instructions given before or after entering into a situation where a 
conflict between one’s own interest and the other exists influence empathy and choice 
behavior. 
 “Expensive” helping leads to lower levels of helping which is in line with other 
studies. Empathetic helping is only likely if the cost of helping is low (Neuberg et al., 
1997). Does the cost of helping influence whether empathetic concern becomes induced 
through perspective taking? This question cannot be answered with the current data, 
because the cost of helping did not vary between groups. Future research should examine 
whether the use of the perspective taking manipulation induces empathy in situations 
where the salience of possible personal losses is low.  
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Exiting. 
The participants in the experiment did not use the exit option. The exit option was 
provided after making the choices and since participants did not behave differently in the 
individual choices than in the interpersonal choices the exit option was not attractive nor 
necessary, because there was nothing to hide. The non-use of the exit option does not allow 
any conclusions about whether image motivation was driving prosocial behavior, because 
there was no prosocial behavior. 
Furthermore, the participants’ choices already reflected a high degree of risk 
aversion, and therefore to exit was not attractive, even for free, since this would decrease 
the expected payoff. 
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Discussion of Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 
The question from the interviews stimulating the experimental study was: Do people 
dare because they care? Or in proper scientific language: Does the propensity for risk-
taking increase if others benefit from the risky choice? 
The experimental findings show that the answer to this question is conditional. 
Prosocial behavior (i.e., increased risk-taking for others) is observed in both experiments. 
However, the significant decrease in risk aversion depends on two conditions: the 
distribution of payoffs in the risky option and the salience of losses for the decision maker. 
Personal values do not seem to be systematically associated with the change of risk 
attitudes. 
Inter-individual Differences of Personal Values and Prosocial Behavior 
Schwartz (Schwartz, 2007; Schwartz et al., 2001) assumes that personal values can 
be represented as a coherent structure. The structure is presented as a circle, in which 
values that are opposed are depicted across from one another and values associated with 
one another are neighboring. It is assumed that correlation coefficients between 
neighboring values should be positive and with increasing distance between value the 
correlation coefficients decrease and even become negative when values oppose one 
another in the circle. The survey’s used to validate the structure of the personal values had 
large samples (        ) and even low correlations (    ) were significantly different 
from 0. As a result the studies could establish the assumed structure and relationship with 
behavior such as voting or support of gay marriage. In the current two experimental studies 
the samples were much smaller (Experiment 1:      and Experiment 2:     ) and 
the correlations in the current study between prosocial behavior under certainty (dictator 
game), as well as under uncertainty (risky choice tasks in interpersonal context), were not 
generally significantly different from 0. The values universalism and benevolence, 
expected to be associated with prosocial behavior, were not significantly associated with 
prosocial behavior in the dictator game. In the risky choice task in the interpersonal context 
only for the group yielding a low salience of personal loss (certain option was framed as 
sure gain) and when the risky option lead to advantageous inequality for the decision 
maker both values were associated with more risk-taking. Because the majority of the 
correlations were not significant and the direction of the relationship changed depending 
on the choice tasks distributional equality, personal values cannot explain changes in 
individual risk-taking when comparing individual and interpersonal choice contexts. In 
160 
 
order to gain a better understanding of the influence of personal values on risk-taking, 
more different choice tasks should be used to reflect the three possible distributions (equal, 
disadvantageous and advantageous) in order to create a more reliable measure for them. 
One reason why personal values did not influence choice could be that personal 
values were not activated by the situation. Values influence behavior only if they are 
consciously represented (Verplanken & Holland, 2002). According to Schwartz (2010) 
perspective taking should function as a way to activate personal values. The findings of the 
second experiment reported here do not support this claim, but can also not refute it. The 
manipulation check suggests that the perspective taking instructions as a means to induce 
empathy did not work. Whether perspective taking does not induce empathy in the 
economic context of the choice tasks or whether it is not related to personal values remains 
unsolved. Additionally, the finding that personal values were not associated with behavior 
in the dictator game is contrary to the finding of Schwartz (1996), where differences in 
value priority of benevolence and universalism were predictive for decisions about how to 
split a given amount of money. Thus, the current two experiments suggest that differences 
in priority of personal values do not significantly influence choices in economic decisions 
when another anonymous person is affected.  
Distribution of Expected Payoffs and Prosocial Behavior 
In the first experiment the findings suggest that if the risky option yields 
disadvantageous expected payoffs for the decision maker, risk aversion does not 
significantly decrease. It appears as if envy crowds out prosocial behavior. The results 
show that inequality concerns not only affect choices under certainty, but also choices 
involving risk. People prefer certain outcomes yielding inequality to their advantage more 
than disadvantageous outcomes even if these maximize joint payoffs. 
Does inequality aversion or welfare maximization motivate choices in interpersonal 
decisions? In some studies it has been observed that people seem not to care for their 
relative payoffs, but rather choose as if interested in maximizing joint payoffs, even if this 
means to sacrifice personal gains (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004). 
However, other studies show that people’s choices are motivated by inequality aversion in 
favor of oneself (i.e., envy), rendering equal and advantageous distributions more attractive 
than disadvantageous payoffs even if these would maximize joint payoffs (Fehr & 
Schmidt, 1999; Loewenstein, Thompson, & Bazerman, 1989). In a recent paper it was 
suggested that agency can explain these conflicting findings (Choshen-Hillel & Yaniv, 
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2011). Agency refers to the ability to determine outcomes. When experiments involve the 
implementation of payoffs, they are considered “high agency” situations. On the other 
hand, experiments in which the distribution of outcomes is merely rated according to their 
satisfactory value are referred to as “low agency” conditions. It was found that when 
people implement the specific outcomes, when decision makers have high agency, they are 
more likely to choose the maximizing option. However, when decision makers have low 
agency and the decision was not implemented but merely rated for their satisfaction with 
outcomes, they prefer equality (Choshen-Hillel & Yaniv, 2011).  
The choice tasks in the two experiments reported here are considered a high agency 
situation, because participants determine outcomes for themselves and others through their 
choices. According to the agency hypothesis, the decision maker also should choose the 
lottery with disadvantageous outcomes, since it maximizes joint payoffs. However, the 
decision maker did not sacrifice her own payoff for an option which maximizes joint 
payoffs but leads to disadvantageous inequality. How can the findings of the current 
experiments be accommodated in the agency framework?  
One explanation could be cost of the option leading to maximization. It is assumed 
that prosocial behavior is depending on the balance between the cost of prosocial and cost 
of not acting prosocial (e.g., Dovidio et al., 1991). This notion is supported by the finding 
that the rate of people who chose the option which maximizes joint payoffs in the high 
agency condition decreased from 68.6% to 53.9% (comparing study one and study two of 
Choshen-Hillel & Yaniv, 2011) when it was costly to implement this choice. Possibly in 
the current study the cost to resolve inequality was perceived as too high? Supporting this 
assumption is the finding that even when expected payoffs led to equality or advantageous 
inequality people would only be willing to increase their certainty equivalent by 10%. This 
suggests that the personal cost to maximize joint payoffs influences the choice.  
In the current study participants were faced with risky options that led to different 
distributions of outcomes between the decision maker and an anonymous recipient which 
may have shaped the evaluation of outcomes. According to prospect theory choice, risky 
options are not perceived objectively, but are edited by those calculating their value. One 
important step in the editing process is setting the reference point (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1979). The perception of inequality in the disadvantageous lottery in the current 
experiment might involve two steps. First, the decision maker’s own expected payoffs in 
the risky option and the payoffs for the other are compared. If expected payoffs yield 
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equality or advantageous inequality own payoffs are compared to the payoffs of the other 
and the own minimal payoff is at least as good as the payoff of the other. As a result, if the 
reference point is set at the lowest minimal payoff, which is the payoff for the recipient, the 
decision makers expected outcomes are perceived as gains. This is not the case when the 
lottery leads to a disadvantageous payoff distribution. When the decision maker compares 
her own minimal payoff to the recipient’s minimal payoff in the disadvantageous lottery, 
the decision maker’s minimal payoff is below the minimal payoff of the recipient. As a 
result, the minimal payoff for the decision maker is perceived as a loss relative to the 
payoff of the recipient. This leads to the perception that one is faced with a mixed gamble 
(negative and positive outcomes or possible). Depending on what could be gained by 
choosing the certain option versus the possible gain of the lottery, the participant calculates 
the cost prosocial behavior. The final expected outcome seems even more 
disadvantageous, when the own relative payoff of the risky option is negative while the 
recipients payoff is positive. In this case the cost of prosocial behavior is perceived higher 
than not to behave prosocial.  
Besides the assumption that inequality aversion leads to a change in behavior, two 
other explanations come to mind: loss-aversion, and whether the risky option is perceived 
as threat or opportunity. Both explanations will be further elaborated when the findings of 
the first and second experiment are compared.  
Salience of Personal Loss and Prosocial Behavior 
People are willing to take higher risks in an interpersonal choice context when their 
personal sacrifice is not salient, and with increasing salience of potential personal losses 
the likelihood to take a higher risk than when alone decreases. Possible reasons for this 
effect will be explored in this section. 
One explanation could be that prosocial behavior decreased with increasing salience 
of loss because it rendered all interpersonal lotteries as yielding disadvantageous inequality 
for the decision maker. The cost of helping was objectively constant across all treatments. 
But by introducing the endowment in the second experiment, the lotteries subjectively 
yielded mixed payoffs (gains and losses). While the payoffs between the conditions in 
which the certain option was presented as sure gain and the condition where the certain 
option was presented as price of the lottery did not differ in terms of absolute wealth, they 
did in terms of relative wealth. Consider the following choice problem depicted in Table 
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25, once presented as a choice with the certain option as sure gain and once as price of the 
lottery. 
Table 25: Difference between relative and absolute changes of wealth depending on presentation 
of the certain option. 
 Certain option as sure gain 
(Condition 1 in Experiment 1) 
 Certain option as price to pay 
(Condition 2 in Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2) 
 Certain Option Risky Option  Certain Option Risky Option 
 Sure gain 50% 50%  Price of lottery 50% 50% 
Change of 
absolute final 
wealth 
1500 1000 2000  1500 1000 2000 
Change of relative  
wealth 
1500 1000 2000  0 -500 500 
 
Choosing the certain option in the sure gain condition leads to a gain for sure, while 
in the case when the certain option is portrayed as price, the change of wealth is zero, since 
one has already received the amount one would have paid. Therefore, while the final 
wealth is the same in both conditions, the relative change in wealth differs. As a result the 
decision maker perceives the lottery as extremely disadvantageous and therefore 
unattractive. This assumption is supported by the observed lack of prosocial behavior in 
the first experiment in the interpersonal choice leading to expected disadvantageous 
payoffs in the risky option. An alternative explanation which also captures the findings of 
the second experiment could be loss-aversion.  
Loss aversion refers to the effect that “the disutility of giving up an object is greater 
that [sic] the utility associated with acquiring it” (Kahneman et al., 1991, p. 194). Possibly 
in the condition yielding disadvantageous equality the decision maker felt as though they 
were giving up an object without the certainty of acquiring another. In addition, the 
introduction of endowment led to mixed gambles and induced loss-aversion. Associated 
with loss-aversion are the status quo bias and the endowment effect.  
Mixed gambles involve losses and gains, where the loss is not directly implemented 
in the lottery payoff matrix, but through introducing a payment, the lottery could lead to 
payoffs which were below the price paid, resulting in a decrease of the endowment. The 
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endowment effect refers to the phenomenon that people’s valuation of goods depends on 
whether they are asked to value it by stating how much they would sell it for or by saying 
how much they would pay for it (Kahneman et al., 1991). The endowment effect is related 
to the status quo bias (Samuelson & Zeckhauser, 1988), which means that people prefer the 
status quo over a probabilistic gain if it requires risking part of their endowment. Based on 
the endowment effect, the risky options become less attractive, because in the high salience 
of personal loss, one has to give up parts of the endowment to participate in the lottery. 
However, it does not explain the collapse of prosocial behavior. If it is loss-aversion 
leading to an endowment effect, then the salience of loss should yield a main effect. 
However, the interaction effect suggests that the introduction of mixed gambles did 
influence the risk attitude in the individual context differently than in the interpersonal 
choice context.  
Associated with loss-aversion is the reflection effect (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). 
It is assumed in prospect theory that the reflection effect is due to loss-aversion. In 
conditions where the certain option yields sure losses, people would rather take a risk if 
this could lead to an outcome that is closer to the reference point. The finding that people 
try to reduce the sure loss by choosing the risky option, indicating risk seeking, while in 
the case of gain, they would rather take a small sure gain than choosing a risky option, 
seems to be robust across a number of studies (Levin, Schneider, & Gaeth, 1998). When 
comparing the experiments reported in this thesis it seems at first sight that the condition in 
which the certain option presents a price to pay a loss frame might be induced. However, 
this is not the case, since the certain option is not a loss. Therefore, the increase of risk 
aversion as a result of an increase of the salience of personal losses does not question 
prospect theory, but it points to an important distinction between the situational 
components of lotteries such as whether they are framed as gains or losses, as well as the 
informational component whether lotteries are perceived as a threat or opportunity.  
The assumption that gain and loss frames lead to risk aversion and risk seeking 
respectively seems to be in conflict with studies focusing on risk behavior in the field of 
management (Sitkin & Pablo, 1992). In a review of literature concerning risk-taking 
among managers March and Shapira (1987) found that particularly in contexts that yield 
opportunities, managers were risk seeking and also encouraged others to do so. It was 
found in later studies, that assessing a risky option as opportunity or threat influences 
whether people favor the risky option or a certain option (Highhouse & Paese, 1996). In a 
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hypothetical management decision in an experiment it was observed that participants were 
risk seeking in situations framed as gain and risk averse in situations framed as loss. The 
opportunity and threat perception mediated the relationship between the situation frame 
and risk-taking (Xie & Wang, 2003). 
The manipulation of the increasing salience of personal loss is not a framing of the 
choice, because in this case the certain option should also have varied regarding whether it 
is a sure loss or a sure gain. Thus, instead of framing the choices as losses or gains, the 
manipulation of the salience of losses could have changed the perception of opportunities 
and threats in the given choice problems, leading to different risk appraisals.  
The change of the risk preferences seems not to be due to a change in the individual 
risk attitude but relationship between the perceived risk and the response to it. The gamble 
is perceived as a greater threat in the condition of high salience of personal losses and 
consequently less attractive. The focus is rather on the threat due to the losses than the 
opportunity to gain payoffs for the other. As a result, the risking of certain personal payoffs 
in order to increase expected joint payoffs is unattractive. The moderating role of salience 
of personal loss between risk perception and risk-taking suggests that the perception of 
opportunities and threats yielded by a risky option might be an important determinant of 
risky choice in interpersonal situations. 
Alternative Explanation 
An alternative explanation to loss-aversion as the driving mechanism in the second 
experiment leading to a lack of prosocial behavior could be a decrease in the perceived 
need of the recipient. Possibly by introducing the endowment, the decision maker assumed 
that the recipient also received an endowment and therefore, was not dependent on his or 
her choices to receive a payoff from the experiment. The perceived need of the recipient is 
an important prerequisite for prosocial behavior (e.g., Batson et al., 1988; Batson, Eklund, 
Chermok, Hoyt, & Ortiz, 2007; Toi & Batson, 1982). If the endowment would decrease the 
perceived need of the recipient by the decision maker, the endowment would present a 
confound in the experiment. However, at least two reasons speak against this assumption: 
First, participants were told that two types of players existed and they were told that they 
were a decision maker, meaning that they had no concrete information about the recipient. 
This was followed by the instruction when introducing the endowment: “You have an 
endowment of 3000 Taler for the next task.” This does not suggest that participants should 
assume that everybody independent of their role should have received this endowment, but 
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that the endowment was particularly for the choice task. If the decision makers would 
assume that everybody received this endowment, then this would question all findings in 
dictator or ultimatum games. Thus, the endowment instruction as a means to decrease 
perceived need seems unlikely. Second, in the second experiment, choices in the individual 
choice task reflected extreme risk aversion, which was significantly higher than in 
individual choices in the first experiment. To observe the effect of the endowment on the 
choices in the individual choice task implies that the effect of the endowment was 
independent of the recipient and the beliefs about his or her needs. 
Limitations 
The perspective taking manipulation and the endowment present two variations 
between the first and the second experiment, which independently could have led to the 
change of behavior. Despite this pitfall, the ceasing of prosocial behavior in the second 
experiment is assumed to be due to the endowment, and not the perspective taking 
manipulation for the following reasons. The perspective taking manipulation did not lead 
to any changes between the experimental groups depending on whether they were 
instructed to focus on numbers or on the recipient. Furthermore, it did not lead to 
differences in empathetic concern. While this suggests that the manipulation did not have 
any effect on the risk preference in the choices, a treatment condition with the endowment 
added without the perspective taking manipulation would have been more suited to satisfy 
experimental rigor. In addition, the current study cannot shed light on the question of 
whether empathy influenced the choices in the first experiment, since no endowment was 
given. As a result, an experiment with a perspective taking manipulation without an 
endowment would be necessary to clarify the role of empathy. 
The finding that people did not use the exit option in the second experiment does not 
rule out that behavior in the first was not partially driven by image motivation. Since 
prosocial behavior was not found in the second experiment the question could not be 
addressed.  
Lastly, the incentive structure of the choice tasks did not allow a clear distinction 
between altruism and inequality concern as a motive for higher risk-taking in the 
interpersonal choice task. Inequality concern would lead to higher risk-taking in 
interpersonal choice tasks because the certain option yielded extreme inequality of payoffs 
and this creates the desire to decrease inequality by choosing the risky option perceived as 
fair. Altruism would lead to more risk-taking not because of the inequality in the certain 
167 
 
option, but to give the recipient a chance to receive some earning. Altruism and inequality 
aversion cannot be disentangled in the present experiments. Therefore, it has to be assumed 
that inequality aversion as well as altruism motivated prosocial choices. However, it 
remains an open question why the disliking of advantageous payoff distributions should 
not be the same as altruism, since it considers the welfare of the other.  
Conclusion 
When people find themselves in a choice situation where taking a risk can benefit 
another person, people are likely to behave as if more risk seeking than they would when 
they would decide for themselves in a similar situation. However, the tendency to behave 
prosocially is influenced by two factors: inequality considerations and the salience of 
personal losses. When outcomes yield high inequality disadvantageous to the decision 
maker people are less likely to take higher risks for others than they would when alone. 
Furthermore, the likelihood of taking higher risks for others decreases when the salience of 
possible personal losses increases. The findings suggest that inequality concerns influence 
choices under risk where there are consequences for others as well as loss-aversion. 
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General Discussion 
This thesis examined the relationship between risk perception and responses to risk, 
such as risk-taking and risk appraisal. Two variables that influence the relationship 
between risk perception and responses to risk were identified: adjustment processes and the 
social consequences of the risky choice. The review of the literature revealed that risk 
perception is based on the integration of probabilities, the subjective value of consequences 
(utility), and feelings associated with those consequences. Rational and emotional 
information jointly determine how a situation is appraised (Finucane & Holup, 2006; van 
Gelder et al., 2009). Dual process theories of information processing (Epstein, 2003; 
Séguin et al., 2007; Sloman, 1996) represent a way to integrate cognitive and emotional 
processes. However, the role of adjustment processes on the relationship between risk 
perception and responses to risk had not yet been examined. 
Although control is considered an important factor of responses to risk (Slovic, 
2000), the theories concerned with responses to risk do not consider the reflection of the 
individual’s resources and capacities to limit the impact of negative events or their 
probability of occurrence as important factors. As a result, the experimental conditions 
under which most of the empirical studies testing assumptions about risk perception and 
responses to risk did not involve risks that can be influenced by the participants. The 
influence of an agent’s action on the probability and the outcomes of the risk and how this 
changes possible responses to risk are not within the scope of those studies. However, if 
risk is understood as an expectation involving negative outcomes (Sjöberg, 2003), then the 
influence of one’s own actions on the risky event should be considered as a factor 
influencing the response to risk.  
Using the cognitive-transactional model of stress (Lazarus, 1966, 1999; Lazarus & 
Folkman, 1984) as a structural meta-theory allowed the integration of independent areas of 
research focusing on processes of risk perception and adjustment in a tentative model and 
led to specific research questions. The findings, implications and limitations of the 
interviews and experiments were discussed in the respective chapters and will not be 
repeated here. Instead, the findings of the interviews and experiments will be integrated 
and discussed.  
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Summary of findings 
The findings in this thesis suggest: first, theory of risk perception and responses to 
risk should consider internal processes of adjustment when trying to explain and predict 
risk appraisals in situations of ongoing threat. Second, the relationship between risk 
perception and risk-taking is affected by the implications the option fraught with risk can 
have on another person. 
This thesis employed a qualitative and a quantitative approach to examine the 
relationship between risk perception and risk-taking and the role of adjustment on this 
relationship. In the qualitative part of the thesis interviews with humanitarian aid workers 
were conducted. Due to the political situation in the Sudan it was possible to examine risk 
perception and the appraisal of extreme events, such as kidnapping and armed assaults, for 
personal well-being. The qualitative study gave insight into the use of adjustment 
strategies. The adjustment strategies together with risk-perceptions and risk appraisals 
were used to infer the underlying processes of adjustment. The question of whether or not 
the propensity for risk-taking increases when the expected outcomes of risk-taking affect 
another person emerged from the interview findings. This question was investigated in two 
experiments with student samples. The results suggest that when risky options lead to 
helping it increases the propensity for risk-taking when the salience of personal losses are 
low and when the distribution of outcomes is not disadvantageous for the deciding 
individual. 
The interviews suggested the hypothesis that if people’s choices under risk involve 
outcomes for others, they are willing to take higher risks than they would when alone. The 
experiment allowed the testing of this assumption and showed that it is conditional on the 
salience of personal losses. Do the people who were identified as considering the welfare 
of others compared to the ones who did not voice this in the interviews, indicate different 
degrees of salience of personal loss? No, rather the findings suggest that people who did 
not consider their risk-taking as a means for helping others indicated a lower salience of 
personal losses by often refuting the assumption put forth by the interviewer that their 
working context is risky.  
Participants in the interviews who stated that risk-taking presents a means to help 
others were aware of possible personal losses, indicated by their ratings of the ambient risk 
of security incidents. For those participants the salience of personal losses did not lead to 
less risk-taking because they engaged in adjustment based on self-regulation and as a result 
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did not experience concern and distress. It was inferred from the participants’ reasoning 
and the discrepancy between risk and concern ratings that accommodative processes 
played a central role to enable participants to experience safety, despite ongoing threat. 
However, participants acknowledging the possible personal losses but incapable of 
accommodating them further experienced heightened distress and left the area of ongoing 
threat.  
The effect of salience of losses on risk-taking was also found in the experiments. 
With increasing salience of possible losses for the individual, the likelihood of taking 
higher risks decreased when risky options presented a means for helping. In the 
experiments processes of adjustment did not influence behavior because choices were not 
carried out with feedback and information was only available through description.  
The findings from the experiments and interviews show that adjustment processes 
focusing on internal and situational aspects are important when making choices that require 
the resolution of conflict between opposing goals. In the current case these are helping 
others and personal safety. However, no direct test of the influence of adjustment processes 
is possible at this point in time due to the underlying methodological differences of 
interviews and experiments which will be further elaborated now. 
Integrating qualitative and quantitative data: A problem of compatibility? 
The integration of qualitative and quantitative data is referred to as a mixed methods 
approach. Mixed methods are regarded as a means to enrich psychological research (Gelo, 
Braakmann, & Benetka, 2008; Yoshikawa, Weisner, Kalil, & Way, 2008). A number of 
procedures of how to mix methods exist but their process and their description remains 
vague. For example, triangulation is one proposed way to combine qualitative and 
quantitative methods, and can be used to give insight into a phenomenon from different 
angles in order validate one’s findings and conclusions drawn from the data. While the 
purpose of triangulation is stated repeatedly, the methodological prescriptions of how to 
integrate information of different data formats (verbal vs. numerical data) remain vague 
(see for example Flick, 2000). Qualitative research is based on the assumption that reality 
is constructed by the respective individual and research attempts to capture the way 
situations are constituted in a participant’s awareness through interpretation of verbal 
material. For this reason verbal accounts are central and transport the meaning of the object 
of interest. Qualitative findings are always bound to specific individuals or groups, 
quantitative findings can be generalized to the general population. Because quantitative 
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research is based on the assumption that reality is constituted by measurable objects and 
research aims to observe these and their relationship by measuring them. 
Going beyond the question of data compatibility an even more critical question arises 
which is hardly touched on by the authors proposing mixed methods: how can two very 
different schools of thought be integrated (for a discussion see Gelo et al., 2008; Toomela, 
2011; Wiggins, 2011)? When considering this question in light of this study, it is necessary 
to note that the experimental findings cannot be used to explain the behavior of 
humanitarian aid workers working in situations of ongoing threat. The experiments tested 
the relationship between a set of independent variables, such as choice context, equality 
considerations, and empathy, and their effect on the dependent variable risk-taking. In the 
field setting the situation was more complex and yielded numerous variables which could 
have influenced behavior. Second, the interview findings do not allow the conclusion about 
causal relationships between variables, but give insight into how people interpret the 
situation and how this interpretation is influenced by adjustment processes. The influence 
of adjustment processes on the subjective representation of a given situation cannot be 
explored using aggregated data of a group of individuals and therefore the use of 
interviews which focused on the subjective representation was fruitful.  
However, to combine both approaches to complement each other enables a more 
complex picture of human behavior and the underlying processes guiding it. While the 
interviews allowed the identification of variables of interest in a complex environment, the 
experimental approach permitted the testing of specific hypothesis about their relationship. 
The experiments reflected the psychological situation of the consequences associated with 
the choice options described by some interview participants as a reason for why they 
engage in risk-taking. Therefore, the use of experiments presents an expansion of the 
insight gained through the interviews and tested whether the subjective situation perceived 
by some of the interview participants presents a situational factor that influences general 
behavior when it is an objective situational feature.  
To integrate these findings in a coherent picture is difficult without assuming a 
hierarchical structure of methods, which would be the case when viewing the interviews as 
an exploratory study leading to the experiments or to view the experiments as a mere test 
of the conclusion drawn from the interviews. To avoid drawing such a conclusion, this 
thesis took a different approach by viewing the insights as complementary. This will be 
explained further in the following section. 
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Theoretical implications: Towards a transactional model of risk perception 
This thesis found evidence suggesting that risk perception of events that are not one 
time decisions is the result of a transactional process. The results showed that adjustment 
processes and consequences of risk-taking beyond self-interest influence risk perceptions 
and risk-taking. The experiments and the interviews indicate that risk-taking is not 
determined by an attitude towards risk in general. Rather risk-taking depends on the 
situation specific perceived risk and the individual’s risk attitude. This suggests that a 
transactional model of risk perception has to consider person specific variables as well as 
situation specific variables. The structural components of risk perception in a transactional 
model are the activation of adjustment processes (e.g., Greve, 2000), person specific risk 
attitudes which could be dependent on traits such as sensation seeking (e.g., Zuckerman, 
1994) as well as threat orientation (e.g., Thompson, Schlehofer, & Bovin, 2006) and 
situational characteristics such as framing of the situation (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 
1984), information format (e.g., Slovic et al., 2000) and emotional valence associated with 
the expected outcomes (e.g., Loewenstein et al., 2001). In order to formulate a 
transactional model of risk perception in the future research has to examine the specific 
relationships between those constructs. The role of adjustment processes, feelings in 
interpersonal choice and the role of uncertainty, three aspects which were of particular 
importance in the present work, will be discussed and directions for future research will be 
described in detail below.  
Risk perception, responses to risk and adjustment processes. 
It was found that risk perception is not only determined by consequences that affect 
the individual itself but also by consequences that affect others. The propensity for greater 
risk-taking when it presents a means to help another person is influenced by fairness 
considerations and also depends on the salience of personal losses for the individual. This 
finding is in contrast to classical economic theory where it is assumed that risk attitudes 
expressed as risk preferences in lottery choices are stable and that choices are guided by 
self-interest (Arrow, 1971). Furthermore, the findings question the underlying assumption 
that risk perceptions exclusively determine responses to risk and that risk responses, 
particularly risky choice, present a measure of risk perceptions.  
In each of the two experiments, risk preferences were assessed repeatedly without a 
long time lag between measurements, using the same method, while the framing of the 
decision problem did not vary. The variation between the tasks was only whether they 
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were carried out in an individual or an interpersonal context. It is assumed that the risk-
taking increased in interpersonal choices in the experiments because the utility of the 
lotteries increased when other people were affected and not because of a change in risk 
attitudes. This is in line with concepts of other regarding preferences (Fehr & Schmidt, 
2005) assuming that people receive utility from either the relative payoff difference (i.e. 
inequality considerations) (Bolton, Katok, & Zwick, 1998; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999) or that 
their utility is directly increased through the gain of the other (i.e. joint welfare 
maximization or altruism) (Charness & Rabin, 2002; Engelmann & Strobel, 2004). For this 
reason, other regarding preferences have to be considered when interested in risky choices 
in an interpersonal choice context. Therefore, when trying to model choice behavior in 
risky contexts that involve outcomes affecting others, it is necessary to integrate an 
individual’s risk attitude as well as other regarding preferences in one utility function. This 
is a problem that remains to be solved.  
In the interpersonal choice context, people seemed to be willing to take higher risks 
than when outcomes only impacted them alone. The propensity towards risk-taking was 
influenced by whether the risky option could yield relative negative payoffs compared to 
the certain option for the decision maker. This suggests that perceived opportunity and 
perceived threat influenced risk-taking in interpersonal choices. The role of the perception 
of opportunity and threat has been examined in individual choice contexts (Highhouse & 
Yüce, 1996; Sitkin & Weingart, 1995; Xie & Wang, 2003), but no study has explored this 
issue in an interpersonal choice context.  
The perception of opportunity or threat in an ambiguous situation is dependent on 
situational variables such as perceived control (Brandtstädter et al., 2004) and goal focus 
(Rothermund et al., 2001). This suggests that internal processes shape the subjective 
representation of the situation and are also likely to influence the relationship between risk 
perception and responses to risk such as risky choice. Furthermore, the interview study 
suggests that adjustment processes influence the subjective representation of the context 
and the appraisal of ambient risk of security. Particularly the appraisal of threat is assumed 
to be influenced by adjustment processes (Folkman et al., 1986). For this reason future 
studies should investigate how the activation of adjustment processes influences the 
perception of ambiguous situations and resulting responses to risk.  
Future research needs to focus on the influence of adjustment processes on 
information processing and information search behavior because they are assumed to 
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determine risk perception. It is assumed that people generally dislike uncertainty 
(Loewenstein, 1994). When people could have taken a chance to win but did not, they are 
still searching for information in order to resolve the uncertainty about whether they would 
have won or not. This shows that people dislike ignorance even in the face of missed 
chances (Shani, Igou, & Zeelenberg, 2009; Shani, Tykocinski, & Zeelenberg, 2008). 
However, is this also true for situations of pending catastrophe? For example, how do 
house owners respond to information about possible flood risks associated with their 
building grounds? Adjustment and the use of strategies to manage risks are only likely to 
be used when a risk is acknowledged. Particularly immunization processes are likely to 
interfere with accurate judgments because they lead to biased information. The use of 
interviews enabled the identification of characteristics which are likely to influence how 
the individual perceives an ambiguous situation.  
Future research should find out if those variables are systematically related to risk 
perceptions and how situational characteristics affect risk perception. For example, 
whether risk is appraised before or after the decision could give insight into when 
immunization processes are likely to be activated. Furthermore, it remains an open 
question of how adjustment processes and strategies used to adapt to ongoing threat 
influence responses to risk (risk appraisal in this case) and functioning after the experience 
of traumatic events. In order to explore person specific adjustment trajectories and 
responses this would require a longitudinal approach. 
Feelings and risk-taking involving consequences for others. 
In the current experimental study feelings were not examined as possible predictors 
of risky choices. It cannot be ignored that feelings may influence choice in interpersonal 
choices under risk, because of the possibility that acting prosocially can induce positive 
feelings. To perceive the act as rewarding suggests that it is not only the increase of the 
welfare of the other that matters but that being the one who acts is satisfying as well. This 
was found to be the case both in the interviews and in the laboratory, where it was 
observed that people donate payoffs to a public good even when their contribution does not 
increase the public good. This led to the assumption that giving itself has value and induces 
a “warm glow” (Andreoni, 1990). The metaphor of warm glow giving was explored and it 
was found that people do indeed experience a positive feeling when giving (Anik, Aknin, 
Norton, & Dunn, 2009; Konow & Earley, 2008). This finding is significant because 
feelings are related to risk perception. Finucane et al. (2000) point out an inverse 
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relationship between the perception of risk and benefit of a hazard. It is assumed that 
hazards which yield high benefit are perceived as less risky than hazards which yield low 
benefit. The effect is mediated by affect; a high benefit associated with a hazard induced 
positive affect which in turn leads to a low risk perception, while a high risk judgment 
induces negative affect which in turn is associated with low perceived benefit.  
Future research needs to explore how immediate feelings experienced during risk 
perception induced by the consequence of helping influence risk-taking. People who 
judged the risk of security incidents as high but experienced low concern might be 
influenced by the positive affect caused by the benefits of risk-taking for others. On the 
other hand, participants who do not focus on the possible benefit are more concerned, 
because they perceive the threat of the hazard to be greater since they experience no 
positive affect associated with the prosocial act. The hypothesis that feelings induced by 
prosocial acts influence risky choice remains to be tested experimentally. 
Interpersonal risk-taking in the face of uncertainty. 
In the applied setting, which was examined in the interviews, consequences and the 
likelihood of negative events were at all times uncertain. In contrast, in the experiments 
probability information as well as payoff information was provided to the participants. The 
findings of the experiments shed light on choices under risk when probabilities and 
consequences are known. The probabilities assigned to the outcomes of the risky options in 
the experiment were in the medium range (      ), while in the applied context of the 
interviews, the participants were faced with choices where possible negative outcomes 
were rare (      ) as the review of the past security incidents indicates (e.g., Stoddard et 
al., 2009). How would risk-taking in the interpersonal choice context differ when the 
choices would involve rare events?  
Prospect theory would suggest that the rare event would be overweighted and people 
would be more likely to opt for the safe option (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1992). Future research needs to find out if this still holds when another person 
participates in the winnings but not in the losses which have a small probability. The 
behavior of people in interpersonal choice contexts where probabilities are more extreme is 
likely to be different. The probability information in the experiments was provided through 
description. The findings should only be generalized to situations where probability 
information is provided through description, because choices in individual contexts differ 
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when information about probabilities is acquired through experience (e.g., Barron & Erev, 
2003; Hertwig et al., 2004; Hertwig et al., 2006).  
One important characteristic of the situation of the humanitarian aid workers who 
participated in the interview study is that the possible negative events that they can 
experience yield very low probabilities. As a result they mostly experience positive, i.e. 
safe consequences, which benefit another person and not themselves. How are choices 
influenced by risky options, which have a high probability of positive payoffs for another 
person and very low probability of consequences leading to negative outcomes for the 
individual in repeated decisions where the distribution of events is acquired through 
experience?  
Future directions. 
It was shown that a transactional perspective on the relationship between risk 
perception and responses to risk leads to a number of new questions. The activation of 
adjustment processes might be an important factor influencing information processing and 
information search and therefore indirectly shape responses to risk. Another factor 
associated with information processing are feelings experienced during the decision 
making process. Those are likely to be affected by the specific nature of outcomes, as well 
as the individual’s ability to regulate emotional responses. The activation of adjustment 
processes therefore also might influence risk perception and not just responses to risk. The 
picture becomes even more complex when considering how information was acquired, 
which might influence all of the processes and factors above. Some ways how these 
individual questions can be approached are proposed in the sections above, but to put 
together the puzzle pieces remains a task for the future. 
Practical implications 
At the beginning of this work the underlying assumptions of operational security 
management in organizations working in situations that yield ambiguous security was 
described. It was argued that the focus of security management is the event or object 
presenting the risk and that it is generally assumed that responses to risk represent a 
manifestation of risk perceptions. This thesis shows that the perception of safety not only 
depends on the information about the possible threat but responses to risk and risk 
perception are distinct. The response to a threat is influenced by situational aspects and 
information concerning how the threat can be controlled. Therefore, the way risk is 
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communicated must be transactional, which means it has to consider the impact of the 
affected person on the object emanating threat. Threat information leads to an increase of 
anxiety but not better coping (Ruiter, Verplanken, Kok, & Werrij, 2003), the focus when 
exploring responses to risk should not only focus on the risky event but also the individual 
affected by it. This can have two implications which need to be explored in future research: 
first, if a threat cannot be controlled people will be more careful and second, if the threat 
can be controlled people will experience less distress.  
Furthermore, a focus on the individual affected by threat is necessary when 
considering the impact of emotional reactions on risk perception and decision making. It 
was shown in previous studies that particularly the ability of emotional regulation 
influences decisions in situations when emotions are activated (Magar, Phillips, & Hosie, 
2008) and that strategies to regulate emotions differ in their effectiveness depending on 
whether emotions are accepted but reappraised or when they are controlled and suppressed 
(Gross & John, 2003; Richards & Gross, 2000). The two ways of emotion regulation were 
also identified in the interviews conducted with humanitarian aid workers in the Sudan. For 
these reasons it is an important question for future research.  
In line with the above argument that the focus on risk perception and responses to 
risk needs to include the person affected by the threat, is the finding that people displayed 
less risk-taking when their personal possible losses were highly salient. It has been found 
in other studies that narrative descriptions of specific cases reduced the likelihood of 
defensive reactions and led to elevated risk perception (De Wit, Das, & Vet, 2008; Slovic 
et al., 2000). This suggests that when communicating the risk of an event or an object with 
the goal to increase precaution, the communication should not only focus on the event or 
object itself in terms of probabilities and outcomes but the negative impact it can have on 
the person affected by it.  
Limitations 
The limitations of the interview study and the experiments were presented 
individually above. However, it is important to keep in mind the possible limitations when 
integrating experimental data and interview findings to gain insight into risk perception 
and risk-taking. Here one is faced with a “challenging translation” for methodological and 
content specific reasons. It is difficult to combine qualitative and quantitative research, due 
to the fact that the nature of the answers differs. However, in the current work the insight 
gained through the interviews leads to a better understanding of the situational components 
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of the context and how it is experienced from the point of view of the interviewed person. 
The experiments, on the other hand, allowed the opportunity to test whether these 
situational variables have a general effect on risk perception. Thus, the findings which 
emerged from one method allow a better understanding of the findings emerging from the 
other. 
A second important limitation is the question of whether the incentive structure of 
the experiment really captures the situation of humanitarian aid workers. While in the 
interview study the risky options that the participants reported were concerned with 
consequences such as providing medicine to sick people or distribute food among the 
hungry, participants in the experiments were making choices concerning money. While it 
has been shown that the quantity of monetary rewards do not significantly change choice 
behavior (Holt & Laury, 2005; Kachelmeier & Shehata, 1992), this remains a question for 
rewards which differ in their quality.  
Third, it was argued that self-regulation as well as viewing risk-taking as a means of 
helping led to the asymmetry between risk perception and concern in the interviews. 
However, the reported difference between risk perceptions and personal concern could also 
be artifacts of the interview procedure for two reasons. First, during the interviews, 
experiences were reported retrospectively. Retrospective reports are prone to be influenced 
by hindsight bias, which refers to the phenomenon that “when people try to recall past 
beliefs, their view is unwittingly contaminated by subsequently acquired ones. As a result, 
they exaggerate the extent to which they knew all along what they actually learned only 
later” (Fischhoff, Gonzalez, Lerner, & Small, 2005, p. 125). Participants that stated in the 
interview that they perceived the security situation as risky might not have done so in the 
situation when they actually made risky choices and their report presents a skewed 
representation of their risk perception and safety concerns in the past. Second, it is shown 
in other studies that justification pressure leads to an increase of information search in 
order to use risk defusing operators which leads to choices of otherwise risky options (Bar 
& Huber, 2008; Huber et al., 2009). The interviews could have induced justification 
pressure and, as a result, participants searched for information about risk defusing 
operators. It could also be that the participants stated their concern as low because they 
used risk defusing operators when they presented and evaluated their personal risk during 
the interview.  
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Conclusion 
The findings of this thesis suggest that in decision making under risk preferential 
choices do not directly reflect risk perceptions. The relationship between risk perceptions 
and risky choices can differ depending on situational variables such as choice context and 
distributional equality as well as inter-individual differences regarding the activation of 
adjustment processes. The findings support the transactional perspective on the 
relationship of risk perception and responses to risk put forward in this thesis. In the 
literature to date the perspective on risk perception has been focused on the event or object 
emanating the risk. While control and newness of risks are considered crucial components 
of risk perception besides probability information and outcomes, the ways that people use 
strategies and knowledge to limit the impact of risks and how these in turn affect risk 
perception has not been examined. This leads to the general assumption implicitly held that 
risk perception is directly reflected by responses to risk.  
However, in this thesis it was found that responses to risk are influenced by 
adjustment strategies and the attractiveness of outcomes associated with the risky options 
beyond self-interest. A new model of risk perception and responses to risk is proposed that 
views risk perception as influenced by context factors which determine the attractiveness 
of risky outcomes. Accordingly, this thesis shows that responses to risk are determined by 
more than a calculation of given probabilities and outcomes associated with an event or 
object, but depend on the individual’s representation of the risk.  
In order to further understand the relationship between risk perception and responses 
to risk the focus needs to move beyond the object or event associated with the risk itself 
and needs to integrate the reactions and adjustment processes of the individuals affected by 
the risky event. This thesis is a first step towards this end. It appears that when the 
transactional conception of risk perception and responses to risk is pursued further, we can 
increase our understanding of how to enable people to live well in a fundamentally 
uncertain world. 
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Appendix A 
Instructions of individual choice task varying regarding the formulation of the 
certain option 
You have completed the introduction and practice rounds for the next part of the study. 
In this part of the study lotteries will be presented to you in tables. The structure of the tables 
is equivalent to the ones just practiced. In each row of the table you have to decide whether 
you buy a ticket for a lottery, which is offered to you, or not (In each row of the table you 
have to decide between two lotteries: Option B or Option A). The lottery choices are inde-
pendent of one another. The consequences of the lottery affect only you personally. The pay-
off of the lottery depends on a coin toss. The probability of heads or tails is 50 % respectively. 
At the end of the study one your lottery choices will be drawn randomly and played out. 
1200 Taler are equivalent to 1 €. If you have any questions at this point please turn to the lab 
assistants. When you are ready to continue, please press OK. 
To read the instructions and to complete the table you have 3 minutes. In each of the 
rows of the table depicted below you see a lottery and its respective price to participate (In 
each of the rows of the table depicted below you see two lottery options: Option A and Option 
B). 
The payoff of the lottery depends on a coin toss. The probability of heads or tails is 50 
% respectively. The lotteries are independent of one another. 
Please decide in each row, if you buy a ticket for the respective lottery or not (between 
Option A and Option B). At the end of the study one your choices will be drawn randomly 
and played out. Your decisions are regarding real money!  
214 
 
Appendix B  
Instructions for the interpersonal choice task varying regarding the formulation 
of the certain option 
You have completed the introduction and practice rounds for the next part of the study. 
In this part of the study lotteries will be presented to you in tables. The structure of the tables 
is equivalent to the ones just practiced. In each row of the table you have to decide whether 
you buy a ticket for a lottery, which is offered to you, or not (In each row of the table you 
have to decide between two lotteries: Option B or Option A). In this part there are two types 
of participants: Decision makers and recipients. You are a decision maker. Your decisions do 
not only have consequences for you personally but also for another person, the recipient. The 
recipient is another participant who is randomly assigned to you. It holds that: You will not 
interact with the other, or receive information about his/her identity. The other will receive 
information at the end of the study that he received payoffs through choices of another person, 
but not through whom. The payoff of the lottery depends on a coin toss. The probability of 
heads or tails is 50 % respectively. 
At the end of the study one your lottery choices will be drawn randomly and played out. 
1200 Taler are equivalent to 1 €. If you have any questions at this point please turn to the lab 
assistants. When you are ready to continue, please press OK. 
To read the instructions and to complete the table you have 3 minutes. In each of the 
rows of the table depicted below you see a lottery and its respective price to participate (In 
each of the rows of the table depicted below you see two lottery options: Option A and Option 
B). 
There are two types of participants: Decision makers and recipients. You are a decision 
maker. Your decisions do not only have consequences for you personally but also for the re-
cipient. The recipient is another participant who is randomly assigned to you.  
It holds that: You will not interact with the recipient, or receive information about 
his/her identity. The recipient will receive information at the end of the study that he received 
payoffs through choices of another person, but not through whom.  
The payoff of the lottery depends on a coin toss. The probability of heads or tails is 50 
% respectively. The lotteries are independent of one another. 
Please decide in each row, if you buy a ticket for the respective lottery or not (between 
Option A and Option B). 
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At the end of the study one your choices will be drawn randomly and played out. Your 
decisions are regarding real money! 
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Appendix C 
Example of individual choice task with the certain option portrayed as price 
 Lottery Price Do you buy a 
ticket? 
 You get in case of    
 Heads Tails   
1. 1500 2500 1500 Yes / No 
2. 1500 2500 1600 Yes / No 
3. 1500 2500 1700 Yes / No 
4. 1500 2500 1800 Yes / No 
5. 1500 2500 1900 Yes / No 
6. 1500 2500 2000 Yes / No 
7. 1500 2500 2100 Yes / No 
8. 1500 2500 2200 Yes / No 
9. 1500 2500 2300 Yes / No 
10. 1500 2500 2400 Yes / No 
11. 1500 2500 2500 Yes / No 
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Appendix D 
Example of individual choice task with the certain option portrayed as sure gain 
 Option A Option B Your Choice 
 You get in case of You get in case of  
 Heads Tails Heads or Tails  
1. 1500 2500 1500 A / B 
2. 1500 2500 1600 A / B 
3. 1500 2500 1700 A / B 
4. 1500 2500 1800 A / B 
5. 1500 2500 1900 A / B 
6. 1500 2500 2000 A / B 
7. 1500 2500 2100 A / B 
8. 1500 2500 2200 A / B 
9. 1500 2500 2300 A / B 
10. 1500 2500 2400 A / B 
11. 1500 2500 2500 A / B 
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Appendix E 
Example of interpersonal choice task with certain option portrayed as price 
 Lottery Price Without the 
lottery the other 
will get 
Do you 
buy a 
ticket? 
 You get in case of The other gets in 
case of 
   
 Heads Tails Heads Tails    
1. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1500 0 Yes / No 
2. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1600 0 Yes / No 
3. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1700 0 Yes / No 
4. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1800 0 Yes / No 
5. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1900 0 Yes / No 
6. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2000 0 Yes / No 
7. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2100 0 Yes / No 
8. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2200 0 Yes / No 
9. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2300 0 Yes / No 
10. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2400 0 Yes / No 
11. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2500 0 Yes / No 
 
 
219 
 
Appendix F 
Example of interpersonal choice task with certain option portrayed as sure gain 
 Option A Option B Your 
Choice 
 You get in case 
of 
The recipient 
gets in case of  
You get in case 
of 
The other gets 
in case of 
 
 Heads Tails Heads Tails Heads or Tails Heads or Tails  
1. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1500 0 A / B 
2. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1600 0 A / B 
3. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1700 0 A / B 
4. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1800 0 A / B 
5. 1500 2500 1500 2500 1900 0 A / B 
6. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2000 0 A / B 
7. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2100 0 A / B 
8. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2200 0 A / B 
9. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2300 0 A / B 
10. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2400 0 A / B 
11. 1500 2500 1500 2500 2500 0 A / B 
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Appendix G 
Instructions of the dictator game 
In the next part of the study different distributions of money will be presented to you. In 
the task you have to decide, how much of the money you want to give to a randomly assigned 
other participant. 
It holds that: You will not interact with the other participant or receive information 
about his/her identity. The recipient will receive information at the end of the study that he 
received payoffs through choices of another person, but not through whom.  
The decisions that you make in the next task influence your payoffs that you will re-
ceive at the end of the study. 
At the end of the study one of your choices will be selected randomly and paid out. 
1200 Taler equal 1 €. 
If you have any questions at this point please turn to the lab assistants. When you are 
ready to continue, please press OK. 
In the table below you see 21 rows with paired payoffs: Payoffs for you personally and 
payoffs for another participant. The other participant is now randomly assigned to you. Please 
indicate which distributions of the 2000 Taler you accept. At the end of the study one of your 
decisions is picked at random and paid out. 
In this part 1200 Taler equal 1 €. You have 6 minutes to complete the table. 
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Appendix H 
Dictator game choice matrix 
 Distribrution of Payoffs Do you accept the distribution 
 You get The other gets  
1. 2000 0 Yes / No 
2. 1900 100 Yes / No 
3. 1800 200 Yes / No 
4. 1700 300 Yes / No 
5. 1600 400 Yes / No 
6. 1500 500 Yes / No 
7. 1400 600 Yes / No 
8. 1300 700 Yes / No 
9. 1200 800 Yes / No 
10. 1100 900 Yes / No 
11. 1000 1000 Yes / No 
12. 900 1100 Yes / No 
13. 800 1200 Yes / No 
14. 700 1300 Yes / No 
15. 600 1400 Yes / No 
16. 500 1500 Yes / No 
17. 400 1600 Yes / No 
18. 300 1700 Yes / No 
19. 200 1800 Yes / No 
20. 100 1900 Yes / No 
21. 0 2000 Yes / No 
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Appendix I 
Items of Portraits Values Questionnaire (PVQ) (Schwartz et al., 2001) translated 
into German (Schmidt et al., 2007) 
For each portrait, respondents answer: “How much like you is this person?” The re-
sponse alternatives are; “very much like me”, “like me”, “somewhat like me”, “a little like 
me”, “not like me”, and “not like me at all”. For each portrait, respondents choose their re-
sponse by checking one of six boxes labeled with the response alternatives. 
Rating Items from 1 (not like me at all) to 6 (very much like me). 
Benevolence 
12. It's very important to him to help the people around him. He wants to care for other 
people.  
18. It is important to him to be loyal to his friends. He wants to devote himself to people 
close to him.  
27. It is important to him to respond to the needs of others. He tries to support those he 
knows. 
33. Forgiving people who might have wronged him is important to him. He tries to see 
what is good in them and not to hold a grudge. 
Universalism 
3. He thinks it is important that every person in the world be treated equally. He wants 
justice for everybody, even for people he doesn’t know.  
8. It is important to him to listen to people who are different from him. Even when he 
disagrees with them, he still wants to understand them.  
19. He strongly believes that people should care for nature. Looking after the environ-
ment is important to him.  
23. He believes all the worlds’ people should live in harmony. Promoting peace among 
all groups in the world is important to him. 
29. He wants everyone to be treated justly, even people he doesn’t know. It is important 
to him to protect the weak in society. 
40. It is important to him to adapt to nature and to fit into it. He believes that people 
should not change nature. 
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Self-direction 
1. Thinking up new ideas and being creative is important to him. He likes to do things in 
his own original way.  
11. It is important to him to make his own decisions about what he does. He likes to be 
free to plan and to choose his activities for himself.  
22. He thinks it's important to be interested in things. He likes to be curious and to try to 
understand all sorts of things. 
34. It is important to him to be independent. He likes to rely on himself. 
Stimulation 
6. He thinks it is important to do lots of different things in life. He always looks for new 
things to try.  
15. He likes to take risks. He is always looking for adventures.  
30. He likes surprises. It is important to him to have an exciting life.  
Hedonism 
10. He seeks every chance he can to have fun. It is important to him to do things that 
give him pleasure. 
26. Enjoying life’s pleasures is important to him. He likes to ‘spoil’ himself.  
37. He really wants to enjoy life. Having a good time is very important to him.  
Achievement 
4. It's very important to him to show his abilities. He wants people to admire what he 
does.  
13. Being very successful is important to him. He likes to impress other people.  
24. He thinks it is important to be ambitious. He wants to show how capable he is. 
32. Getting ahead in life is important to him. He strives to do better than others. 
Power 
2. It is important to him to be rich. He wants to have a lot of money and expensive 
things.  
17. It is important to him to be in charge and tell others what to do. He wants people to 
do what he says. 
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39. He always wants to be the one who makes the decisions. He likes to be the leader. 
Security 
5. It is important to him to live in secure surroundings. He avoids anything that might 
endanger his safety. 
14. It is very important to him that his country be safe from threats from within and 
without. He is concerned 
that social order be protected.  
21. It is important to him that things be organized and clean. He doesn’t want things to 
be a mess. 
31. He tries hard to avoid getting sick. Staying healthy is very important to him. 
35. Having a stable government is important to him. He is concerned that the social or-
der be protected. 
Conformity 
7. He believes that people should do what they're told. He thinks people should follow 
rules at all times, even when no-one is watching.  
16. It is important to him always to behave properly. He wants to avoid doing anything 
people would say is wrong.  
28. It is important to him to be obedient. He believes he should always show respect to 
his parents and to older people. 
36. It is important to him to be polite to other people all the time. He tries never to dis-
turb or irritate others. 
Tradition 
9. He thinks it's important not to ask for more than what you have. He believes that peo-
ple should be satisfied with what they have. 
20. Religious belief is important to him. He tries hard to do what his religion requires. 
25. He believes it is best to do things in traditional ways. It is important to him to follow 
the customs he has learned.  
38. It is important to him to be humble and modest. He tries not to draw attention to 
himself.  
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Appendix J 
Risk attitude classification for all participants based on lottery choices depending on choice context 
Table J1: Risk attitude classification of participants in experiment 1. 
Number 
of safe 
choices 
Risk 
attitude 
individual context lottery interpersonal context lottery 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
% Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% 
0 risk-
seeking 
1.7 1.7 .8 .8 2.5 2.5 .8 .8 9.2 9.2 8.3 8.3 15.0 15.0 6.7 6.7 
1 .8 2.5 1.7 2.5 1.7 4.2 1.7 2.5 4.2 13.3 1.7 10.0 1.7 16.7 .8 7.5 
2 0 2.5 .8 3.3 .8 5.0 0 2.5 .8 14.2 .8 10.8 .8 17.5 1.7 9.2 
3 0 2.5 2.5 5.8 1.7 6.7 .8 3.3 5.8 20.0 3.3 14.2 5.0 22.5 5.0 14.2 
4 2.5 5.0 7.5 13.3 2.5 9.2 5.0 8.3 7.5 27.5 10.0 24.2 5.8 28.3 3.3 17.5 
5 risk-
neutral 
27.5 32.5 25.0 38.3 25.0 34.2 5.0 13.3 21.7 49.2 20.0 44.2 22.5 50.8 10.0 27.5 
6 risk-
averse 
35.0 67.5 32.5 70.8 35.0 69.2 21.7 35.0 25.0 74.2 27.5 71.7 20.0 70.8 23.3 50.8 
7 12.5 80.0 14.2 85.0 12.5 81.7 12.5 47.5 12.5 86.7 7.5 79.2 15.0 85.8 9.2 60.0 
8 13.3 93.3 5.8 90.8 5.8 87.5 11.7 59.2 7.5 94.2 5.8 85.0 6.7 92.5 5.8 65.8 
9 2.5 95.8 6.7 97.5 5.0 92.5 9.2 68.3 3.3 97.5 2.5 87.5 3.3 95.8 5.0 70.8 
10 3.3 99.2 2.5 100.0 3.3 95.8 8.3 76.7 1.7 99.2 6.7 94.2 1.7 97.5 9.2 80.0 
11 .8 100.0 0 100.0 4.2 100.0 23.3 100.0 .8 100.0 5.8 100.0 2.5 100.0 20.0 100.0 
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Appendix K 
Frequency of inconsistent choices in individual and interpersonal choice context 
in Experiment 1 
Table K1: Inconsistent choices in experiment 1. 
Choice Context Frequency of 
inconsistent choices 
Number of 
participants 
Percent 
Individual 0 102 85.0 
 1 9 7.5 
 2 4 3.3 
 3 4 3.3 
 4 1 .8 
 Total 120 100 % 
Interpersonal 0 101 84.2 % 
 1 10 8.3 % 
 2 4 3.3 % 
 3 3 2.5 % 
 4 2 1.7 % 
 Total 120 100 % 
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Appendix L 
Relationship between inconsistent choices in individual and interpersonal choice 
context in Experiment 1 
Table L1: Cross tabs for inconsistent choices in interpersonal and individual choice tasks. 
N = 120  Frequency of inconsistent choice in individual context  
  0 1 2 3 4 Total 
Frequency 
of 
inconsistent 
choices in 
interpersonal 
context 
0 92 5 3 1 0 101 
1 6 4 0 0 0 10 
2 3 0 1 0 0 4 
3 1 0 0 1 1 3 
4 0 0 0 2 0 2 
Total 102 9 4 4 1 120 
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Appendix M 
Descriptive statistics for of risk attitudes in experiment 1 (uncorrected dataset) 
Table M1: Mean risk attitudes and standard deviations for each choice task and choice context. 
   Descriptive Statistics 
Choice context  Choice task Frame of certain 
option 
Mean SD N 
individual 1 Sure gain .94 .10 66 
  Price to pay .90 .12 54 
  Total .92 .11 120 
 2 Sure gain .94 .16 66 
  Price to pay .87 .19 54 
  Total .91 .17 120 
 3 Sure gain .96 .11 66 
  Price to pay .92 .10 54 
  Total .94 .10 120 
 4 Sure gain .84 .18 66 
  Price to pay .77 .14 54 
  Total .81 .17 120 
Interpersonal  1 Sure gain 1.03 .17 66 
  Price to pay .94 .14 54 
  Total .99 .16 120 
 2 Sure gain .99 .31 66 
  Price to pay .86 .21 54 
  Total .93 .27 120 
 3 Sure gain 1.03 .15 66 
  Price to pay .96 .11 54 
  Total 1.00 .14 120 
 4 Sure gain .92 .22 66 
  Price to pay .82 .19 54 
  Total .87 .21 120 
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Appendix N 
Descriptive statistics for of risk attitudes in experiment 1 (only consistent 
participants) 
Table N1: Mean risk attitudes and standard deviations for each choice task and choice context. 
   Descriptive Statistics 
Choice context  Choice task Frame of certain 
option 
Mean SD N 
individual 1 Sure gain .93 .10 46 
  Price to pay .89 .12 46 
  Total .91 .12 92 
 2 Sure gain .92 .12 46 
  Price to pay .86 .20 46 
  Total .89 .16 92 
 3 Sure gain .95 .09 46 
  Price to pay .92 .11 46 
  Total .93 .10 92 
 4 Sure gain .83 .18 46 
  Price to pay .76 .14 46 
  Total .79 .17 92 
Interpersonal  1 Sure gain 1.01 .16 46 
  Price to pay .93 .15 46 
  Total .97 .16 92 
 2 Sure gain .96 .30 46 
  Price to pay .85 .21 46 
  Total .91 .27 92 
 3 Sure gain 1.02 .15 46 
  Price to pay .95 .12 46 
  Total .98 .14 92 
 4 Sure gain .90 .22 46 
  Price to pay .81 .18 46 
  Total .86 .20 92 
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Appendix O 
Giving in the dictator game 
Table O1: Frequency of transferred amount in percent of the endowment. 
Proportion of 
endowment 
transferred in % 
Frequency Percent of 
participants 
Cumulative Percent 
.00 27 24.8 24.8 
5.00 5 4.6 29.4 
10.00 7 6.4 35.8 
15.00 4 3.7 39.4 
20.00 2 1.8 41.3 
25.00 4 3.7 45.0 
30.00 3 2.8 47.7 
35.00 4 3.7 51.4 
40.00 3 2.8 54.1 
45.00 5 4.6 58.7 
50.00 27 24.8 83.5 
55.00 3 2.8 86.2 
60.00 6 5.5 91.7 
65.00 4 3.7 95.4 
70.00 1 .9 96.3 
75.00 1 .9 97.2 
80.00 3 2.8 100.0 
Total 109 100.0  
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Appendix P 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with equal payoffs with giving in dictator game, certain 
option = sure gain 
 
Figure P1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
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Appendix Q 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with equal payoffs with giving in dictator game, certain 
option = price to pay 
 
Figure Q1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
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Appendix R 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with disadvantageous payoffs with giving in dictator game, 
certain option = sure gain 
 
Figure R1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
Percent of endowment transferred
80,0060,0040,0020,000,00
C
h
a
n
g
e
 o
f 
ri
s
k
 a
tt
it
u
d
e
 i
n
 p
e
rc
e
n
t 
o
f 
th
e
 e
x
p
e
c
te
d
 v
a
lu
e
 -
  
In
te
rp
e
rs
o
n
a
l 
lo
tt
e
ry
 w
it
h
 e
q
u
a
l 
p
a
y
o
ff
1,00
0,50
0,00
-0,50
-1,00
Frame: sure gain
R Sq Linear = 0,033
234 
 
Appendix S 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with disadvantageous payoffs with giving in dictator game, 
certain option = price to pay 
 
Figure S1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
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Appendix T 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with advantageous payoffs with giving in dictator game, 
certain option = sure gain 
 
Figure T1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
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Appendix U 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with advantageous payoffs with giving in dictator game, 
certain option = price to pay  
 
Figure U1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
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Appendix V 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with equal payoffs and high variance with giving in dictator 
game, certain option = sure gain 
 
Figure V1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
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Appendix W 
Scatter plot and regression slope, predicting change of safe decisions in 
interpersonal lottery with equal payoffs and high variance with giving in dictator 
game, certain option = price to pay 
 
Figure W1: Scatterplot and regression slope for endowment transferred in the dictator game with 
change of risk attitude in risky choices depending on context. 
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Appendix X 
Correlation between individual importance of situational aspects and the change 
of the risk attitude in the interpersonal lottery, certain option = sure gain 
Table X1: Correlation coefficients of changes of risk attitude and importance of situational 
characteristics. 
N = 26   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Responsibility Pearson’s r 1       
  Sig. (2-tailed)        
Personal payoff Pearson’s r -.051 1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .806       
Recipient’s 
payoff 
Pearson’s r .445* -.246 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .226      
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 1 
Pearson’s r .118 -.144 .392* 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .565 .482 .048     
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 2  
Pearson’s r .285 -.333 .472* .434** 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .158 .096 .015 .000    
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 3 
Pearson’s r .002 -.209 .170 .463** .492** 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .993 .307 .406 .000 .000   
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 4 
Pearson’s r .156 -.168 .200 .297* .416** .475** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .446 .413 .327 .015 .001 .000  
**.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
*.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
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Appendix Y 
Correlation between individual importance of situational aspects and the change 
of risk attitude in the interpersonal lottery for certain option = price to pay 
Table Y1: Correlation coefficients of changes of risk attitude and importance of situational 
characteristics. 
N = 26   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Responsibility Pearson’s r 1       
  Sig. (2-tailed)        
Personal payoff Pearson’s r -.179 1      
  Sig. (2-tailed) .383       
Recipient’s 
payoff 
Pearson’s r .510 -.123 1     
  Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .549      
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 1 
Pearson’s r -.115 -.183 .144 1    
Sig. (2-tailed) .578 .372 .483     
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 2  
Pearson’s r -.124 .232 -.105 .354* 1   
Sig. (2-tailed) .547 .254 .611 .009    
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 3 
Pearson’s r .251 -.136 -.161 .399* .298* 1  
Sig. (2-tailed) .217 .507 .432 .003 .028   
Change of risk 
attitude in 
choice task 4 
Pearson’s r .072 -.085 -.250 -.027 .145 .145 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .727 .680 .217 .848 .294 .297  
**.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
*.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
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Appendix Z 
Correlation between personal values and change of risk attitude for certain option = sure gain 
Table Z1: Correlation coefficients for personal values and change of risk attitude. 
N = 49   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Universalism (1) Pearson’s r 1              
Sig. 2-tailed               
Stimulation (2) 
  
Pearson’s r -.009 1             
Sig. 2-tailed .953              
Benevolence (3) 
  
Pearson’s r .488** .136 1            
Sig. 2-tailed .000 .352             
Security (4) 
  
Pearson’s r -.040 -.374** -.193 1           
Sig. 2-tailed .783 .008 .184            
Performance (5) 
  
Pearson’s r .119 .174 -.087 .447** 1          
Sig. 2-tailed .415 .231 .553 .001           
Conformism (6) 
  
Pearson’s r -.051 -.148 .214 .398** .209 1         
Sig. 2-tailed .728 .309 .139 .005 .149          
Tradition (7) 
  
Pearson’s r -.037 .029 .405** .026 -.156 .397** 1        
Sig. 2-tailed .799 .845 .004 .858 .285 .005         
Power (8) 
  
Pearson’s r .002 -.102 -.235 .384** .489** -.103 -.197 1       
Sig. 2-tailed .992 .486 .105 .006 .000 .482 .175        
Self-determination (9) 
  
Pearson’s r .351* .511** .095 -.024 .406** -.078 -.113 .163 1      
Sig. 2-tailed .013 .000 .517 .871 .004 .594 .440 .263       
Hedonism (10) Pearson’s r -.087 .533** .039 -.110 .099 -.033 -.234 .061 .520** 1     
Sig. 2-tailed .553 .000 .792 .453 .501 .820 .105 .676 .000      
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 1 (11) 
Pearson’s r .139 -.196 .141 .132 -.119 .178 .057 -.175 -.159 -.006 1    
Sig. 2-tailed .341 .178 .334 .366 .414 .221 .699 .229 .276 .969     
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 2 (12) 
Pearson’s r .184 -.360* .204 .176 -.100 .178 -.028 .042 -.192 -.106 .434** 1   
Sig. 2-tailed .205 .011 .159 .226 .494 .220 .850 .774 .186 .469 .000    
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 3 (13) 
Pearson’s r .332* .076 .308* .122 .057 .121 .081 -.138 .162 .116 .463** .492** 1  
Sig. 2-tailed .020 .604 .031 .402 .696 .409 .581 .345 .266 .427 .000 .000   
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 4 (14) 
Pearson’s r .340* -.131 .162 .066 .228 .080 -.034 .200 .034 -.157 .297* .416** .475** 1 
Sig. 2-tailed .017 .369 .267 .652 .115 .587 .818 .168 .814 .283 .015 .001 .000  
**.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
*.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
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Appendix AA 
Correlation between personal values and change of risk attitude for certain option = price to pay 
Table AA1: Correlation coefficients for personal values and change of risk attitude. 
N = 41   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Universalism (1) Pearson’s r 1              
Sig. 2-tailed               
Stimulation (2) Pearson’s r .204 1             
Sig. 2-tailed .201              
Benevolence (3) 
 
Pearson’s r .569** .288 1            
Sig. 2-tailed .000 .068             
Security (4) Pearson’s r -.122 -.027 .156 1           
Sig. 2-tailed .447 .867 .331            
Performance (5) Pearson’s r -.098 .405 .088 .414* 1          
Sig. 2-tailed .541 .009 .586 .007           
Conformism (6) 
 
Pearson’s r .141 -.042 .453 .497* .303 1         
Sig. 2-tailed .380 .792 .003 .001 .054          
Tradition (7) Pearson’s r .146 .136 .502** .336 .111 .506** 1        
Sig. 2-tailed .363 .396 .001 .032 .491 .001         
Power (8) Pearson’s r -.219 .253 -.415 .163 .360* -.263 -.139 1       
Sig. 2-tailed .170 .110 .007 .309 .021 .096 .386        
Self-determination (9) Pearson’s r .196 .700** .324 -.077 .391 -.077 .100 .107 1      
Sig. 2-tailed .220 .000 .039 .632 .011 .633 .532 .505       
Hedonism (10) Pearson’s r .172 .638** .234 .103 .260 -.059 -.125 .119 .375 1     
Sig. 2-tailed .282 .000 .140 .523 .101 .713 .437 .457 .016      
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 1 (11) 
Pearson’s r -.060 -.145 -.067 -.045 .175 .074 -.027 -.107 -.098 -.039 1    
Sig. 2-tailed .711 .366 .675 .779 .273 .647 .866 .505 .543 .810     
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 2 (12) 
Pearson’s r -.092 -.184 -.266 -.067 .131 -.235 -.176 .172 -.133 -.037 .354* 1   
Sig. 2-tailed .565 .250 .093 .676 .414 .138 .272 .283 .408 .816 .009    
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 3 (13) 
Pearson’s r -.264 -.225 -.422* .015 .226 -.034 -.223 .118 -.278 -.165 .399* .298* 1  
Sig. 2-tailed .095 .158 .006 .928 .156 .832 .161 .462 .079 .302 .003 .028   
Change of risk attitude 
in choice task 4 (14) 
Pearson’s r -.091 .080 -.084 -.181 -.031 .013 .055 -.206 .011 .024 -.027 .145 .145 1 
Sig. 2-tailed .573 .619 .601 .257 .849 .935 .731 .197 .947 .881 .848 .294 .297  
**.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
*.  Correlation is significant at the          level 2-tailed. 
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Appendix BB 
Risk attitude classification for all participants based on lottery choices depending on choice context for experiment 2 
Table BB1: Risk attitude classification of participants in experiment 2. 
Numbe
r of 
safe 
choices 
Risk 
attitude 
individual context lottery interpersonal context lottery 
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
% Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% % Cum% 
0 
risk-
seeking 
.8 .8 1.6 1.6 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.1 2.3 2.3 3.1 3.1 4.7 4.7 4.7 4.7 
1 0 .8 0 1.6 0 2.3 0 3.1 .8 3.1 0 3.1 0 4.7 0 4.7 
2 0 .8 1.6 3.1 0 2.3 .8 3.9 .8 3.9 .8 3.9 0 4.7 .8 5.5 
3 2.3 3.1 2.3 5.5 .8 3.1 1.6 5.5 0 3.9 2.3 6.3 2.3 7.0 1.6 7.0 
4 5.5 8.6 4.7 10.2 7.0 10.2 3.1 8.6 1.6 5.5 3.1 9.4 4.7 11.7 3.1 10.2 
5 
risk-
neutral 
21.1 29.7 23.4 33.6 24.2 34.4 14.8 23.4 28.1 33.6 25.0 34.4 24.2 35.9 12.5 22.7 
6 
risk-
averse 
22.7 52.3 21.1 54.7 19.5 53.9 12.5 35.9 18.8 52.3 21.9 56.3 19.5 55.5 15.6 38.3 
7 10.2 62.5 13.3 68.0 11.7 65.6 7.0 43.0 14.8 67.2 7.0 63.3 13.3 68.8 6.3 44.5 
8 12.5 75.0 7.8 75.8 12.5 78.1 4.7 47.7 7.0 74.2 12.5 75.8 7.8 76.6 7.0 51.6 
9 6.3 81.3 10.2 85.9 7.8 85.9 8.6 56.3 7.0 81.3 4.7 80.5 7.0 83.6 10.2 61.7 
10 14.1 95.3 10.2 96.1 6.3 92.2 18.0 74.2 13.3 94.5 12.5 93.0 7.8 91.4 18.0 79.7 
11 4.7 100.0 3.9 100.0 7.8 100.0 25.8 100.0 5.5 100.0 7.0 100.0 8.6 100.0 20.3 100.0 
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Appendix CC 
Frequency of inconsistent choices in individual and interpersonal choice context 
in experiment 2 
Table CC1: Inconsistent choices in experiment 2. 
Choice Context Frequency of 
inconsistent choices 
Number of 
participants 
Percent 
Individual 0 113 88.3 
 1 5 3.9 
 2 4 3.1 
 3 2 1.6 
 4 4 3.1 
 Total 128 100.0 
Interpersonal 0 114 89.1 
 1 6 4.7 
 2 3 2.3 
 3 2 1.6 
 4 3 2.3 
 Total 128 100.0 
 
 245 
 
Appendix DD 
Relationship between inconsistent choices in individual and interpersonal choice 
context in experiment 2 
Table DD1: Cross tabs for inconsistent choices in interpersonal and individual choice tasks. 
N = 128  Frequency of inconsistent choice in individual context  
  0 1 2 3 4 Total 
Frequency 
of 
inconsistent 
choices in 
interpersonal 
context 
0 106 4 1 2 1 114 
1 4 1 1 0 0 6 
2 2 0 1 0 0 3 
3 1 0 1 0 0 2 
4 0 0 0 0 3 3 
Total 113 5 4 2 4 128 
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Appendix EE 
Descriptive statistics for of risk attitudes in experiment 2 (uncorrected dataset) 
Table EE1: Mean risk attitudes and standard deviations for each choice task and choice context. 
   Descriptive Statistics 
Choice context  Choice task Perspective Taking  Mean SD N 
individual 1 Yes .89 .15 68 
  No .87 .13 60 
  Total .88 .14 128 
 2 Yes .86 .23 68 
  No .83 .19 60 
  Total .85 .21 128 
 3 Yes .93 .12 68 
  No .92 .10 60 
  Total .92 .11 128 
 4 Yes .83 .21 68 
  No .78 .17 60 
  Total .81 .19 128 
Interpersonal  1 Yes .90 .16 68 
  No .88 .14 60 
  Total .89 .15 128 
 2 Yes .85 .24 68 
  No .84 .23 60 
  Total .85 .24 128 
 3 Yes .92 .13 68 
  No .94 .12 60 
  Total .93 .12 128 
 4 Yes .85 .21 68 
  No .80 .17 60 
  Total .83 .19 128 
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Appendix FF 
Descriptive statistics for of risk attitudes in experiment 2 (only consistent 
participants) 
Table FF1: Mean risk attitudes and standard deviations for each choice task and choice context. 
   Descriptive Statistics 
Choice context  Choice task Perspective Taking  Mean SD N 
individual 1 Yes .88 .15 59 
  No .86 .12 47 
  Total .87 .14 106 
 2 Yes .85 .22 59 
  No .81 .18 47 
  Total .83 .20 106 
 3 Yes .91 .11 59 
  No .91 .11 47 
  Total .91 .11 106 
 4 Yes .82 .20 59 
  No .76 .16 47 
  Total .80 .19 106 
Interpersonal  1 Yes .88 .13 59 
  No .88 .14 47 
  Total .88 .14 106 
 2 Yes .85 .24 59 
  No .83 .24 47 
  Total .84 .24 106 
 3 Yes .92 .11 59 
  No .93 .12 47 
  Total .92 .11 106 
 4 Yes .84 .21 59 
  No .78 .15 47 
  Total .81 .19 106 
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Appendix GG 
Correlations between personal values and change of risk attitude in interpersonal 
choices, empathy = high 
Table GG126: Correlation coefficients of changes of risk attitude and personal values priorities. 
N = 68  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Universalism 
(1) 
Pearson’s 
r 
1         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
         
Stimulation 
(2) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.104 1        
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.400         
Self-
determination 
(3) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.355** .449** 1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.003 .000        
Benevolence 
(4) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.506** .114 .345** 1      
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .357 .004       
Security (5) Pearson’s 
r 
.222 .015 .202 .274* 1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.068 .900 .099 .024      
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
1 (6) 
Pearson’s 
r 
-.042 -.041 -.057 -.216 -
.057 
1    
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.735 .740 .646 .077 .647     
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
2 (7) 
Pearson’s 
r 
-.023 .014 -.049 .047 -
.003 
.284* 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.854 .909 .690 .705 .979 .019    
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
3 (8) 
Pearson’s 
r 
-.167 -.005 -.128 -.081 -
.018 
.424** .426** 1  
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.173 .967 .299 .512 .884 .000 .000   
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
4 (9) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.033 -.148 -.102 -.111 .213 .401** .322** .668** 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.789 .229 .408 .366 .081 .001 .007 .000  
**. Correlation is significant on the         level. 
*. Correlation is significant on the         level. 
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Appendix HH 
Correlations between personal values and change of risk attitude in interpersonal 
choices, empathy = low. 
Table HH1: Correlation coefficients of changes of risk attitude and personal values priorities. 
N = 60  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Universalism 
(1) 
Pearson’s 
r 
1         
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
         
Stimulation 
(2) 
Pearson’s 
r 
-.005 1        
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.968         
Self-
determination 
(3) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.036 .519** 1       
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.786 .000        
Benevolence 
(4) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.510** -.104 -
.015 
1      
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.000 .430 .909       
Security (5) Pearson’s 
r 
.120 -.267* .101 .146 1     
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.361 .039 .442 .267      
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
1 (6) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.173 -.266* -
.179 
.161 .010 1    
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.186 .040 .171 .218 .938     
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
2 (7) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.208 -.300* -
.143 
.151 .120 .662* 1   
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.110 .020 .276 .248 .361 .000    
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
3 (8) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.144 -.072 -
.104 
-
.115 
.056 .542** .513** 1  
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.271 .583 .428 .380 .670 .000 .000   
Change of 
risk attitude 
in choice task 
4 (9) 
Pearson’s 
r 
.052 -.045 -
.096 
.140 -
.002 
.082 .157 .327* 1 
Sig. (2-
tailed) 
.692 .730 .464 .288 .990 .532 .230 .011  
**. Correlation is significant on the         level. 
*. Correlation is significant on the         level. 
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